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I. INTRODUCTION 
In The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century,1 we 
surveyed the first seven presidencies under the Constitution to 
determine the view of presidential power held by the incumbents 
during that period. We found that from 1789 to 1837, American 
presidents from Washington to Jackson strongly believed in a unitary 
executive of the kind defended by many scholars in recent years, 
including Professor Calabresi.2 In particular, we established that the 
first seven presidents vigorously defended the president’s unitary 
authority over the execution of federal law. We also concluded that 
many of these presidents believed the Vesting Clause of Article II 
was a direct grant of power to the president, as Professor Calabresi 
has previously argued in a debate with Professors Lawrence Lessig 
and Cass Sunstein.3 
We now pick up our survey where we left off in the prior article 
and examine the presidencies during the second half-century of our 
nation’s history to see what view these men held on the scope of the 
president’s power to execute the law. In so doing, we focus primarily 
on three mechanisms generally viewed as essential to any theory of 
the unitary executive: the president’s power to remove subordinate 
policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the 
manner in which subordinate officials exercise discretionary 
executive power, and the president’s power to veto or nullify such 
officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power.4 We also 
employ the interpretive methodology known as “departmentalism” or 
“coordinate construction,” which is based on the principle that all 
three branches of the federal government have the competency and 
 
1. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First 
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997). 
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power 
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 
(1992). 
3. Compare Calabresi, supra note 2, at 1378-1400, 1403-05 (arguing that the Article II 
Vesting Clause represents a substantive grant of constitutional power); Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 2, at 563-64, 570-81, 612-13 (same); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 
2, at 1165-70, 1175-81, 1186-1206 (same), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-55, 119 (1994) (disagreeing 
with Professor Calabresi’s views). 
4. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1458. 
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responsibility to interpret the Constitution and that the meaning of the 
Constitution is determined through the dynamic interaction of all 
three branches.5 
As we shall see, presidential power ebbed and flowed several times 
during the second fifty years under the Constitution. Congress 
reasserted itself and remained ascendant in the years following 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency until the crisis of the Civil War, which 
led the country to look to the president for leadership once again. 
Throughout these various shifts in the relative power of the branches 
and regardless of which party was in power, presidents generally 
defended their sole authority to execute the federal laws. Although 
some deviations from the unitary executive model did occur during 
this period, they were not so significant as to constitute presidential 
acquiescence to congressional interference with presidential execution 
of the laws. 
We begin in Part I with the history of the unitary executive in the 
years leading up to and including the Civil War and trace in Part II the 
pivotal presidencies of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. These 
years culminated with a remarkable but ultimately unsuccessful attack 
on the unitary executive when Congress impeached but failed to 
remove Johnson from office because of his decision to fire Secretary 
of War Stanton in violation of the Tenure of Office Act. We turn in 
Part III to the reclamation of presidential power during the years 
following Johnson’s disastrous presidency. All told, our survey covers 
the years from 1837 to 1889, during which the Tenure of Office Act 
was repealed after Congress finally saw it as the constitutional 
monstrosity it truly was. 
II. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE  
JACKSONIAN PERIOD, 1837-1861 
By modern standards, the eight presidential administrations 
between the Jackson and Lincoln administrations were generally 
unremarkable, both in terms of historical significance and executive 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, historical review convincingly 
demonstrates that the actions and words of these presidents reflected a 
consistent desire to protect the constitutional powers of the presidency 
against incursions by Congress. Indeed, several presidents during this 
period actually succeeded in expanding the constitutional powers of 
 
5. For a more complete discussion of coordinate construction and its particular 
applicability to separation of powers disputes, see id. at 1463-72. 
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the presidency in a number of important ways. 
But perhaps the best direct evidence that the presidents of this 
period consistently protected their unitary constitutional powers from 
Congress can be found in the words of one of the executive branch’s 
greatest antagonists throughout this period, Henry Clay of Kentucky, 
who commented: 
The executive branch of the government . . . was eternally in 
action; it was ever awake; it never slept; its action was continuous 
and unceasing, like the tides of some mighty river, which 
continued flowing and flowing on, swelling, and deepening, and 
widening, in its onward progress, till it swept away every 
impediment, and broke down and removed every frail obstacle 
which might be set up to impede its course.6 
The presidential history from this period would ultimately 
underscore the truth underlying Clay’s words. 
A. Martin Van Buren 
President Martin Van Buren was not as outspoken as Andrew 
Jackson on the great questions of presidential power that form the 
topic of this series of articles. However, this relative silence was not 
necessarily indicative of a passive view of executive power on Van 
Buren’s part. Rexford Tugwell suggests that Van Buren was as 
responsible as Jackson himself for the development of the spoils 
system and of the powerful Jacksonian national political machine.7 
Indeed, as a New York senator in the 1820s, Van Buren had 
orchestrated the use of lobbying for the removal and appointment of 
federal officials to support the creation of local political machines.8 
He used his tenure in the Jackson administration to nationalize these 
practices, which was one of the chief reasons why Van Buren 
succeeded Jackson to the presidency, despite his lack of popularity 
with much of the Democratic leadership in Congress.9 
Van Buren was generally a loyal follower and implementer of 
Jackson’s views, which is significant given Jackson’s enthusiastic 
embrace of the theory of the unitary executive during the Bank War.10 
 
6. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
1829-1861, at 109 (Macmillan 1967) (1954) (quoting 6 HENRY CLAY, WORKS 309 (Jan. 
24, 1842)). 
7. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY 105-07 (1960). 
8. CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 63-65 (1905). 
9. See TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 105-07. 
10. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1531. 
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Van Buren’s biographer, Major L. Wilson, describes Van Buren’s 
close affinity with Jackson as follows: 
In a public letter accepting the nomination of the Democratic party 
to succeed Andrew Jackson as president, Martin Van Buren 
pictured himself “the honored instrument” of the administration 
party and vowed “to tread generally in the footsteps of President 
Jackson.” Friends welcomed the statement as a pledge to defend 
the work of Jackson . . . . When divested of partisan rhetoric, Van 
Buren’s statement, and others of like tenor, have been taken by 
historians as texts for the persistent interpretation of his presidency 
as the “third term” of Jackson.11 
During his four years in office, Van Buren governed much as 
Andrew Jackson had as the leader of his political party. Van Buren 
held “regular cabinet meetings” but “took no votes in the cabinet and, 
as usual, reserved final decisions for himself.”12 At least two cabinet 
members probably favored a national bank, “[y]et they readily 
deferred to Van Buren’s views of party and presidential power.”13 
Wilson discusses Van Buren’s approach to leadership: 
In regard to key questions in foreign affairs, President Van Buren 
took a direct and active part. He also remained involved in the 
affairs of the Treasury Department, particularly in the aspects of its 
operations that bore upon his proposal[s]. On other and more 
routine matters of administration, by contrast, Van Buren allowed 
virtual autonomy to department heads.14 
Van Buren’s support for the unitary executive is reflected in his 
continuation of Jackson’s policy towards the Treasury Department, 
which, as we have noted earlier, represented perhaps the most 
dramatic conflict over the president’s authority to control the 
execution of the law to take place during the first fifty years of the 
Republic.15 Van Buren adamantly believed that the “keeping and 
disbursing of Treasury funds without congressional safeguards . . . 
gave the president an unchecked control over the nation’s purse and 
 
11. MAJOR L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF MARTIN VAN BUREN xi (1984); see also 
id. at 94 (noting that Daniel Webster also assailed Van Buren for “rejecting a national 
bank solely on the ground of a ‘party pledge’ to follow in Jackson’s footsteps”); JAMES C. 
CURTIS, THE FOX AT BAY: MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1837-1841, at 45 
(1970) (noting that Van Buren pledged during the election of 1836 to continue Jackson’s 
policies). 
12. WILSON, supra note 11, at 70. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 171. 
15. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1538-59. 
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an enormous engine of spoils.”16 This provoked the ire of the Whig 
opposition, who criticized Van Buren for carrying 
to the ultimate limit that tendency under Jackson—with his bank 
veto, his removal of deposits, his ‘Specie Circular’—to wrest the 
control of the Treasury from Congress and to place the nation’s 
purse exclusively under executive power . . . . The forms of 
republican government [would] remain[], but its substance would 
flow to a Treasury Caesar.17 
The Whigs would repeat the cry of “Treasury Caesarism” many 
times.18 
Van Buren’s adherence to the theory of the unitary executive is 
also manifest in his use of the power of removal. Van Buren exercised 
this removal power sparingly at first, since many of the continuing 
appointees were as much his as they were Jackson’s. Leonard White, 
who often uses the heavily patronage-influenced postal service as a 
barometer for presidential removal activity during this period, notes 
that Van Buren removed only 364 of 12,000 postmasters during his 
first two years in office.19 As Van Buren began positioning himself 
within his party for a second term, however, he became more 
aggressive in his use of the removal power, looking beyond mere 
party affiliation and instead emphasizing personal political loyalty to 
his own faction of the Democratic Party.20 Wilson reports that, “[a]s if 
responding to earlier criticisms that he was too passive and fatalistic, 
[Van Buren] began to act in a more vigorous and ‘political’ way. For 
one thing, he surrendered his initial policy of making no outright 
removals from office and began to brandish the ‘pruning knife.’”21 
Van Buren enjoyed the full support of his predecessor in this regard. 
Wilson notes: 
[Andrew Jackson] welcomed and justified the new policy. Arguing 
that the opinions of all officeholders “ought to correspond with the 
Executive in all of his important measures,” Jackson urged [Maj. 
William B.] Lewis to resign as second auditor in the Treasury 
before he was removed. “Rotation in office must from the great 
pressure of public opinion be adopted by the President,” he 
 
16. WILSON, supra note 11, at 114. 
17. Id. at 95. 
18. See id. at 99, 114, 197. 
19. WHITE, supra note 6, at 309. 
20. See id.; see also FISH, supra note 8, at 75; 2 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE 
GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 981-82 (1974). 
21. WILSON, supra note 11, at 130-31. 
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explained.22 
The Van Buren administration’s reliance on the theory of the 
unitary executive as the basis for its authority is reflected in an 
opinion authored by Attorney General Benjamin Butler denying that 
Congress had the right to require collectors of the revenue to disclose 
their reasons for any removals of subordinate officers appointed by 
them. Butler concluded that “constitutional power of removal 
exercised by the President” prevented Congress from forcing the 
president to disclose the reasons underlying his removals and that, by 
analogy, the same principle protected collectors from being required 
to do so.23 Van Buren did accede to two resolutions asking him to 
provide the House with a list of all executive removals since the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1787,24 a resolution with which Van 
Buren complied the following year.25 Passage of this resolution 
prompted no objection from Van Buren, since requiring a list of past 
removals did not in any way purport to limit the president’s ability to 
make further removals in the future.26 An earlier resolution that would 
have established a select committee to inquire into all dismissals and 
to consider restrictions on patronage27 would have been more 
problematic. The House’s failure to pass this resolution obviated any 
need for comment from Van Buren. 
The Van Buren administration did litigate a landmark Supreme 
Court case on the scope of the executive power, Kendall v. United 
States ex rel. Stokes,28 that some scholars have erroneously suggested 
undercuts the unitariness of the executive.29 The case arose when a 
group who had contracted with the post office to transport the mail 
asserted a claim for an additional payment that Postmaster General 
Amos Kendall, a close confidant of Van Buren and Jackson,30 refused 
to pay. The contractors then successfully obtained enactment of 
 
22. Id. at 131. 
23. 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 326 (1838). 
24. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 225 (1839). 
25. H.R. DOC. NO. 26-130 (1840). 
26. See DARRELL H. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 4-6 
(1928). 
27. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1838). 
28. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
29. Lessig and Sunstein discuss the Kendall case at some length. Lessig & Sunstein, 
supra note 3, at 55-61. 
30. The Postmaster General was a key figure in the patronage machine that Jackson and 
Van Buren set up. Kendall was a close ally of Jackson and Van Buren. See CURTIS, supra 
note 11, at 58-60. Kendall had helped Jackson draft his message vetoing the rechartering 
of the Bank of the United States. Id. at 38. 
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private legislation directing the solicitor of the treasury to settle the 
claim in the contractors’ favor. After Kendall continued to refuse to 
honor the award even after the solicitor of the treasury had ruled 
otherwise, the contractors went to court and obtained a writ of 
mandamus from Judge William Cranch of the circuit court of the 
District of Columbia against Kendall obliging him to pay the 
additional money.31 The Supreme Court upheld the issuance of the 
writ of mandamus by a vote of six to three on the grounds that the 
solicitor’s award had left Kendall only to perform a purely ministerial 
act in paying Stokes.32 The Court found Kendall had no executive 
discretion to decline to perform that ministerial act.33 Kendall 
ultimately bowed to the Court’s ruling and paid the additional 
$40,000. 
The case is of landmark significance because it establishes that 
executive branch officials can be ordered by courts to perform 
ministerial duties. Although the Van Buren administration was 
skeptical about the propriety of this conclusion, modern proponents of 
the unitary executive have readily conceded its validity.34 It would be 
a mistake, however, to conclude that Kendall represents acquiescence 
to any limitation of presidential authority to execute the laws. Van 
Buren’s reaction to the pressure from party leaders to pay the 
contractors the additional money is quite telling in this regard: 
Van Buren turned back this pressure, however, and stood by the 
postmaster general. He also supported Kendall’s decision to reject 
a writ of mandamus, which was issued . . . by the circuit court in 
the District of Columbia, ordering the payment of the award. In a 
letter to Judge William Cranch, Kendall based his refusal on a 
sweeping Jacksonian concept of executive power, at once unitary 
in nature and independent of the other branches. The act of any 
executive officer was ultimately the act of the president, he argued, 
and therefore was not liable to direction from the judiciary. He 
wrote: “The Executive is ONE—one in principle, one in object. Its 
object is the execution of the laws. It is not susceptible of 
subdivisions and nice distinctions as to its duties and 
responsibilities.”35 
Attorney General Butler echoed the same themes when arguing the 
case before the Supreme Court when he based his argument on the 
 
31. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 527-35. 
32. Id. at 613. 
33. Id. at 614. 
34. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 1502-03. 
35. WILSON, supra note 11, at 174. 
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celebrated Decision of 1789.36 Butler told the Court: 
This doctrine [of the unitary executive] was also announced and 
established by the congress of 1789, in the debates relative to the 
power of removal . . . . [The theory flowed from] that clause which 
declares that the “executive power shall be vested in the 
President.” From that provision, and from the direction that the 
President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” 
[James Madison] deduced the conclusion, that it was “evidently the 
intention of the constitution, that the first magistrate should be 
responsible for the executive department.” He showed that this 
principle of unity and responsibility was necessary to preserve that 
equilibrium which the constitution intended . . . . But, whether the 
particular question as to the power of removal was correctly 
decided or not; no one, in that debate, disputed the position of Mr. 
Madison and his associates, that the constitution had actually 
vested in the President the whole executive power . . . . The whole 
course of this debate, independently of the conclusion to which it 
came, is, therefore, utterly irreconcilable with the recent suggestion 
adopted and maintained by our learned adversaries; that when the 
constitution says “the executive power shall be vested in a 
President,” it only gives a name to the department, and merely 
means that he shall possess such executive power as the legislature 
shall choose to confer upon him.37 
Even after having lost before the Supreme Court, the administration 
attempted to have the last word by trying to get Congress to enact 
legislation stripping the circuit court of its mandamus power. Van 
Buren made clear that the bill was intended to take away “from the 
judiciary at the seat of government the power to interfere with the 
executive in the performance of its duties, even those of a 
‘ministerial’ sort.”38 Although the bill passed the Senate, the effort 
 
36. In our previous article on the unitary executive, we described the Decision of 1789 
as follows: 
Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bill to establish the Department of Foreign 
Affairs provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was “to be removable from 
office by the President of the United States.” Concerned that this language 
suggested that the power to remove the Secretary was conferred by congressional 
rather than constitutional grant, Representative Egbert Benson offered an 
amendment to this language to remove this implication. This amended language 
was subsequently incorporated into the statutes creating the War Department 
(without much controversy) as well as the Treasury Department (by the 
narrowest of margins: the casting vote of Vice President Adams). Congress’s 
action has been thereafter regarded as recognizing the constitutional basis of the 
President’s removal power. 
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1472 n.53. 
37. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 597-98 (argument of Attorney General Benjamin F. 
Butler) (citation omitted). 
38. WILSON, supra note 11, at 175. 
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died when the House refused to take any action upon it.39 
Any claim that Kendall marked any large-scale derogation of the 
president’s authority to execute the law is further belied by dicta in 
the Court’s opinion drawing a distinction between executive acts and 
“mere ministerial act[s],” which do not involve any exercise of 
discretion.40 The Kendall Court elaborated as follows: 
We do not think the proceedings in this case interfere[] in any 
respect whatever with the rights or duties of the executive . . . . The 
mandamus does not seek to direct or control the Postmaster-
general in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any 
respect of an executive character, but to enforce the performance 
of a mere ministerial act, which neither he not the President had 
any authority to deny or control.41 
The Supreme Court turned this dicta into a holding two years later 
in Decatur v. Paulding.42 That case arose after the Secretary of the 
Navy denied a claim for a general pension asserted by the widow of 
Stephen Decatur after she had already collected a special pension 
granted to her by private legislation. The circuit court refused to issue 
a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary to pay the pension. In 
affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court adopted the arguments 
advanced by Attorney General Henry Gilpin43 and based its decision 
squarely on the distinction drawn in Kendall “between executive 
duties and ministerial acts.”44 Officials exercising executive powers 
are “continually required to exercise judgment and discretion,” in 
contrast to “mere ministerial duties,” which do not involve any 
discretion whatsoever.45 
Finally, the Van Buren years saw the Supreme Court issue an 
important ruling in Ex parte Hennen,46 a case in which the 
administration appears not to have participated. In Hennen, the Court 
held that a district court clerk could be removed by the judges who 
appointed him at any time because inferior officers in the judicial and 
executive branch serve not for life but at the pleasure of the official 
who appointed them.47 In so holding, the Court specifically noted that 
 
39. Id. 
40. Kendall, 37 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 614. 
41. Id. at 610. 
42. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). 
43. Id. at 509-10. 
44. Id. at 515; see also id. at 514, 516 (citing Kendall). 
45. Id. at 515. 
46. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). 
47. Id. at 259-60. 
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it was the “practical construction of the Constitution that [the removal 
power] was vested in the President alone” and not in the president and 
the Senate jointly.48 Dicta in Hennen thus accept the Decision of 1789 
as having construed the Constitution as giving the president unlimited 
removal power. Indeed, the point was considered so well established 
that all of the attorneys arguing the case before the Supreme Court 
conceded as much.49 
When it came time in 1840 to seek re-election, Van Buren, 
“[h]aving shaped his administration in the steps of Jackson, [looked] 
to reelection on the same basis.”50 Van Buren’s critics attacked him 
for the same monarchical tendencies that they discerned in Jackson. 
They argued that “the greatest threat to liberty was Democratic 
Caesarism—that is, the encroachment of executive power, supported 
by a drilled and disciplined party that was bent on spoils rather than 
the public good.”51 James Barbour of Virginia proclaimed, as had 
Henry Clay during the Bank War, “We are indeed in the midst of a 
revolution . . . . The forms of the Constitution are retained, but its 
spirit is gone—your President is a monarch almost absolute.”52 
William Henry Harrison, the Whig candidate for president in 1840, 
“evoked thunderous applause with the declaration that ‘the 
Government is now a practical monarchy.’ The true issue was not 
democracy versus aristocracy—the people against a privileged few—
as the Democrats claimed, but democracy versus monarchy.”53 Van 
Buren was tagged as a would-be monarch, just as Jackson had been, 
revealing the extent to which Van Buren’s philosophy of executive 
power followed Jackson’s. Democrats responded in the 1840 
campaign by stressing “the continuity of Van Buren’s administration 
with that of Jackson,”54 thus accepting the Whig thesis that Van 
Buren was just an extension of Old Hickory himself. 
Van Buren was as staunch a proponent of the theory of the unitary 
executive as his mentor, Andrew Jackson. Van Buren’s willingness to 
exercise strong presidential authority, particularly against the 
Treasury Department; his increasing use of his power of removal;55 
 
48. Id. at 258. 
49. See id. at 233-35, 238 (argument of Mr. Coxe); id. at 246 (argument of Mr. Gilpin); 
id. at 255 (argument of Mr. Jones). 
50. WILSON, supra note 11, at 191. 
51. Id. at 197. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 198. 
54. Id. at 202. 
55. See FISH, supra note 8, at 75; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 981-82. 
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the opinion authored by Attorney General Butler reiterating that 
Congress has no right to require the president to disclose the reasons 
underlying his removals; and the positions advanced by his 
administration before the Supreme Court each suggest that had Van 
Buren was as committed a defender of the unitary executive as 
Jackson. 
B. William H. Harrison 
The Whig presidency of William Henry Harrison saw the same 
aggressive defense of executive power often associated with the 
Jacksonian Democrats. This was surprising since the Whig Party’s 
self-proclaimed raison d’être was belief in a limited and weak 
executive branch. Many observers had assumed that the election of 
Harrison would mark a sharp reversal in the president’s position with 
regard to the unitary executive. Surely given the vehement opposition 
of the Whigs to presidential removals during the Jackson and Van 
Buren administrations and Harrison’s pre-election dedication to strict 
limitations on presidential power,56 the Harrison administration would 
have little choice but to forego the transient political advantage of 
displacing twelve years worth of Democratic appointees to federal 
office and instead adhere to the limited vision of the executive power 
it had previously so vigorously espoused. However, despite the best 
efforts of Whig luminaries Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Harrison 
clung steadfastly to a belief in the assertive use of the executive 
power. 
Harrison started out by pleasing Whigs with an inaugural address 
that pledged to curtail the perceived trend toward presidential 
despotism.57 He vowed to limit himself to a single term and promised 
caution in using the veto power.58 At the same time, however, 
Harrison’s inaugural address had made it clear that he believed that 
the Constitution conferred the removal power upon the president. As 
Harrison commented, “It was certainly a great error in the framers of 
the Constitution not to have made the head of the Treasury 
Department entirely independent of the Executive. He should at least 
 
56. In 1838, Harrison had espoused a program that would confine presidential service to 
a single term, establish a Treasury independent of presidential control, and strictly limit the 
use of the veto power. See Letter from William Henry Harrison to Harmar Denny (Dec. 2, 
1838), reprinted in 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 637-41. 
57. William H. Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), in 3 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1860, 1863 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS]. See generally WHITE, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
58. Harrison, Inaugural Address, supra note 57, at 1863-66. 
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have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of 
the Legislature.”59 To Harrison, “it appear[ed] strange indeed that 
anyone should doubt that the entire control which the President 
possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, 
by the power of removal with or without cause, does for all 
mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure . . . to his 
disposal.”60 Although Harrison believed the decision to confer the 
removal power upon the president to be a mistake, he nonetheless 
implied that he regarded the issue to be settled, a conclusion 
supported by the opinions issued by his Attorney General.61 
Therefore, Harrison could only offer his assurances to the people that, 
as a matter of policy, he would “never . . . remove a Secretary of the 
Treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such 
removal to both Houses of Congress.”62 
Harrison’s qualms about broad exercises of presidential removal 
power ultimately proved short-lived. Although at one point he seemed 
to be willing or compelled to “yield his will to a majority vote in his 
Cabinet,”63 an anecdote in Leonard White’s The Jacksonians shows 
that Harrison ultimately believed that broad presidential power also 
extended to appointment of inferior officers, independent of 
consultation with Congress or the cabinet: 
At a Cabinet meeting, so the story is told, [Secretary of State] 
Webster informed the President that the Cabinet had decided on 
 
59. Id. at 1868. 
60. Id. at 1867. 
61. As Attorney General Hugh S. Legare noted: 
Whatever I might have thought of the power of removal from office, if the 
subject were res integra, it is now too late to dispute the settled construction of 
1789. It is according to that construction, from the very nature of executive 
power, absolute in the President, subject only to his responsibility to the country 
(his constituent) for a breach of such a vast and solemn trust. 
4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1-2 (1842). Legare had previously opined: 
If any authority were needed to enforce considerations which seem so obvious 
and conclusive in themselves, I think the celebrated debate on the power of 
removal in the first Congress would furnish it. The whole country seems to have 
acquiesced in the argument of Mr. Madison, in favor of that power drawn from 
the character of executive power and responsibility, and from the irresistible 
necessity of the case. 
3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673, 676 (1841); see also 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 165 (1843) (reasoning that 
even assuming arguendo that Congress may restrain cabinet secretaries’ exercise of the 
removal power, “the power of the President as head of the government, under the 
constitutional injunction to see the laws faithfully executed, stands, I incline to think, in a 
different category”). 
62. Harrison, Inaugural Address, supra note 58, at 1868; see also 2 GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 20, at 649; WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 90 (1947). 
63. WHITE, supra note 6, at 47. 
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James Wilson to be governor of [the] Iowa [Territory]. Harrison 
wrote a few words on a slip of paper and asked Webster to read 
them aloud: “William Henry Harrison, President of the United 
States.” The President then rose to his feet and said, “And William 
Henry Harrison, President of the United States, tells you 
gentlemen, that . . . John Chambers shall be Governor of [the] Iowa 
[Territory].”64 
Norma Peterson, Harrison’s biographer, paints a similar picture of 
an active chief executive who was willing to assert his authority over 
the execution of the law. She notes that Harrison “visited every 
department to observe operations [and he] then called for reports 
detailing the activities and responsibilities of each office.”65 
Nor did the Whigs exhibit much restraint in effecting removals. In 
a March 1841 cabinet meeting that took place shortly after the 
election, the Whig leaders agreed to wield the removal power in the 
same partisan manner as Jackson had.66 Harrison proceeded to remove 
executive officials at a rate far exceeding that of either Jackson or 
Van Buren.67 Peterson adds: 
[I]nnumerable removals were made for political reasons. All the 
leading Whigs, as well as lesser members of the party, had 
countless friends to reward. Because his department controlled 
more positions than any of the others, Postmaster General Granger 
probably held the record for dismissals. During his six months in 
office, he ousted seventeen hundred postmasters and boasted that 
had he remained in the cabinet another two or three weeks, three 
thousand more would have been gone. For the time being, at least, 
the creation of a nonpartisan civil service was impossible. The 
Democrats had been in command for a long period, and the Whigs 
were hungry.68 
In filling positions, Harrison repeatedly annoyed powerful Whig 
Senator Henry Clay who unsuccessfully tried to control 
administration appointments. To Clay’s immense irritation, Harrison 
rejected Clay’s candidate for Secretary of the Treasury and for the 
collectorship of the port of New York (a key patronage position that 
 
64. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Parmelee, Recollections of an Old Stager, 47 HARPER’S NEW 
MONTHLY MAGAZINE 753, 754 (1873)). 
65. NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON & 
JOHN TYLER 39 (1989). 
66. See PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 41 
(Greenwood Press 1976) (1958). 
67. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 981-82; FISH, supra note 8, at 73-76. 
68. PETERSON, supra note 65. at 39-40. 
  
No. 3] The Unitary Executive 681 
controlled possibly five hundred jobs).69 Harrison and Clay’s 
argument over the composition of the cabinet ultimately became so 
heated that Harrison ended his final meeting with Clay by declaring, 
“Mr. Clay, you forget that I am the President.”70 
Although the Whigs’ sudden conversion could cynically be 
attributed to the triumph of political necessity over principle, it can 
just as easily be attributed to structural factors: the Whigs’ return to 
the White House brought home the simple truth that presidents must 
have the power of removal if they are to ensure the proper execution 
of the laws. The Democrats, having endured Whig criticism of 
presidential removals for twelve years, could not let this abrupt 
reversal in Whig constitutional philosophy pass unchallenged. 
Therefore, on June 17, 1841, Senator (and future President) James 
Buchanan introduced a resolution requesting that the President 
provide a list of all removals made during the current 
administration.71 Buchanan freely admitted that the resolution was 
introduced not to articulate a particular constitutional theory, but 
rather to embarrass the Whigs by showing “the beautiful consistency 
between Whig professions and Whig practice; between promises 
made before the election, and the performance afterwards.”72 The 
Buchanan resolution eventually passed the Senate,73 and a similar 
resolution passed the House on July 16, 1841.74 However, since 
neither of these resolutions did anything more than request a list of 
those officers removed, as during the Van Buren administration, the 
eventual passage of such a resolution did not have any particular 
precedential significance. More far-reaching resolutions that would 
have required the President to present Congress with the reasons 
 
69. See id. at 34, 37. 
70. Id. at 34; see also WILFRED E. BINKLEY, THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 89-91 
(1937); 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 651-54. 
71. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1841); S. RES. 25, 27th Cong. (1841). 
72. Buchanan reportedly charged: 
[T]he ruthless proscription which was now progressing so directly at variance 
with all the professions and pledges of the Whig party, was the most glaring 
and signal example in the history of any Government, ancient or modern, of 
the opposition, between professions before an election, and practice 
afterwards. No popular Government had ever existed . . . in which a political 
party had so recklessly and so suddenly violated their most solemnly professed 
principles as the Whig party of the present day had done. It was no wonder that 
they should endeavor to shroud their conduct in mystery, and to conceal their 
removals from the world. 
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1841). 
73. Id. at 230. 
74. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-48, at 1 (1841). See generally SMITH, supra note 26, at 5. 
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underlying the removals of certain officers were submitted but never 
enacted.75 
C. John Tyler 
The obvious dismay that these incidents inspired in the 
congressional Whig leadership deepened when Harrison died at the 
end of his first month in office. Despite Harrison’s apostasy in many 
areas of Whig presidential doctrine, most congressional Whigs 
accepted him as a “birthright” Whig whose other party loyalties were 
basically secure.76 Vice President John Tyler, a traditional states’ 
rights Democrat who had joined the Whig ticket in the spirit of anti-
Jackson coalition, did not inspire similar confidence among the 
Whigs.77 Because of doubts about Tyler and general Whig hostility to 
presidential power, many congressional Whig leaders, upon learning 
of Harrison’s death, immediately attempted to undermine Tyler’s 
nascent presidency.78 They did this by advancing the textually 
plausible claim that the Constitution did not permit a vice president 
actually to become president but instead only allowed the vice 
president to adopt the role of “acting president” while continuing in 
the official title of vice president.79 
To his credit, Tyler refused to accept this Whig interpretation of 
constitutional law. Tyler immediately assumed the title of president, 
rather than acting president, and he went on to take the presidential 
oath of office specified by the Constitution and collect the presidential 
 
75. On June 17, 1841, Representative Alford introduced a resolution requesting that the 
President furnish the names of all officers removed along with the reasons for their 
removals. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-48, supra note 74, at 65-66. On July 1, 1841, Senator Benton 
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for removing five named officers. Id. at 133. On July 27, 1842, Representative Garrett 
Davis reported a resolution requesting the reasons for the removal of H.H. Sylvester. 
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future. H.R. REP. NO. 27-945 (1842). The Senate Committee on Retrenchment reported a 
similar bill on June 15, 1844. S. DOC. NO. 28-399 (1844); see also 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, 
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Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1845) (Grider resolution); CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 
(1844) (Thomasson resolution). See generally SMITH, supra note 26, at 4-6. 
76. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 654-55. 
77. See id. at 669. 
78. See id. at 657. 
79. See PETERSON, supra note 65, at 45-48; see also 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 
654. 
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salary. Ultimately, both houses of Congress voted to recognize Tyler 
as president rather than acting president.80 This incident marked the 
beginning of Tyler’s jealous protection of his executive powers from 
Congress for the remainder of his combative term.81 
In his inaugural address, however, Tyler committed one horrible 
mistake that forever brands him as something of a pariah to unitary 
executivists. Tyler, in a fit of anti-Jackson indiscretion, said: 
I deem it of the most essential importance that a complete 
separation should take place between the sword and the purse. No 
matter where or how the public moneys shall be deposited, so long 
as the President can exert the power of appointing and removing at 
his pleasure the agents selected for their custody the Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy is in fact the treasurer. A 
permanent and radical change should therefore be decreed.82 
Tyler went on to propose the creation of a five-person 
“Independent Board of Exchequer,” the majority of whose members 
would be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate 
and who could be removed “only for physical inability, 
incompetency, or neglect or violation of duty, with reasons laid before 
the Senate. The Exchequer Board was to become the sole agency to 
receive, hold, and disburse all public money—’safe from Executive 
control.’”83 This wild scheme outdid anything ever previously 
proposed and can only be understood if one recollects the charges of 
Caesarism and Napoleonism leveled against Andrew Jackson.84 
Happily, Tyler’s idea sank without a trace as other “issues pushed 
aside one so academic in nature. No President followed Tyler’s 
lead.”85 
In all matters other than the proposed Independent Board of 
Exchequer, Tyler was a paragon of virtue in defending presidential 
prerogatives. Tyler’s son and private secretary reported that Tyler’s 
first cabinet meeting gave him a striking opportunity to show his 
belief in a strong unitary presidency. After being told by Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster that all matters discussed in cabinet meetings 
should be decided by majority vote with each secretary and the 
 
80. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 49-50. 
81. See id. at 45-48. 
82. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 43. 
83. Id. 
84. See id. at 43-44. 
85. Id. at 44; see also id. at 44 n.62 (“In 1841, Congressman Millard Fillmore was 
committed to ‘the separation of the purse and the sword from the hands of the executive.’ . 
. . As President he forgot the issue.”). 
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President having only one vote, Tyler is said to have responded: 
I beg your pardon, gentlemen; I am very glad to have in my 
Cabinet such able statesmen as you have proved yourselves to be. 
And I shall be pleased to avail myself of your counsel and advice. 
But I can never consent to being dictated to as to what I shall or 
shall not do. I, as President, shall be responsible for my 
administration. I hope to have your hearty cooperation in carrying 
out these measures. So long as you see fit to do this, I shall be glad 
to have you with me. When you think otherwise, your resignations 
will be accepted.86 
Tyler’s unofficial press organ, The Madisonian, expressed the 
administration’s commitment to a unitary executive branch, 
describing what it saw as “the proper relationship between the 
president and his cabinet”: 
The executive branch, it declared, should be a whole unit, with the 
department heads acting as sincere and willing exponents of the 
president’s deliberate convictions. Otherwise the administration 
would present to the world the “absurd spectacle” of a power 
divided against itself. Taking issue with this point of view, the 
National Intelligencer [Henry Clay’s press organ] called it an 
“odious Jacksonian pretension.”87 
Tyler’s extensive correspondence with his first secretary of state, 
Daniel Webster, indicates “[his] close attention to detail and the time 
he spent reading documents and considering what should be done.”88 
He was a hands-on chief executive who sometimes bypassed even his 
secretary of state in communicating directly with the U.S. ambassador 
to Great Britain. On December 30, 1842, he announced the Tyler 
Doctrine, whereby the Monroe Doctrine was extended to the 
“Sandwich Islands,” today known as Hawaii. This type of broad 
proclamation of foreign policy, like the Monroe Doctrine itself or like 
George Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, suggests a willingness 
to exercise vigorous control over all matters involving the state 
department.89 
Perhaps the most striking example of Tyler’s belief in the assertive 
use of executive power was his aggressive defense of the presidential 
 
86. Id. at 86 (quoting Interview with John Tyler, Jr., 41 LIPPINCOTT’S MONTHLY MAG. 
417, 417-418 (1888)); see also OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD, JOHN TYLER: CHAMPION OF 
THE OLD SOUTH 270 (1964); BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 95-96. 
87. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 71. 
88. Id. at 145. 
89. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1513. 
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veto power.90 In a confrontation that echoed the earlier Bank War of 
the Jackson administration,91 Tyler vetoed numerous pieces of Whig-
sponsored legislation during his tenure. Most notably, Tyler twice 
vetoed bills attempting to recharter the Bank of the United States on 
the Jacksonian grounds that they were unconstitutional.92 Tyler also 
vetoed a number of proposed tariffs that he thought were excessive.93 
These vetoes caused outrage among the leaders of the Whig party, 
most notably Henry Clay, who unsuccessfully argued that the 
presidential veto power should be narrowly constrained by 
constitutional amendment.94 On several occasions, Clay 
unsuccessfully sought a constitutional amendment “that would allow 
presidential vetoes to be overturned by a simple majority in each 
house, rather than by the current constitutional stipulation of a two-
thirds vote of the House and the Senate.”95 Clay also implied in a 
famous Senate speech that Tyler’s repeated use of the veto power 
suggested that he was out of touch with the contemporary political 
consensus and, like a latter-day prime minister, should consider 
resignation from the presidency.96 Tyler stubbornly refused to yield to 
these Whig arguments. In fact, the rude manner in which one of his 
veto messages was received prompted him to file a “Protest”97 that 
was somewhat reminiscent of the similarly named document lodged 
by Andrew Jackson.98 As happened to Jackson, Congress refused to 
receive Tyler’s Protest.99 Tyler’s course of action ultimately prompted 
his expulsion from the Whig Party, congressional criticism, and 
political acrimony that undermined the remainder of his presidency.100 
Turnover in the cabinet was common during the Tyler 
administration. Including the holdover cabinet members appointed by 
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Harrison, the Tyler administration featured four secretaries of state, 
four secretaries of the treasury, five secretaries of the navy, four 
secretaries of war, three attorneys general, and two postmasters 
general.101 Tyler even suffered the mass resignation of all the 
holdover cabinet secretaries Harrison appointed in 1841, except for 
Daniel Webster, to protest his second veto of legislation that would 
have rechartered the Bank of the United States. Even the strong-
willed Whig Daniel Webster eventually resigned as Secretary of 
State, both because Tyler was determined to push forward with the 
annexation of Texas and because Tyler was trying to run for re-
election as a Democrat. The one constant in Tyler’s administration 
was Tyler himself, and he was indisputably in control of all aspects of 
his administration’s foreign and domestic policy. 
In his use of the removal power, Tyler continued the trend towards 
partisan removal of office holders originally authorized by Harrison. 
In fact, historian Carl Russell Fish, after a comprehensive comparison 
of the removal behavior of the Harrison and Tyler administrations 
with the Jackson administration, found the difference between the so-
called “sweep of 1829” and the “sweep of 1841” to be merely one of 
degree, with the Whig administrations making a total of 304 
politically-motivated removals from a potential total of 924.102 Tyler 
became particularly aggressive in partisan use of the removal power 
as his political future became progressively bleaker during his term in 
office. He commented to his Treasury Secretary, “[W]e have 
numberless enemies in office and they should forthwith be made to 
quit . . . in short the changes ought to be rapid and extensive and 
numerous . . . we must be cautious and never appoint any other than a 
well known friend.”103 
Tyler also “made the strongest statement made thus far by a chief 
executive on the president’s right to use discretion in complying or 
refusing to comply with congressional requests or demands for 
information from the executive branch.”104 
The President, Tyler pointed out, was directed by the Constitution 
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” This included an 
obligation to inquire into the manner in which all public agents 
 
101. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 146. 
102. See FISH, supra note 8, at 150. 
103. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 147 (quoting Letter from John Tyler, President, to 
John Spencer, Treasury Secretary, (May 13, 1843 and Sept. 2, 1843) (on file in 
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress)). 
104. Id. at 170. 
  
No. 3] The Unitary Executive 687 
performed their duties. If the president were not able to use 
discretion in the dissemination of information collected in 
investigations, an inquiry could be arrested in its first stage, and 
those who were under suspicion could elude detection.105 
The Whig fury at Tyler, which commenced during the second 
round of bank wars in 1841 and continued unabated for the rest of his 
tempestuous term, thus stemmed from Tyler’s near-Jacksonian 
conception of presidential power. The Whigs had been formed as a 
party to oppose the Jacksonian conception of the presidency, and so 
they came to consider Tyler a traitor to their cause. Peterson reports: 
[Tyler’s] undermining of the creation of a national bank was 
harmful, but what really angered the congressional Whigs was 
Tyler’s thwarting of their determination to control the chief 
executive and to destroy, for all time, presidential usurpation. 
Therefore, to secure the nation against future abuses, 
encroachments, and usurpations by the chief magistrate, the Whig 
caucus reiterated many of the points voiced during the 1840 
campaign: a single term for the incumbent in the president’s office, 
the right of Congress to appoint the secretary of the treasury, 
severe restrictions on the president’s power to dismiss from office, 
the establishment of a fiscal agent (a national bank), and the 
adoption of an amendment to the Constitution which would limit 
the chief executive’s use of the veto. Tyler had to be brought to 
heel; otherwise, there would be three more years of “the same kind 
of suffering inflicted during the last twelve years by the 
maladministration of the Executive Department of the 
government.”106 
When Tyler refused to bend to the Whig caucus, he was not only 
expelled from the Whig Party, but he was also threatened with 
impeachment, making him the first president to be so threatened.107 
Impeachment went nowhere, but Tyler governed for the remainder of 
his term with minimal support in Congress, and the support he did 
have was from Jacksonian Democrats, not his fellow Whigs. 
As Tyler was preparing to leave office in the winter of 1845, he 
succeeded, with the help of President-elect James K. Polk, in pushing 
through the annexation of Texas and its admission to the Union as a 
state.108 This was an extraordinarily important action for an embattled 
chief executive to take. He also secured adoption of a major treaty 
with Great Britain that settled a disputed boundary along the U.S.-
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Canadian border in a manner that presaged the Polk administration’s 
settlement of the Oregon boundary line.109 In sum, Tyler’s belief in a 
strong, assertive, and unitary executive branch always remained firm. 
This prompted Wilfred Binkley to note that, “Tyler saved the 
presidency from suffering a backset,” even in the face of 
unimaginable personal political damage.110 
D. James K. Polk 
Presidential support for the unitary theory of the executive branch 
did not waver when the Jacksonian Democrats returned to power 
under James K. Polk. A Jacksonian Democrat from Tennessee, Polk 
was often called “Young Hickory,” and his assertive philosophy of 
presidential power mirrored that of his colloquial namesake, Andrew 
Jackson.111 Polk’s biographer, Paul Bergeron, reports: 
Polk did not conform to the Whiggish notions about weak or 
limited presidents who yielded to a vigorous and dominant 
legislative branch. Imitating the model established by his mentor, 
Andrew Jackson, Polk set out to dominate the nation’s capital in 
just about every respect possible. He knew, as all effective 
presidents have known, that the office is more than an enumeration 
of constitutional duties and prerogatives. Indeed, the presidency is 
whatever the occupant can make of it (within constitutional 
bounds, of course).112 
Bergeron adds that Polk “follow[ed] Jackson’s concept of the 
[presidential] office. Regardless of how one responds to Polk’s 
policies and programs, there is no question that he was a strong 
executive. The nation would not see such again until the 
administration of Abraham Lincoln, an old Whig who essentially 
abandoned Whiggish ideas about the presidency.”113 Charles Sellers 
adds that “Polk was to display a brand of presidential legislative 
leadership that the country would not see again until the time of 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.”114 
Polk himself once made the following comment on presidential 
power as it related to Whig views of presidential subservience to 
other branches of government: 
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Any attempt to coerce the President to yield his sanction to 
measures which he cannot approve would be a violation of the 
spirit of the Constitution . . . and if successful would break down 
the independence of the Executive department and make the 
President clothed by the Constitution with the power to defend 
their rights the mere instrument of the majority of Congress.115 
Polk articulated another Jacksonian notion that had infused the 
unitary executive arguments of Jackson’s protest message vis-à-vis 
the Bank of the United States. This was the argument that the 
president was the only true representative of the whole people of the 
United States since he alone had been elected by the whole people: 
Polk felt confident in his attitude toward and his relationship with 
Congress, for he believed that he was the true representative of the 
people of the United States. Jackson had been the first to express 
such a startling notion; Polk reiterated it and refined it.116 
“More boldly and more cogently than Jackson had done earlier, 
Polk declared that the president was the representative of the whole 
people of the United States, whereas congressmen were relegated to 
lesser roles of representing only portions of the people.”117 Polk was 
committed to the Jacksonian notion that the president was uniquely a 
spokesman of the whole people of the United States. Polk, like 
Jackson, was thus unquestionably a believer in a strong and 
independent presidency. 
As one historian has noted, Polk “undertook to make reality of the 
principle sought to be established by Washington, that the executive 
branch of the government was one whole to be managed by the 
President alone.”118 Paul Bergeron reports: 
Polk effectively seized control of the governmental bureaucracy. 
Upon occasion he boasted, and justifiably so, of his mastery of the 
details of the functioning of the various executive departments. 
Because he kept such close scrutiny over them, he was able to 
control them. This was particularly noteworthy with regard to the 
Treasury Department, which, since the days of Alexander 
Hamilton, had been accustomed to functioning more or less 
independently of the president. But Polk did not permit his 
secretary of the Treasury to stray from presidential policy or to 
exhibit independence. One of the chief consequences of Polk’s 
domination was that his administration produced what could truly 
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be called an executive budget, the first such in the nation’s 
experience.119 
Bergeron adds that “[c]ombing through [Polk’s] diary, one is able 
to account for at least 364 cabinet meetings during [his] four years” in 
office,120 an incredible average of one cabinet meeting every four 
days. The diary goes on to indicate that the President met with cabinet 
visitors during parts of 1079 days in a period of three and a half 
years.121 “Having an apparently prodigious mind for minute details 
and an accurate memory, the president astounded his cabinet 
members and others with his knowledge of the bureaucracy of the 
federal government.”122 In September 1848, while four of his six 
cabinet members were absent from Washington on trips, Polk handled 
the details of governance in the absence of his departmental 
secretaries. Polk bragged after a month of this work: 
Indeed, I have become so familiar with the duties and workings of 
the Government, not only upon general principles, but in most of 
its minute details, that I find but little difficulty in doing this. I 
have made myself acquainted with the duties of the subordinate 
officers, and have probably given more attention to details than 
any of my predecessors.123 
Polk’s boast indicates that he was the ultimate hands-on president 
of his day, a figure comparable to Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton in his 
willingness to become immersed in the details of governance and 
public policy. Another example of this tendency was Polk’s 
aggressive management of individual Cabinet members, including a 
requirement that all secretaries read status reports to him regularly 
and verbatim.124 Leonard White quotes Polk: “If [the President] 
entrusts the details and smaller matters to subordinates constant errors 
will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations of the 
Government myself rather than entrust the public business to 
subordinates, and this makes my duties very great.”125 Polk was also 
the first president to manage the flow of information between his 
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subordinates and Congress, explicitly prohibiting cabinet members 
from communicating with members of Congress without his 
permission.126 
Perhaps the most striking illustration of Polk’s belief in a strong 
executive branch was seen in Polk’s groundbreaking use of the 
commander-in-chief powers of the presidency during the Mexican 
War. During this conflict, Polk used his military powers under the 
Constitution vigorously. Deferring to the practical advice of his 
Secretary of War, Polk refrained from aggressively removing military 
officers whose political motivations he questioned, but nevertheless 
subjected their actions to a high degree of direct supervision.127 Polk 
also used the appointment power to create new positions within the 
military, in part to counter the influence of Zachary Taylor and 
Winfield Scott, whom he correctly suspected of having Whig political 
sympathies. Just as he managed all other aspects of war policy, Polk 
managed most of these appointments personally and without 
congressional or military input.128 As Polk’s Secretary of the Navy 
George Bancroft was later to observe, Polk “insisted on being [his 
administration’s] center and in overruling and guiding all his 
secretaries to act as to produce unity and harmony.”129 
Unsurprisingly, Polk’s assertive and occasionally partisan 
management of the Mexican War drew heavy criticism from his 
opponents in the Whig Party, who often referred to the conflict as 
“Polk’s War.”130 Regardless of the merits of such criticism of Polk, it 
seems unquestionable that his management of state affairs during this 
conflict was one of the strongest examples of the use of presidential 
power to direct specifically the conduct of subordinate officers since 
the Jackson administration. 
Polk was even less restrained in his use of the removal power with 
respect to civilian positions. Polk made wide use of his removal 
power specifically to sweep out Whig loyalists appointed by Harrison 
and Tyler.131 In the Postal Service alone, Polk used induced 
resignations to replace as many as 13,000 federal employees.132 Paul 
Bergeron observes: 
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Polk launched his removal policy in a fashion befitting the days of 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency. He apparently decided to make 
extensive removals, but in the words of one observer, he “would 
not tomahawk beyond what might be considered Christian 
ferocity.” The first removal notices hit the desks of Washington 
clerks on 29 March; the new broom intended to sweep clean. The 
president ordered all department heads to submit to him detailed 
lists of all employees, with information about their political 
loyalties, the circumstances of their original appointment, and 
recommendations to retain or dismiss said employees. With that 
available data, the president would be able to proceed with a 
systematic realignment of personnel in the Washington offices. 
Federal employees who were located elsewhere would happily 
have a bit more time before the new administration would reach 
them. All in all, it was a truly serious business that the Polk crowd 
set about doing. Once the president had launched removal 
procedures during the very first month, office seekers began to 
descend upon Washington like the plague of locusts in Biblical 
Egypt.133 
Bergeron adds with reference to Polk’s removals in the post office 
that “by the end of the administration, there had been an astounding 
13,500 appointments as postmasters,” and he notes that “[o]ne 
marvels that the mail was ever delivered in those days of disruption 
and turmoil in the post offices.”134 Most of these removals were 
without significant debate or protest because, by the ascension of Polk 
to the presidency, “the country was by this time so used to the 
practice [of partisan removal] that little complaint [was] heard.”135 
Polk consulted with individual members of Congress in making 
local executive appointments, but always made clear that such 
consultations were purely advisory and that Congress should not 
abuse his courtesy. Polk observed that “I have treated [members of 
Congress] with great civility and have yielded to their wishes about 
appointments in their respective States until they seem to come to the 
conclusion that I must administer the Government precisely as they 
may direct. In this they will find themselves mistaken.”136 
The Polk administration’s support for the unitary executive theory 
can also be seen in the opinions of his attorneys general espousing the 
view that the Constitution granted the power of removal to the 
president. In the eyes of Attorney General John Young Mason, the 
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removal power stemmed from “the constitutional duty of the 
President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”137 
Mason’s successor, Nathan Clifford, similarly maintained that the 
president possessed the power to remove civil officers “at pleasure in 
all cases under the constitution where the term of office is not 
specially declared.”138 Although Clifford recognized that Hamilton in 
The Federalist No. 77 had suggested otherwise, the issue “was 
distinctly settled by the Congress of 1789 in favor of the power of the 
President” after “one of the ablest discussions in the history of the 
country” upon the ground that the power to remove “was clearly in its 
nature a part of the executive power, and was indispensable for a due 
execution of the laws and a regular administration of the public 
affairs.”139 Clifford further noted that the decision received the 
sanction of every department of the government, as well as Justice 
Story, Chancellor Kent, and the Supreme Court.140 
Polk’s attorneys general, however, stopped short of arguing that the 
president possessed the plenary power to direct his subordinates. 
Relying on the previous opinions offered by Attorneys General 
William Wirt and Roger Taney,141 Mason concluded that the president 
“has the power of removal, but not the power of correcting, by his 
own official act, the errors of judgment of incompetent or unfaithful 
subordinates.”142 Thus, despite the Polk administration’s firm support 
for the president’s power to remove, its position on the president’s 
power to direct represented another swing in the pendulum that began 
during the Monroe and Jackson administrations. This minor deviation 
hardly represents the degree of acquiescence required to establish a 
particular constitutional construction under the methodology of 
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departmental or coordinate construction. It does not alter the 
overriding fact that Polk was a committed Jacksonian and an ardent 
believer in the theory of the unitary executive. He was also by any 
measure a strong and effective president. 
E. Zachary Taylor 
Zachary Taylor was a genuine war hero in the mold of Presidents 
George Washington, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison. 
He was narrowly elected in 1848, largely because of public 
admiration for his role in helping to win the Mexican War, where he 
earned the nickname “Old Rough and Ready.” Taylor was selected as 
the Whig candidate for president because, like the previous Whig 
victor, William Henry Harrison, Taylor was a former general. 
Unfortunately for the Whigs, who elected only these two presidents, 
Taylor, like Harrison, was to die in office. Taylor’s term in office 
lasted only sixteen months, from March 4, 1849, to July 9, 1850, and 
his reputation has suffered from his brief service as well as the 
repeated derision of his presidency by elite nineteenth-century 
historians who treated him with disdain as a general-turned-
president.143 
Taylor had some genuinely Whiggish ideas about the presidency 
and presidential power. A supportive newspaper once went so far as 
to say: 
Taylor . . . had taken office against “the Executive influence, 
Executive patronage, Executive dictation, and the Executive veto.” 
Under Jackson these elements had “resolved the Government into 
the one-man power and almost annihilated the Legislature.” 
Congress under the Democrats had “ceased to be what it was 
intended to be under the Constitution, the independent and only 
legitimate organ for the expression of the public will.” To correct 
this great evil had been a major reason for electing General 
Taylor.144 
Taylor was most obviously a Whig in his aversion to use of the 
presidential veto, which he had often denounced “as a tool of 
presidential tyranny.”145 Notwithstanding his opposition to use of the 
veto, Taylor was happy to threaten a veto of the Compromise of 
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1850,146 and Taylor believed in the use of the veto against 
constitutionally suspect legislation. 
While Taylor may have had Whiggish ideas about the use of the 
veto, he was far from being passive and meek during his sixteen 
months as president, owing no doubt in part to his experience as a 
military commander.147 British chargé d’affaires John F. Crampton 
emphasized Taylor’s strong will and remarked upon the “fearless and 
determined manner” with which Taylor pursued a course of 
conduct.148 Taylor had a “well-known reputation for bold and decisive 
action,”149 and his biographer Elbert Smith reports: 
During most of his presidency, Taylor bore insults and 
condemnations with equanimity and angry defiance. He had often 
been a center of controversy during his long military career, and he 
took the presence of enemies for granted. Indeed, like Andrew 
Jackson, he seemed almost to enjoy quarrels over principle. He had 
never been reluctant to make up his own mind and to stand firm 
against overwhelming pressures, and this trait did not desert him in 
the White House.150 
Smith further reports that Taylor dominated his cabinet and set all 
the major policies of his administration, which opposed the spread of 
slavery to California and New Mexico and which opposed Texas’s 
territorial designs on much of present day New Mexico. Cabinet 
meetings were held but no votes were taken, and Taylor made all the 
important policy decisions himself. Some Taylor critics accused the 
President of being under the influence of William H. Seward, the free 
soil Whig Senator from New York, or of his cabinet, but Taylor’s 
biographer reports: 
Long before he had been elected president, Taylor had stated the 
basic convictions from which he did not deviate during his brief 
term in office. If he and most of his cabinet were a harmonious 
group on important policies, it was because they agreed on what 
should be done and not because strong advisors had captured the 
mind of a weak and ignorant president. Indeed, on the subject of 
Texas and New Mexico, Taylor’s belligerence went far beyond 
that of his advisers. No one had to let Taylor be Taylor; no one 
could have kept Taylor from being Taylor. He was neither weak 
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nor modest, and no had always been one of his favorite words.151 
Taylor actually went so far as to threaten to protect New Mexico 
from any invasion by Texas over the disputed boundary,152 and he 
volunteered to lead the U.S. Army himself in defending New 
Mexico’s territorial integrity. Taylor “minced no words. When he 
announced that he would defend New Mexico, in person if necessary, 
no one doubted it.”153 
Taylor and Secretary of State John M. Clayton enjoyed a relatively 
successful foreign policy, much to Taylor’s credit: 
The question naturally arises of whether the bulk of the credit 
should go to Taylor or to Clayton. The answer must be that Taylor 
selected Clayton in the first place, approved and took full 
responsibility for every policy, clearly played an important role in 
the formulation of some of the policies, and actually took a 
stronger stand than Clayton did when dealing with the British and 
Nicaragua. Because Taylor bore the brunt of the incessant attacks 
by opposing politicians and newspapers on each of his policies, it 
is only fair that he should receive much credit for his firmness, 
good sense, decisiveness, clarity of expression, and patriotism. In 
each case, it is difficult to imagine an alternative policy that would 
have served American interests better.154 
With regard to use of the removal power, Taylor pledged 
circumspection and stated in his inaugural address: “So far as it is 
possible to be informed, I shall make honesty, capacity, and fidelity 
indispensable prerequisites to the bestowal of office, and absence of 
either of these qualities shall be deemed sufficient cause for 
removal.”155 It should be noted that in pledging to use the removal 
power sparingly, Taylor was acknowledging that the president had the 
power to remove. In any event, Taylor removed subordinates from 
office with great vigor. The Democrats’ legacy left almost no Whigs 
in federal positions by 1849, and the Whigs were keenly aware of the 
missed opportunities.156 Smith reports, “Of 17,180 governmental 
employees in 1849, 3,400 were removed and 2,800 resigned. The 
Whigs, who had previously held virtually none of the 929 presidential 
appointments, received 540 of these prizes, while Democratic leaders 
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and press screamed to high heaven about the injustice of it all.”157 In 
other words, upon returning to office, the Whigs embraced the 
Jacksonian spoils system and removed subordinate executive branch 
officials freely and at will, just as they had done in 1841.158 
Again, senators in the opposing party could not resist the 
temptation to needle the Whigs for their wide-scale removals.159 
Congressional actions on these proposals generally failed to shed 
much light on the constitutional issues, since these resolutions were 
offered primarily to score political points and not to challenge the 
president’s power to remove. Senator Bradbury candidly 
acknowledged that his resolution was intended to point out “the 
inconsistency between the professions and practice of the party in 
power” and not to call into question “the policy of making 
removals.”160 
There is also strong anecdotal support in the historical record that 
Taylor, despite his public claims to the contrary, acknowledged the 
necessity for partisan use of the removal and appointment powers. 
Leonard White offers support for this contention in a story in which 
Taylor personally approached the Secretary of the Treasury—of all 
departments!—to ensure that Whigs were receiving “their share of the 
offices” in the department, noting that “[r]otation in office, provided 
good men are appointed, is sound republican doctrine.”161 Thus, 
despite his urging of circumspection in the making of removals, 
Taylor in practice used the removal power vigorously and for partisan 
purposes, even in the supposedly “independent” Treasury 
Department.162 There was no deviation from the theory of the unitary 
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executive during Taylor’s brief sixteen months in the White House. 
Indeed, there is one area in which the Taylor administration 
surpassed its immediate predecessor in its defense of the unitary 
executive. On the issue of presidential direction of subordinates, 
Taylor’s talented attorney general, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, 
contradicted the conclusion of Polk’s administration163 and took the 
position that the department heads had the power to direct accounting 
officers in their settlement of accounts. Johnson acknowledged that 
such had “been the practice of the government from its origin, and 
[was] well authorized by the laws organizing the departments, as it is 
absolutely necessary to the proper operation of the government.”164 
Taylor’s contribution to the theory of the unitary executive is 
unequivocal. He was a strong president who controlled his 
administration down to the smallest details, and he was not afraid to 
take on Henry Clay and other leading members of Congress, despite 
his party’s doctrine of presidential submission to Congress. Taylor’s 
strength as president is illustrated by the fact that two days before he 
died, an opposition newspaper “demanded his impeachment ‘for 
usurping kingly powers and for trampling on the rights of a sovereign 
state.’”165 As Taylor’s vigorous and partisan use of the removal power 
attests, the unitary executive survived his administration quite intact. 
F. Millard Fillmore 
Millard Fillmore was the last in a long series of presidents 
genuinely committed to a policy of compromise between the interests 
of the North and the South, which began under the Monroe 
administration with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and continued 
through the Compromise of 1850. As a congressman in 1841, 
Fillmore had been committed to the separation of the purse and the 
sword, but as president he forgot the issue.166 Fillmore succeeded 
Zachary Taylor as president on July 10, 1850, and like John Tyler, he 
immediately assumed the title of president (rather than acting 
president) and proceeded to exercise the full powers of the 
presidential office. His first acts in office were to fire and replace all 
of Taylor’s cabinet,167 which had been tarred by a minor scandal, and 
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to throw his enthusiastic support behind the Compromise of 1850, 
which was then pending in Congress. This marks the only time a 
succeeding vice president has ever fired his predecessor’s entire 
cabinet.168 Both actions are important to us. The firing and replacing 
of Taylor’s whole cabinet indicates Fillmore’s desire to control his 
own administration and his belief in the removal power. Fillmore’s 
active legislative support for the Compromise of 1850 indicates his 
desire, as a Northerner with Southern sympathies, to mediate the 
sectional conflict and put it behind him. 
Today, Fillmore is remembered as one of America’s most 
forgettable presidents,169 but he was by no means a cipher while in 
office. Fillmore’s biographer Elbert Smith reports: 
Millard Fillmore was neither quarrelsome nor vindictive by nature, 
but his bland exterior and impeccable manners concealed a 
fighting spirit in its own way just as tough as that of Zachary 
Taylor. Fillmore had not risen from dire poverty to the nation’s 
second highest office without a driving ambition, enormous 
energy, and a shrewd eye for his own best interests.170 
Fillmore selected very high quality men for his cabinet, which was 
perhaps most distinguished by the presence of Daniel Webster as 
secretary of state. Fillmore was not afraid of being overshadowed by 
the great Webster, and he worked effectively with Webster during 
their time together in office. At one point, when Webster was near 
death, Fillmore handled a crisis involving Cuba entirely on his own.171 
Elbert Smith reports that Fillmore’s leadership was admirable: 
Like Taylor, Millard Fillmore deserves high praise for his 
leadership as a maker of foreign policy. His decisions and actions 
were clear and unequivocal and were marked by imagination, 
moderation, and firmness. He followed his own judgments with 
but little regard for public or political pressures, although he did 
allow [Edward] Everett [Webster’s successor as secretary of state] 
to soften his Cuban policy with some harmless rhetoric. Webster, 
before he was overtaken by illness, and Everett, after Webster’s 
death, were able secretaries of state, but the president was the final 
arbiter and accepted full responsibility. In appointing Webster, 
Fillmore, unlike some presidents, did not hesitate to give the top 
cabinet post to a man whose national reputation far exceeded his 
own. Everett, a brilliant scholar, was an equally wise choice. 
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Fillmore worked closely with both of them, participated fully in 
the making of virtually every decision, and did not hesitate to 
countermand Webster over the incident with Peru.172 
Fillmore was thus personally involved in the details of his 
administration’s foreign policy, and he deserves credit for its 
successes, which included the launching of Commodore Mathew 
Perry’s expedition to open up Japan. In sum, Fillmore was an 
involved and conscientious executor of the presidential office. 
Fillmore repeated Taylor’s pledge to defend the federal territory of 
New Mexico from Texas by military force if necessary.173 The 
determination of these two Whig presidents to prevent Texas from 
seizing big chunks of New Mexico was absolutely critical to 
preventing a civil war from breaking out and was essential to laying 
the groundwork for the final Compromise. “Any show of weakness or 
indecision by the president that could [have] lead the Texans to 
believe they would be fighting only against New Mexicans might well 
have invited the fatal attack.”174 
Fillmore’s defense of New Mexico’s territorial integrity was an 
appeal to the North, for New Mexico seemed destined to be a free 
state while Texas, which had designs on New Mexican land, was of 
course a slave state. But the Compromise of 1850, which Fillmore 
shepherded through Congress, had in it one big sop to the South, and 
that was the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act.175 In the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,176 the onus for 
recovering fugitive slaves fell on the federal government, and 
Southerners demanded the Fugitive Slave Act as their price for 
admitting new free states like California and giving up the parity they 
had enjoyed between free and slave states in the Senate. The Fugitive 
Slave Act thus represented a key part of the Compromise of 1850. It 
passed with the support of northern Whigs like Daniel Webster, but 
was hated by most Northerners. A key question of presidential power 
loomed: To what extent would Fillmore “faithfully execute” the 
Fugitive Slave Act in the North, where the law was bitterly opposed 
by much of the population? 
Fillmore was relentless in vigorously executing the Fugitive Slave 
Act. In one instance in Pennsylvania he “instructed the Marine 
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commander at Philadelphia to assist the marshal or deputy if he was 
supported by a federal judge.”177 In another prominent instance in 
Boston, “Fillmore, with no other legal alternative, announced that he 
would use troops, if necessary, to enforce the law.”178 Fillmore told an 
ally that he would “enforce the laws of the land at all hazards, and put 
down, with the whole power of the government, if need be, any illicit 
or violent attempt to counteract or overturn them.”179 Elbert Smith 
reports, “In each of the prominent fugitive-slave cases in which he 
could not escape responsibility, Fillmore [spoke] and acted decisively 
in support of the law.”180 The Fugitive Slave Act was a hateful law, 
but Fillmore fully, vigorously, and faithfully executed it as the 
president was bound by oath to do.181 Fillmore’s personal willingness 
to execute the Fugitive Slave Act in the face of enormous opposition 
in the North reveals him to be a proponent of the unitary executive 
theory, under which the president himself is responsible for the 
vigorous execution of the nation’s laws. 
It bears noting that Fillmore was no more willing to tolerate law-
breaking activities when the South tried them either. In November 
1850, Fillmore received reports that Southern radicals were “planning 
to seize the federal forts at Charleston [South Carolina] as the first 
step toward secession. The United States attorney and other federal 
officers in South Carolina resigned, and Fillmore had great difficulty 
replacing them.”182 Fillmore reacted to this crisis with firm resolution, 
including General Winfield Scott, a Mexican War hero, in cabinet 
meetings to develop a response to a potential insurrection: 
On Scott’s advice, Fillmore strengthened the Charleston forts and 
stationed additional troops in both South and North Carolina. 
When the governor of South Carolina demanded an explanation, 
Fillmore replied that it was his duty as commander in chief of the 
armed forces to station troops wherever he thought it would serve 
the public interest and that he owed no explanation to the governor 
of South Carolina.183 
With respect to removal policy, Fillmore began his term in office 
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by firing all of Taylor’s cabinet, as noted above, even though both he 
and President Taylor were loyal members of the Whig Party.184 
Fillmore publicly echoed Taylor’s policy of being willing to remove 
anyone who misbehaved in office. In his first annual message to 
Congress, issued in December 1850, Fillmore observed: 
In so extensive a country . . . where few persons appointed to 
office can be known to the appointing power, mistakes will 
sometimes unavoidably happen and unfortunate appointments be 
made notwithstanding the greatest care. In such cases the power of 
removal may be properly exercised; and neglect of duty or 
malfeasance in office will be no more tolerated in individuals 
appointed by myself than in those appointed by others.185 
It should be noted that in pledging to use the removal power 
sparingly, Fillmore, like Taylor before him, was implicitly 
acknowledging that the president possessed the constitutional power 
to remove. Fillmore’s very able attorney general, John J. Crittenden, 
made this point explicit in opinions that adopted the position 
advanced by every preceding administrations up to that time and 
confirmed the constitutional foundation of the president’s removal 
power.186 Fillmore’s partisan use of the removal power was striking in 
one sense because he employed it against members of rival factions 
within his own party as well as against Democrats. Early in his term, 
Fillmore directed one of his cabinet members to “turn out [disloyal 
Whigs] and put good competent Whigs in their places wherever it 
could be done without prejudice to the public service . . . .”187 Elbert 
Smith also reports that Fillmore ordered “a general housecleaning of 
[Thurlow] Weed’s [Whig] friends holding federal offices.”188 
The Fillmore administration, following Taylor, adopted a rather 
curious position regarding the power of direction. Attorney General 
Crittenden maintained that the president lacked the authority to direct 
accounting officers in their settlement of accounts,189 while at the 
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same time maintaining that the department heads possessed such 
authority.190 Close analysis of Crittenden’s position reveals it to be 
somewhat problematic. First, it ignored the fact that many of the 
authorities he cited for the principle that the heads of departments 
could direct subordinate executive officials also recognized that the 
president could direct those subordinate officials as well.191 Second, 
although Crittenden’s opinion noted the absurdity of “a theory which 
would make the heads of the departments and the President of the 
United States, who are responsible for the due and efficient 
administration of the executive government, . . . dependent for 
supplies of money . . . on the subordinate members of the Treasury 
Department,”192 Crittenden inexplicably failed to carry this reasoning 
through to its logical conclusion by limiting its implications to the 
heads of departments. Finally, Crittenden himself appeared to 
recognize that the president might be reluctant to accept his views as 
the administration’s policy when he conceded that “[i]f the President, 
however, should take a different view of his duty, I am prepared, most 
respectfully and cheerfully, to give him my opinion of the merits of 
each of these cases.”193 In any event, even if these isolated, 
subpresidential disavowals of the president’s power to direct 
subordinate federal officials are read for all that they are worth, they 
are not a significant enough departure from the unbroken line of 
presidential statements in favor of the unitary executive to constitute 
presidential acquiescence. 
Fillmore left office in 1853 with the nation prosperous and at peace 
and the sectional conflict largely under control, at least for the time 
being. Fillmore was a faithful executor of the laws of the United 
States—for good and for ill—and he, like his fellow Whig Zachary 
Taylor, was an enthusiastic exerciser of the removal power. The 
unitary executive was alive and well when Fillmore left office in 
March 1853 and the anti-presidential power Whigs lost power for the 
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last time. 
G. Franklin Pierce 
Franklin Pierce and his successor, James Buchanan, were two of 
the worst presidents in American history. Pierce was a weak man who 
wanted to please everybody, as well as an alcoholic. He was totally 
dominated by his Southern cabinet members, especially his vocal and 
very visible secretary of war, Jefferson Davis, future president of the 
Confederacy.194 “The result was government by cabinet,” a disastrous 
result except with respect to foreign policy, where the able secretary 
of state, William Marcy, was able to rescue a few limited successes.195 
Notwithstanding his weaknesses both as a man and as president, 
Pierce was a committed Jacksonian who, as a matter of political 
philosophy, subscribed to the broad views of executive power 
espoused by the Democratic Party for the previous twenty years. He 
believed in the presidential removal power, opposed a national bank 
and internal improvements, and maintained all the other elements of 
the Jacksonian creed with great fervor. The Democrats, for their part, 
began trying to associate Pierce with Andrew Jackson as early as the 
election campaign of 1852.196 This period of adulation was short 
lived. “Though his supporters labeled him ‘Young Hickory of the 
Granite Hills,’ after the election no one ever compared Pierce to 
Andrew Jackson” again.197 
Pierce’s biographer, Larry Gara, reports that “Pierce’s poor record 
with a Congress that was dominated by his own party underlined his 
weakness and ineptitude.”198 In addition, “Pierce was perceived as an 
inept administrator incapable of carrying out his own policies.”199 His 
appointments rapidly became “a part of the problem in Kansas” as 
controversy over that state, fanned by Pierce’s own actions, began to 
tear the Union apart.200 “In the 1850s, Democrats were still living in 
Jackson’s shadow, though none of them could hope to equal him in 
dynamism and popularity.”201 The problem, as Gara notes, was that 
“Jacksonian democracy had run its course. The fundamental changes 
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at work in all aspects of American life required a degree of political 
adjustment that the president from New Hampshire could neither 
understand nor implement.”202 
As best he could, Pierce tried to govern as president following the 
Jacksonian creed. He vetoed some bills providing for internal 
improvements and spending on the grounds they were beyond the 
Constitution’s enumerated powers.203 In a series of opinions issued by 
his capable but pro-Southern attorney general, Caleb Cushing, he 
backed strict enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, which had come 
to be hated in the North.204 Pierce was thus, like Fillmore, a vigorous 
and faithful executor of that iniquitous law. Pierce and his attorney 
general also pressed a vigorous defense of executive privilege. 
Cushing declared that “Congress had no right to make changes in 
rank mandatory on the president, nor did it have a right to prescribe 
qualifications for diplomats. With Cushing’s opinion to back him up, 
Pierce refused to implement some of the objectionable provisions [of 
a bill that Congress passed].”205 The best that can be said for Pierce is 
that he was personally involved in the matters his departments 
handled, and, while his cabinet was far from harmonious, none of its 
members resigned during Pierce’s term.206 
Backed by three opinions authored by Attorney General Cushing 
supporting the president’s power to remove,207 Pierce did occasionally 
make use of the removal power, such as when he fired a governor of 
the Kansas territory208 and when he ordered a purge of every federal 
official with Know-Nothing sympathies.209 Although the presidency 
had switched parties once again with the election of Pierce as a 
Democrat, the change in partisan control did not elicit any change in 
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presidential policy regarding the removal power. In fact, by the time 
Pierce took office, the power of removal had been so firmly 
entrenched that Pierce’s clean sweep of the previous appointees no 
longer elicited any significant political interest.210 Indeed, most debate 
in this extremely factional period of American history revolved 
around how those appointments would be distributed based on 
officeholder, region, party faction, and view on the subject of 
slavery.211 Thus, to a significant extent, a practice had been 
established and reflected the general acceptance of the president’s 
control of the executive branch through the removal power. 
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie,212 a case that tangentially 
involved the President’s removal power, reached the Supreme Court 
during the Pierce Administration. Guthrie involved the issue of 
whether a Minnesota territorial judge, who had been removed by the 
President, could sue for a writ of mandamus commanding the 
Secretary of the Treasury to pay his salary for the unexpired portion 
of his four year term of office. Attorney General Cushing, in his 
argument of the case before the Supreme Court, asserted that the 
President has had the removal power ever since the Decision of 
1789213 and that the power of removal was essential to fulfilling the 
president’s constitutional duty to “take are that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”214 The Court elided over the removal question and held 
that no court had the power to order the disbursement of money from 
the Treasury and that mandamus could only issue as to a ministerial 
act, which was not the nature of the act here.215 Guthrie thus implies 
tangential support for the theory of the unitary executive and for the 
notion that the President has a broad removal power. 
The Pierce administration did not simply support the unitariness of 
the executive branch by asserting its removal power. It also strongly 
endorsed the president’s power to direct subordinate executive 
officials. In a strident opinion, Cushing joined Attorneys General 
Berrien, Taney, Butler, Johnson, and Crittenden in rejecting Wirt’s 
assertion that the president could direct the department heads, but not 
lower-level executive officials.216 Such a doctrine was nonsensical 
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and contrary to “settled constitutional theory,” which requires that 
executive discretion be exercised in accordance with the “unity of 
executive action, and, of course, unity of executive decision; which 
by the inexorable necessity of the nature of things, cannot be obtained 
by means of a plurality of persons, unduly independent of one 
another, without corporate conjunction, and released from subjection 
to one determining will.”217 Although the president was not under any 
obligation to intervene in every possible decision, there was no 
question that he had the authority to do so.218 
Cushing embraced the president’s power to direct even more 
forcefully in a subsequent opinion. Cushing noted that in setting up 
the various executive departments, Congress recognized that “in the 
President is the executive power vested by the Constitution, and also 
because the Constitution commands that HE shall take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed: thus making him not only the depositary 
of the executive power, but the responsible executive minister of the 
United States.”219 Although the attorneys general had fluctuated on 
the question,220 Cushing concluded that “no Head of Department can 
lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President; and 
that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance of all such 
acts.”221 As Cushing reasoned, “If it were not thus, Congress might by 
statute so divide and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert 
the Government, and to change it into a parliamentary despotism, like 
that of Venice or Great Britain, with a nominal executive Chief utterly 
powerless.”222 Armed with these opinions, Pierce took control of his 
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administration to the extent that someone of his limited ability could, 
issuing an executive order centralizing his control over the federal 
government’s legal affairs.223 The Pierce administration thus firmly 
advanced the president’s power to direct as well as the president’s 
power to remove. 
Finally, the Pierce administration rebuffed one of the earliest 
attempts by Congress to impose what amounted to a legislative veto, 
when both the House and the Senate passed separate resolutions 
urging that the Secretary of the Interior reverse his denial of a claim. 
Again, the administration’s primary instrument was an opinion by 
Attorney General Cushing. As Cushing noted, “[T]he Constitution 
provides for co-ordinate powers acting in different and respective 
spheres of co-operation. The executive power is vested in the 
President, whilst all legislative powers are vested in Congress.”224 
Thus the Constitution gave Congress the authority to participate in the 
enactment of general laws. However, “the Constitution has not given 
to either branch of the legislature the power, by separate resolution of 
its own, . . . to apply [a general law] to a given case. And its 
resolutions have obligatory force only as far as regards itself or things 
dependent on its own constitutional power.”225 That the resolutions 
were directed at the Secretary of the Interior and not the President was 
immaterial. Cushing noted that a department head acts “in 
subordination always to his constitutional and legal relation to the 
President of the United States.”226 Put simply, “the authority of each 
Head of Department is a parcel of the executive power of the 
President. To coerce the Head of Department is to coerce the 
President.”227 
Thus, despite the fact that Pierce is almost invariably placed 
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towards the bottom of any attempt to rate the presidents,228 the 
incompetence of his administration did not stop it from vigorously 
defending the president’s sole authority to control the execution of the 
law. By supporting the president’s power to remove and direct and by 
opposing Congress’s attempt to interfere directly with the execution 
of the law, the Pierce administration supported every major facet of 
the unitary executive. Moreover, although some of the attorneys 
general during the Monroe, Jackson, Polk, and Taylor administrations 
had evinced some willingness to tolerate limitations on the president’s 
authority to oversee the actions of all subordinate executive officers, 
Pierce’s strong opposition to such limitations essentially vitiated 
previous executives’ acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate 
construction. 
H. James Buchanan 
If Pierce was a bad president, then it must be said at the outset that 
James Buchanan was even worse. A former Federalist who had 
become a Jacksonian Democrat by 1828,229 Buchanan was narrowly 
elected to the presidency in 1856 because the Whig Party had 
disappeared and the Republicans and Know-Nothings split the anti-
Democratic vote. 
Buchanan came to the presidency with a well-established 
reputation as a defender of the president’s authority to execute the 
law, having defended the president’s veto power on Jacksonian 
grounds, and having personally authored the Democratic response to 
Whig assertions of limited executive power as a Democrat in the 
Senate during the Tyler administration. Indeed, it was Buchanan’s 
writings during the 1840s that effectively served as the last word on 
the question of presidential power to veto legislation at will.230 
But the defining moment of the Buchanan administration from the 
standpoint of the unitary executive occurred during the months 
following Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860 and 
Lincoln’s inauguration in March 1861. During these lame-duck 
months, Buchanan did nothing while state after state seceded from the 
Union. Although his refusal to surrender Fort Sumter was not 
insignificant, it pales beside his larger failings faithfully to execute 
the Constitution and laws with respect to secession. 
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Buchanan’s administration got off to a horrible start when the 
President-elect undertook to communicate with several Supreme 
Court Justices about the pending Dred Scott case.231 This 
correspondence involved a severe dereliction of duty by both 
Buchanan and the justices involved, and Buchanan’s involvement, in 
particular, constituted a failure of his responsibility to faithfully 
execute the Constitution—in violation of his oath of office. 
During the Buchanan Administration, cabinet meetings were held 
regularly and were “supplemented by equally regular dinners and 
family-type gatherings,” and no “crises were met without long, 
special cabinet sessions in which the president and his advisers 
convened as allies against adversaries usually considered enemies as 
well as opponents on principle.”232 It would be a mistake, however, to 
infer from Buchanan’s willingness to consult his cabinet any lack of 
conviction in the president’s authority over the administration of the 
law. The cabinet members “always insisted that despite the attention 
their views invariably received, the president himself was always in 
command. The administration was a directory because the president 
shared fully the basic precepts and emotional attachments of his 
ministers.”233 
Buchanan’s support for the unitary executive was also made 
manifest in his widespread use of the removal power.234 Not only did 
Buchanan use this power freely, he is cited by modern historians as 
the executive who took the power of partisan removal to its logical 
conclusion when he extended its application to Pierce appointees, 
despite the fact that all of them were fellow Democrats.235 Buchanan’s 
willingness to use the removal power is dramatically illustrated by his 
attempts to muster support for an early legislative effort to get Kansas 
admitted to the Union as a slave state when most of the people in the 
Kansas territory were clearly anti-slavery.236 A bill to this effect 
passed the Senate, with “the cabinet lobbying directly, firing opposing 
postmasters and other officeholders right and left, and using both 
threats and promises wholesale,” but failed to be adopted in the House 
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of Representatives.237 
The widespread removals and threats of removals attest to 
Buchanan’s belief in the Jacksonian theory of an unlimited removal 
power. Phillip Shaw Paludan, a Lincoln biographer, reports: 
When Buchanan sought votes for the Lecompton [Kansas] 
constitution, passed because of massive vote fraud in Kansas, he 
bribed legislators with offers of jobs and with contracts to firms 
owned by congressmen’s relatives . . . . To get support for [another 
Kansas bill] the Buchanan administration walked the lobbies and 
aisles of the House, alternating bribes of government contracts 
with threats of loss of patronage. In June 1860 a committee of the 
House, the Covode committee, reported corruption ranging from 
Kansas to the navy yards in the East, including instances of 
promises of offices to congressmen and offers of printing contracts 
to editors for political support . . . . [T]he overall effect was to 
brand the Buchanan administration as “the Buchaneers,” more 
interested in spoils than in principle.238 
Even after his policy and strategy produced horrible losses in the 
1858 mid-term elections, Buchanan continued to use the removal 
power as a political weapon in retaliating against Northern Democrats 
like Stephen Douglas, who had sensibly opposed Buchanan’s efforts 
to admit Kansas as a slave state. Throughout Douglas’s hard-fought 
1858 Senate re-election campaign against Lincoln, “the 
administration did everything possible to destroy Douglas. 
Democratic newspapers had to oppose him or lose the public printing. 
Postmasters, other officeholders, and those hoping to be officeholders 
dared not speak a word in his favor.”239 Ultimately, Douglas squeaked 
out a victory over Lincoln, “but most Northern Democrats were less 
fortunate,” as “[t]hroughout the North the Republicans were swept 
into governorships, the Senate, and the House.”240 
Buchanan unflinchingly asserted control over his administration. 
Indeed, it was one of the few activities that provided any respite from 
the many political setbacks he was suffering. As Smith reports: 
Frustrated at every turn by an opposition Congress, [Buchanan] 
sought personal relief through immersion in administrative affairs. 
When Cabinet members became ill or took time off, he assumed 
their duties. At the Department of State he busied himself with 
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grandiose but impossible dreams of territorial expansion.241 
As president, Buchanan was among the first to confront a new and 
serious attempt by Congress to limit the president’s control over his 
administration: the appropriations rider. Specifically, when Congress 
appropriated $500,000 to complete the Washington Aqueduct in 
1860, it attempted to prevent Secretary of War John B. Floyd from 
transferring the designer of the aqueduct, Captain Montgomery C. 
Meigs, to a distant post by attaching a rider requiring that the funds 
“be expended according to the plans and estimates” and “under [the] 
superintendence of Captain Meigs.”242 Buchanan signed the bill, but 
criticized the rider as an unconstitutional impingement on his 
constitutional authority.243 According to Buchanan, it was impossible 
that Congress could have intended to interfere with the clear right 
of the President to command the army and to order its officers to 
any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest. If 
[Congress] could withdraw an officer from the command of the 
President and selected for the performance of an Executive duty, 
they might, upon the same principle, annex to an appropriation to 
carry on a war on condition [that] . . . a particular person of its own 
selection should command the army.244 
Since Congress could not have “intend[ed] to deprive the President 
of the power to order [Meigs] to any other army duty for the 
performance of which he might consider him better adapted,” 
Buchanan announced that he would treat this rider merely as an 
expression of Congress’s “preference” rather than a binding 
legislative command.245 
In the end, Meigs’s bid to remain in Washington failed. In defiance 
of the clear mandate of the rider, Buchanan relieved Meigs of his 
duties and transferred him to the Gulf of Mexico. Meigs sent the 
aqueduct funds to the Treasury and urged that no project expenses be 
incurred in his absence, but his recommendations were ignored. By 
the time Floyd’s resignation permitted Meigs to return to the capital 
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six months later, the Army had already paid out more than $150,000 
of the $500,000 allocated in direct contravention of the rider attached 
by Congress.246 In the end, Buchanan successfully rebuffed 
Congress’s first major attempt to limit presidential control over the 
executive branch through an appropriation rider. 
The momentous four-way presidential election of 1860 led to the 
first ever victory for a Republican candidate: Abraham Lincoln of 
Illinois. There followed the greatest crisis in the “faithful execution” 
of the laws that was ever known to the Union. After the election and 
Lincoln’s victory, the echoes of secession grew louder, and the 
slaveholding states began to threaten federal forts. The South viewed 
the issue of the Union forts located behind Southern lines “as an 
indicator of Northern intentions. If the Union would give them up or 
if they could be taken without inciting a war, a peaceful secession 
would be a reality.”247 Most important was Fort Sumter, in 
Charleston, South Carolina, defended by Major Robert Anderson 
who, although of Southern background, was “a Unionist and a 
military professional determined to do his job.”248 
All eyes were glued to the White House to see what Buchanan’s 
policy might be. “With the growing threat to the federal forts and 
other national property in the background, the President had to decide 
upon an overall policy and approach to secession. Was secession 
constitutional? Did the federal government have the constitutional 
power to coerce a seceding state back into the Union?”249 If secession 
were constitutional, what about the problem of all the federal forts, 
post offices, and other property in the seceding states? Could the 
President give up all this federal property consistently with his 
constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed?” 
Buchanan approached this situation “with his usual strong 
determination, dogged stubbornness, and confused insight.”250 As 
usual, he was conscientious and diligent about carrying out his duties. 
He met with his cabinet faithfully and energetically,251 but he waffled 
over sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter. He knew that the army 
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numbered only sixteen thousand men, and he considered a call for 
volunteers early on to be “both unconstitutional and unwise.”252 
Buchanan’s cabinet met with him almost daily and split over the 
question of secession. Secretary of State Lewis Cass, the 1848 
Democratic nominee for president, and Attorney General Jeremiah 
Black said that the President could not acknowledge any right of 
secession, while three Southern members of the cabinet came out in 
favor of secession.253 Buchanan asked Black for a legal opinion on the 
situation. Black emphatically denied that the president had any 
authority to recognize secession254 and underscored the president’s 
right to collect customs and his duty to defend public property and to 
execute the laws.255 In addition, the military act of 1795 gave the 
president the power to call out the militia when judicial proceedings 
were insufficient to check dissenting states.256 
Buchanan delivered his annual message on December 3, 1860, and 
the only useful thing he had to say was that the South was in no 
danger from Lincoln’s mere election and that it should wait for some 
actual grievance to emerge before resorting to secession.257 Buchanan 
took the view that secession was unconstitutional if it was called 
secession,258 but suggested that it might be permissible if it were 
instead called a “revolution.”259 With respect to the forts, Buchanan 
added that the president must fulfill his oath of office260 and that if 
anyone tried “to expel the United States from [its] property by 
force . . . the officer in command of the forts has received orders to 
act strictly on the defensive” and that “responsibility for 
consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the 
assailants.”261 
In the months that followed, Buchanan adopted perhaps the 
narrowest view of presidential power of any president prior to the 
Civil War, viewing the president as “no more than the chief executive 
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officer of the government” whose sole province was “not to make but 
to execute the laws.”262 He thus misused the bully pulpit of the 
presidency to encourage rather than discourage secession, in 
contravention of his oath to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. President-elect Lincoln tried to calm the waters by pledging 
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act,263 but it was too late. Seven states 
in the deep South passed ordinances of secession.264 
Buchanan did stand firm in one regard, however: He would not 
abandon the forts, as “[t]hey were federal property and could not be 
taken legally under either the right of secession, which he opposed, or 
the right of revolution, which he defended.”265 On December 12, 
1860, as the issue of the forts percolated, Buchanan received a blow 
when Secretary of State Lewis Cass resigned in a letter “protesting 
Buchanan’s refusal to send troops to Charleston.”266 Cass became an 
immediate hero, and Buchanan responded by moving Attorney 
General Black to the State Department and by appointing the soon-to-
be-famous Edwin M. Stanton attorney general.267 Elbert Smith 
reports: 
Some historians have given Black . . . and Stanton all the credit for 
Buchanan’s refusal to abandon Fort Sumter, but the president 
himself indicated no great respect and certainly no affection for . . . 
Stanton . . . . He did usually listen to Black, but the position he 
followed on Fort Sumter was probably influenced far more by 
Northern public opinion than by any of his cabinet. Every hint of 
weakness brought a storm of abuse. Every show of defiance 
toward South Carolina brought momentary praise.268 
When South Carolina seceded and its governor asked for the 
immediate surrender of Fort Sumter, Buchanan wrote that “[o]nly 
Congress . . . could decide on relations between the federal 
government and South Carolina, and [that] he had no power to 
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recognize the dissolution of the Union or surrender Fort Sumter to 
anyone.”269 An attack on the fort absent congressional action would 
be militarily repelled. Finally, by the end of December 1860, 
Buchanan ordered federal warships to resupply Fort Sumter.270 
On January 8, 1861, Buchanan sent a special message to Congress, 
again insisting that “only Congress had the power and responsibility 
to find a peaceful solution [to the crisis] or to authorize the use of 
force to protect federal property.”271 President-elect Lincoln, 
meanwhile, circumspectly informed listeners that “he would preserve, 
protect, defend, and enforce the Constitution equally in all parts of the 
country.”272 Buchanan, in contrast, stood idly by in late 1860 and 
early 1861 as state after state seceded from the Union. In so doing, he 
abdicated his sworn responsibility to enforce the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. 
Even though Buchanan may have been the worst president in 
American history as a general matter, on the issues that are central to 
this survey—issues of the unitariness of the executive—he gets a 
passing mark. There was no acquiescence during Buchanan’s one 
term in office in any congressional plan to limit the president’s 
removal power or his ability to control the executive branch. 
Buchanan did fail to defend the Constitution and faithfully execute 
the laws during the winter of 1860 to 1861, but he declined to 
surrender Fort Sumter, and in any event, Lincoln immediately stepped 
in to repair the breach. The greatest outbreak of lawlessness and 
insurrection against federal authority in our history was to be 
followed by the greatest unilateral use of executive power to defend 
the Constitution. Buchanan was the last of the Jacksonian presidents, 
and at the end of this period the concept of the unitary executive 
bequeathed by the Founding Fathers was alive and well, even though 
no Jacksonian president was elected to a second term and several 
were very weak chief executives by modern standards. 
* * * 
Despite the historically unremarkable administrations of many of 
the Jacksonian presidents, the record clearly shows that these 
presidents explicitly or implicitly held the same views of unitary 
executive power as Andrew Jackson, even though all but Polk were 
 
269. Id. at 177. 
270. Id. at 183. 
271. Id. at 161. 
272. Id. at 163. 
  
No. 3] The Unitary Executive 717 
far weaker than Old Hickory while in office. As Leonard White 
observes: 
The Democrats maintained the tradition that heads of departments 
were assistants to the President. Any doubt about the independent 
position of the Treasury was dispelled when Jackson removed 
William Duane. No Secretary from 1829 to 1861 challenged the 
supremacy of the Chief Executive. The Whigs appeared at times to 
lean toward a type of cabinet government, but such a theory found 
lodgment nowhere. The President appointed, the President gave 
directions, and in case of necessity, he had the undoubted power to 
remove the department heads.273 
This consistency is all the more remarkable when considered in 
light of three historical factors specific to this period of American 
history. First, these presidencies all occurred during a time when 
congressional assertiveness had reach unprecedented heights, led by 
such luminaries as Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John Calhoun. 
Second, four of these presidents were nominal Whigs, a party whose 
central political tenet was an executive branch of limited power 
relative to Congress. Third, all of these presidencies, and particularly 
the last four, took place at a time when sectionalism and factionalism 
over slavery were eroding the power of all of the branches of 
government, including the executive branch. In spite of these factors, 
all of the Jacksonian presidents were consistently aggressive and 
unrestrained in their use of the executive appointment, removal, and 
law enforcement powers under the Constitution. 
III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE  
CIVIL WAR, 1861-1869 
Buchanan’s refusal to oppose the rebellion of the Southern states 
set the stage for the climactic event of the first century of our nation’s 
history: the Civil War. The intractability and the morality of the 
slavery issue tore the country apart, at terrible cost. As is so often the 
case, the ensuing peace in many ways proved even more divisive than 
the war itself. The debates surrounding Reconstruction proved just as 
politically explosive and were in many ways even more vindictive 
than were the debates leading up to secession. 
Although the states and citizens that remained part of the republic 
were unified in their support for prosecuting the war, it would be a 
mistake to assume that relations between the various branches of 
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government remained harmonious. Struggles over the balance of 
power between the president and Congress emerged as an important 
undercurrent that ran throughout the war. The desperation of the times 
led Abraham Lincoln to assert and Congress to tolerate an 
unprecedented degree of concentration of power in the chief 
executive. The result was that Lincoln led and Andrew Johnson 
inherited perhaps the strongest presidency in our nation’s history. 
In fact, the unique nature of the civil war presidencies gave rise to a 
paradox of sorts. The fact that Lincoln wielded more raw power than 
any of his predecessors simultaneously appears to have led him to 
tolerate limitations to the devices needed to superintend the execution 
of the law that would otherwise be regarded as quite problematic. In 
addition, Johnson’s personal limitations as a politician and his near-
total lack of a political power base allowed Congress to emasculate 
the presidency in ways that were never before possible. In the end, 
this confrontation between the executive and legislative branches 
culminated somewhat inconclusively with Johnson’s impeachment 
and the Senate’s ultimate refusal to convict him of those charges. 
That said, we believe that it would be dangerous to read too much 
into these developments. The extraordinariness of the times limit their 
precedential significance, and their implications are muted still further 
when viewed in the context of Lincoln’s extraordinary efforts to 
ensure the faithful execution of the laws of the land. But most 
importantly for the purposes of this article, it becomes clear that in 
many cases these presidents did not suffer these indignations in 
silence and under no circumstances did they affirmatively acquiesce 
to them. As a result, whatever deviations from the unitary executive 
that occurred during this period are too minor and too sporadic to 
represent the type of established historical pattern needed to settle an 
issue under the methodology of departmental or coordinate 
construction. 
A. Abraham Lincoln 
If James Buchanan was the nation’s worst president, then Abraham 
Lincoln was one of its best. Lincoln’s administration clearly 
represented the zenith of presidential power during the first century 
under the Constitution. The exigencies of the Civil War demanded 
that Lincoln wield a range of powers the like of which the country 
had never before witnessed, and many of his enemies accused him of 
taking on dictatorial or tyrannical powers. Lincoln’s strong 
presidency is ironic because he began his political career as a Whig 
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and, like most Whigs in the 1840s and 1850s, he began his political 
career opposed to a strong Jacksonian presidency. Lincoln biographer 
Phillip Shaw Paludan reports: “Lincoln’s roots were in a world where 
warnings against unrestrained executive authority were party 
gospel.”274 
However, Lincoln’s private communications during the 1840’s and 
1850’s demonstrate a more thoughtful view of presidential power and 
a realization of the practical necessity of strength and unitariness in 
the presidency. Leonard White notes that Lincoln objected to 
President Zachary Taylor’s policy of delegating responsibility for 
appointments to the departments and, during the Taylor 
administration, Lincoln wrote in a private letter, “This . . . must be 
arrested, or it will damn us all . . . . The appointments need be no 
better . . . but the public must . . . understand . . . they are the 
President’s appointments.”275 Lincoln thus appreciated the fact that 
the president must pick and remove his own men to control his 
administration. 
During the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, Lincoln addressed the 
issue of the unitary executive, advocating the position that 
congressmen and presidents have a co-equal power with the courts to 
engage in constitutional review. Lincoln believed in the legitimacy of 
coordinate or departmental review, and he expressed that view as 
eloquently and forcefully as anyone who has ever occupied the 
presidential office. In a debate against Stephen Douglas in 
Springfield, Illinois on July 17, 1858, Lincoln said: 
 Now, as to the Dred Scott decision; for upon that [Douglas] 
makes his last point at me. He boldly takes ground in favor of that 
decision. 
 This is one-half the onslaught, and one-third of the entire plan of 
the campaign. I am opposed to that decision in a certain sense, but 
not in the sense which he puts on it. I say that in so far as it decided 
in favor of Dred Scott’s master and against Dred Scott and his 
family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision. 
 I never have proposed to do any such thing. I think, that in 
respect for judicial authority, my humble history would not suffer 
in a comparison with that of Judge Douglas. He would have the 
citizen conform his vote to that decision; the member of Congress, 
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his; the President, his use of the veto power. He would make it a 
rule of political action for the people and all the departments of the 
government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb 
no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs.276 
Lincoln reiterated his departmentalist opposition to Dred Scott in 
his first inaugural address: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional 
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny 
that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to 
a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to 
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other 
departments of the government. And while it is obviously possible 
that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil 
effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the 
chance that it may be over-ruled, and never become a precedent for 
other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different 
practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if 
the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the 
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation 
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, 
to be their own rulers, having to that extent, practically resigned 
their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is 
there, in this view, any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a 
duty, from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly 
brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to 
turn their decisions to political purposes.277 
Lincoln was clearly a committed departmentalist in the mold of 
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.278 
In November 1860, Lincoln won the presidency, and the country 
wondered what to expect from him. After all, 
Lincoln lacked administrative experience. He had held no 
significant military command, no leading position in industry, or 
business. He had been a legislator, not a governor. Unlike his 
Southern counterpart, Jefferson Davis, he had not administered any 
government department. Most notably he had not been trained to 
command, as Davis had been at West Point. He was an outsider to 
Washington and its political culture His last visit to the city had 
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been twelve years earlier when he had served one two-year term as 
congressman.279 
President-elect Lincoln was lucky in one regard. He came into office 
with large Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, 
especially after the Southern states seceded and their members gave 
up their congressional seats.280 
President-elect Lincoln picked an exceptionally able cabinet with 
the increasingly cautious William Seward as Secretary of State281 and 
the more radical Salmon P. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury.282 
Unlike Buchanan’s cabinet, Lincoln’s was filled with men of first-rate 
ability, and it was politically and geographically balanced.283 
Lincoln’s willingness to pick men who rivaled him in national stature 
helped him to fulfill his obligation to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.” 
Lincoln’s first inaugural address laid out a sophisticated argument 
as to why secession was unconstitutional,284 an argument eventually 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Texas v. White.285 Lincoln believed 
that the Union was “perpetual” and “could not lawfully be 
divided,”286 and he swore that “I shall take care, as the Constitution 
itself expressly enjoins upon me that the laws of the Union be 
faithfully executed in all the States.”287 The natural concomitant of 
these commitments was to make it “the declared purpose of the Union 
that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.”288 At the same 
time, Lincoln urged that it would be “much safer of all” if he were to 
enforce “all those acts which stand unrepealed,” even those, such as 
the Fugitive Slave Act, whose constitutionality had been 
questioned.289 With the “momentous issue of civil war” before them, 
Lincoln closed by maintaining that the government would not “assail” 
the South if the Union was not assailed, but that both sides needed to 
note that he had taken the most solemn oath “registered in Heaven” to 
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preserve, protect, and defend the Union.290 Lincoln was not going to 
stand aside, as James Buchanan did, while the Union was coming 
apart. 
After his inauguration on March 4, 1861, Lincoln was able to cast 
off the cautious, quiet, reassuring pose he had assumed as president-
elect. Between March 4, 1861, and July 4, 1861, Lincoln unleashed 
the most extraordinary period of unilateral executive action that the 
Republic has ever witnessed. Suffice it to say that had the 
circumstances that Lincoln faced been any less threatening, he could 
not be excused for taking some of the steps that he did without 
congressional approval. Only the extraordinary emergency he faced 
provides any justification for the sweeping character of his actions. 
One of Lincoln’s first major decisions was when to call Congress 
back for an emergency session. “[C]learing a wide space for executive 
initiative, he set the date for congressmen to return over two-and-a-
half months away—4 July 1861. For almost its first three months the 
Civil War was the president’s war.”291 Could Lincoln have safely 
reconvened Congress earlier? It is plausible that he could not have. 
The State of Maryland was in total chaos, as Southern sympathizers 
rioted and sought to get Maryland to join Virginia in seceding.292 Had 
they been successful, Washington would have been behind enemy 
lines and members of Congress meeting there would have been in 
grave danger. Congress could have convened in a city other than 
Washington, but that would have humiliated the government and 
given Southerners great hope that secession was going to succeed, 
while debilitating Northern public opinion. Arguably, the most 
prudent thing to do was to secure Maryland before calling Congress 
back into session in Washington. The delay in calling Congress also 
gave Lincoln the opportunity to take important unilateral actions to 
cope with the secession crisis.293 
First, Lincoln ordered that Union forts and other national outposts 
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and property be defended from any attacks or confiscation by 
Southern states. This required mobilizing troops and supplies without 
congressional consent and sometimes without constitutional 
authority.294 To protect Fort Sumter specifically, Lincoln dispatched 
the strongest federal war ship available, the Powhatan. “Confusion in 
orders, and perhaps Seward’s deception, sent the ship toward [another 
embattled fort] but Lincoln was in charge now” and military force 
was going to be used to defend Union property.295 
Second, there were dramatic increases in the size of the army and 
navy, all accomplished by presidential decree.296 This was arguably 
contrary to the clearly expressed congressional power “to raise and 
support armies.”297 However, the president has unilateral authority to 
federalize the state militias when he believes a crisis calls for this. 
Lincoln thus took a legitimate step when on April 15 he declared the 
existence of a sufficient state of emergency and called up 75,000 
members of state militias into national service.298 
Third, Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of all Southern ports.299 
This was a highly effective unilateral deployment of ships that helped 
greatly in the eventual crushing of the South. As commander in chief, 
Lincoln had the authority to deploy federal warships as he saw fit—as 
the Supreme Court would eventually recognize in its five-to-four 
decision in The Prize Cases300—but surely their use without 
congressional approval with respect to a domestic insurrection was 
extraordinary. 
Fourth, and most strikingly, Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus between Philadelphia and Washington in order to 
deal with riots and disorder in Maryland.301 The Constitution is silent 
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on whether Congress or the president has the authority to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus in times of emergency, but the better argument 
is surely that this is normally a congressional prerogative. In response 
to Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, “[t]he Whig attitude toward the 
presidency, born of the attack on Jackson as ‘King Andrew,’ faded so 
rapidly that within weeks Lincoln was being called a dictator and his 
government a despotism.”302 
Fifth, Lincoln “closed the mails to ‘disloyal’ publications; he told 
generals to begin raising new armies; he paid $2 million out of the 
Treasury to private citizens in New York to expedite recruiting; he 
pledged government credit for $250,000 million. He had no authority 
to do these things; Congress clearly did.”303 Lincoln also issued a 
general order embodying the rules applicable to federal armies in the 
field. This order was arguably in violation of the Constitution’s 
assignment to Congress of the duty “to make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”304 
Sixth, and finally, Secretary of State Seward was made the “hub of 
early internal security actions. He set up a special bureau in his 
department with three clerks assigned to handle the filing and 
recording of internal security activities.”305 Seward used “federal 
marshals and attorneys and judges” to gather information; “[o]nce it 
was known he was interested he attracted grievances and warnings 
from crackpots as well as from serious citizens.”306 “Policemen and 
postmasters opened letters with Southern addresses and sent suspect 
material to Seward. Some letters clearly revealed treason.”307 Even 
newspapers “were targets for strict surveillance,” and one editor “was 
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thrown in jail” and his paper “was expelled from the mails.”308 
In sum, Lincoln unilaterally took a whole variety of measures in the 
spring of 1861 to repel the Southern attack. Lincoln defended his 
actions by arguing that the Commander in Chief Clause, when read in 
conjunction with the Take Care Clause, conveyed upon him the “war 
power,” which empowered him to take the sweeping actions that he 
did.309 Although he expressed the “deepest regret” at having the “war 
power in defense of the Government forced upon him,” he submitted 
that he had no choice “but to call out the war power of the 
Government and so to resist force employed for its destruction by 
force for its preservation.”310 
Lincoln did not waste time fleshing out the finer points of his 
theory of presidential power. Like Jefferson, Lincoln simply took it 
for granted that his duty to defend the Constitution and to faithfully 
execute the laws implicitly authorized him to take whatever steps 
were necessary to preserve the Republic, even if those steps were not 
specifically authorized by any particular constitutional provision.311 
Lincoln noted: 
I understood that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best 
of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every 
indispensable means, that government, that Nation of which that 
Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the 
Nation and yet to preserve the Constitution? . . . I felt that 
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by 
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Union. Right or 
wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it.312 
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In short, constitutional necessity provided its own justification. 
Whether his actions were legal or not, Lincoln undertook them, 
seemingly backed by the populace and the impetus of public 
exigency. He trusted that Congress would later vindicate his 
decisions.313 Further constitutional controversy was averted when, as 
Lincoln predicted, Congress and a sharply divided Supreme Court 
ratified all of Lincoln’s actions after the fact.314 The only unilateral 
action Lincoln undertook that was not immediately authorized by 
Congress was his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and even 
that was later ratified by Congress.315 
Upon taking office, Lincoln also put into effect the departmentalist 
rejection of Dred Scott that he had discussed in his debates with 
Douglas and in his first inaugural address.316 Lincoln directed his 
subordinates to conduct governmental affairs in a manner contrary to 
Dred Scott by ordering them to issue patents and visas to African-
American citizens.317 This departmentalist approach assumed new 
significance for Lincoln when the constitutionality of his suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus was challenged in the famous case of Ex 
parte Merryman,318 which arose when an officer in the Maryland 
militia was placed in military custody for allegedly using his position 
to recruit and train Confederate sympathizers. He filed for a writ of 
habeas corpus before Chief Justice Roger Taney himself, and Taney 
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granted the writ. Taney held that Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of 
the writ was an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress 
and that Merryman was “[e]ntitled to be set at liberty and discharged 
immediately from imprisonment.”319 However, complaining that he 
was “resisted by a force too strong for [him] to overcome,” Taney left 
it for the President, “in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to 
‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what 
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to 
be respected and enforced.”320 
Rather than enforce this order from the Chief Justice, Lincoln 
ignored it and appealed directly to the American people and to the 
legislature in his message to the special session of Congress on July 
4.321 Lincoln believed that “the president could define the meaning of 
the Constitution and that the people themselves, in electing the 
president, also made constitutional law. There was too much at stake 
to leave the meaning of the Constitution and the polity it helped 
define to nine justices.”322 Taney had claimed that Lincoln had 
violated his oath to “[f]aithfully execute” the laws by ignoring 
Merryman’s writ of habeas corpus. Without ever acknowledging that 
his unilateral suspension of habeas corpus was illegal, Lincoln argued 
that regardless of legality, the national situation was so dire that it 
justified his actions: 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully 
executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly 
one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of 
execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the use of the 
means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in such 
extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty, that, practically, it 
relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to a very 
limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are 
all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself 
go to pieces, lest that one should be violated?323 
Attorney General Edward Bates followed up Lincoln’s July 4 
address with a legal opinion further justifying Lincoln’s position.324 
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Bates said the three branches of government “are co-ordinate and 
coequal—that is, neither being sovereign, each is independent in its 
sphere, and not subordinate to the others, either of them or both of 
them together . . . . [I]f we allow one of the three to determine the 
extent of its own powers, and also the extent of the powers of the 
other two, that one can control the whole government, and has in fact 
achieved the sovereignty.”325 Thus, Attorney General Bates applied 
departmentalism to the question of whether a president is obligated to 
follow court judgments. This is arguably the most sweeping 
departmentalist argument ever made by a high government officer.326 
By September 1861, military commissions had been established to 
address disloyalty, but the Union government exercised remarkable 
restraint and arrested few orators and editors for their critiques of 
Lincoln.327 Paludan denies that “Lincoln was a ‘dictator,’” but others 
have debated the question.328 Notably, in the middle of the greatest 
war in the nation’s history, Lincoln held the 1862 and 1864 elections 
right on schedule, something no tyrant or dictator would ever do. In 
fact, although at several points in his 1864 re-election campaign it 
appeared that Lincoln could lose and the war end in stalemate, 
Lincoln nevertheless refused to cancel the presidential election. 
Lincoln paid close attention to the details of the Civil War, as the 
theory of the unitary executive suggests he should. James M. 
McPherson notes that Lincoln personally picked a series of generals 
to manage the war, especially in the East, before he settled on Ulysses 
S. Grant as the man he wanted to command his most important 
army.329 McPherson writes: 
The task of conducting [the Civil War] would stay in [Lincoln’s] 
hands in the most compelling and terrible sense—the war would go 
on as long as he wanted it to go on; it would stop when he said it 
had stopped. And every day as the casualties mounted and the boys 
died and the families agonized, he would decide to continue or to 
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end it. This was his war. He kept close watch on the warmaking 
that he was asking Union generals to direct.330 
At times, Lincoln delved into the most minute details of military 
strategy, and he told his generals very specifically what he wanted 
them to do.331 On one occasion he encouraged General Hooker to 
speak directly with him rather than report to Hooker’s superiors, and 
when he later became exasperated with Hooker, Lincoln personally 
told Secretary of the Army Stanton to accept Hooker’s resignation.332 
On another occasion after the Union victory at Gettysburg, Lincoln 
became furious with General Meade for failing to pursue the 
retreating Confederate troops.333 Lincoln’s General in Chief, Henry 
Halleck, complained “that Lincoln’s ‘fingers itch to be into 
everything going on.’”334 This may have been fortunate because, 
although “Lincoln’s tactical understanding remained flawed, his 
larger strategic ideas were sound.”335 Lincoln held “the same strategic 
ideas that Grant held: Union superiority in numbers meant that 
pressure all along the Confederate front would wear out and break 
down Southern resistance.”336 By the middle of the war, Lincoln 
withdrew somewhat and left the day-to-day command of the armies to 
Halleck, Stanton, and the increasingly able generals he had working 
for him, among them Grant.337 Overall, however, Lincoln was a very 
active and involved commander in chief who took full charge of the 
faithful execution of the war effort and the fight to defend the 
Constitution. 
Lincoln’s management of his cabinet was less direct than his 
supervision of the armies, in that Lincoln was willing to delegate 
authority to the very able men he had picked to advise him. Cabinet 
meetings were held regularly on Tuesdays and Fridays, at Salmon 
Chase’s urging, but “Seward and Stanton often met individually with 
Lincoln . . . generating resentment within the cabinet that lasted 
throughout the war.”338 A major cabinet crisis erupted in December 
1862 when thirty-one of thirty-two Republican senators voted in 
caucus that Secretary of State Seward should be removed, in part 
 
330. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 100. 
331. Id. at 203. 
332. Id. at 204-05. 
333. Id. at 206. 
334. Id. at 208. 
335. Id. at 207. 
336. Id. at 261. 
337. Id. at 217-18. 
338. Id. at 123. 
  
730 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
because Treasury Secretary Chase had been criticizing Seward on 
Capitol Hill.339 Lincoln answered the Seward opponents with finesse, 
calling upon the senators to meet with him at the White House 
without telling them that the entire cabinet, minus Seward, would be 
present. In the presence of the senators, Lincoln pointedly asked his 
cabinet if there was any lack of unity in the government and all the 
cabinet members swallowed hard and said no.340 The senators then 
backed down and Lincoln refused Seward’s resignation, which had 
been tendered.341 “The executive branch had established its ultimate 
autonomy, and Lincoln had clearly shown himself master of it. He, 
not Congress, would determine who his advisers would be.”342 
Ultimately, Lincoln put Treasury Secretary Chase on notice that he 
was watching him and “still controlled the patronage and the 
administration.”343 When Chase tried to appoint yet another former 
Democrat to a Treasury patronage post, Lincoln enthusiastically 
accepted Chase’s resignation, saying “you and I have reached a point 
of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems 
cannot be overcome.”344 
In the wake of the Seward crisis, Lincoln tried to show his devotion 
to cabinet government by ostentatiously asking every cabinet member 
for a written opinion on the legality of the various extraordinary 
events that had made West Virginia a new state.345 Lincoln thought it 
important to do this because he was fighting a war to defend the 
Constitution and laws, and he wanted everyone to see that he took the 
laws seriously with respect to West Virginia statehood. Paludan 
writes: 
An increasingly independent presidency was emerging, however, 
and the circumstances of war were validating it. A former Whig 
and a former Democrat, Bates and Blair, said that the president 
could ask for as many opinions or as few as he wished; he need not 
consult with them unless he wanted to. The president himself was 
accountable for his administration and by implication the only 
point at which congressmen could challenge a cabinet member was 
at confirmation hearings. There could be no such thing as a “plural 
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executive,” in Welles’s words.346 
In the summer of 1862, Lincoln took another momentous step in 
affirming unilateral presidential power when he announced his 
Emancipation Proclamation, under which all slaves in areas still in 
revolt on January 1, 1863, would henceforth and forever after be 
free.347 This followed upon congressional action in June 1862 where 
Congress, in violation of Dred Scott, outlawed slavery in the 
territories of the United States,348 thus settling an historic and long-
debated question. Lincoln believed that he “had authority under his 
war powers to free slaves in places where war was being made.”349 He 
later admitted that the Proclamation, which was criticized by former 
Supreme Court Justice and Dred Scott dissenter Benjamin Curtis,350 
was without “constitutional or legal justification, except as a military 
measure.”351 Lincoln “freed the slaves in the only place that he could 
legally reach them—in places that he ruled under presidential war 
powers.”352 Lincoln’s unilateral action in issuing the Emancipation 
Proclamation may well be the most important unilateral act any 
president of the United States has ever taken, and it was truly a 
sweeping and extraordinary exercise of the executive power conferred 
by the Constitution. 
The Civil War was fought over the issue of the president’s 
authority to take care that the laws be executed in the South, but there 
were a number of subsidiary “take care” questions that arose during 
the War that merit brief mention. First was the question of returning 
fugitive slaves, an issue which remained alive as slavery survived in 
some of the loyal border states. “[C]onstitutional commitment stayed 
firm; the federal government [continued to] return fugitives until June 
1864, when Congress killed the fugitive slave law.”353 Another “take 
care” issue arose over the unpopular draft law, which Democrats, 
lumping it with the habeas law, argued “gave the administration 
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monarchical powers.”354 Lincoln wrote an “extended argument on the 
necessity and constitutionality of the draft . . . [and he] asserted that 
‘it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed.’”355 From 
July 13 to 17, 1863, New York City exploded with riots against the 
draft law, and Lincoln was faced with a serious crisis of how to 
execute that law.356 Lincoln responded discreetly, but he did station 
troops in New York, thus showing his dedication to enforcing even 
unpopular laws.357 
Lincoln maintained military governments in some portions of the 
South that had been freed, like Louisiana, and thus he experimented 
unilaterally with military reconstruction there.358 Lincoln favored a 
quick, nonpunitive Reconstruction led by the military.359 Lincoln’s 
control of Louisiana reconstruction “rested almost entirely on his 
authority as commander in chief” and on the pardon power.360 
Members of Congress fretted that they should have some say over 
Louisiana, and they “worried about executive lawmaking.”361 Lincoln 
worked to bring Louisiana “quickly back into the Union,”362 while 
Congress eventually came to assert its own more radical 
reconstruction plans.363 The conflict came to a head when Lincoln 
refused to sign the second Confiscation Act until Congress had made 
certain changes to correspond with his view of executive and 
legislative authority. In response, Congress refused to seat the 
representatives elected by states that had complied with Lincoln’s 
Reconstruction plan. Finally, on July 2, 1864, relations between the 
President and Congress broke down completely with the embodiment 
of Congress’ Radical Reconstruction policies in the Wade-Davis bill. 
Objecting to the stiff Reconstruction policies represented in the bill, 
Lincoln pocket vetoed it. Congress in turn adopted the Wade-Davis 
Manifesto, reiterating its vision of Reconstruction and denouncing 
Lincoln’s action as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative 
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authority.364 Lincoln’s battles with Congress over Reconstruction thus 
represent another extraordinary exercise of the executive power. It is 
no wonder that on some occasions Lincoln’s Democratic opponents 
called him “King Lincoln” and charged him with “executive 
tyranny.”365 
Lincoln’s unusually strong commitment to the unilateral exercise of 
executive power, which led critics to accuse him of being tyrannical 
and monarchical, may also underlie a few of his more unfortunate 
positions on the unitary executive. Somewhat paradoxically, though 
Lincoln wielded more raw power than any of his predecessors or 
successors, he at times tolerated congressional efforts to limit his 
exercise of executive authority. 
On the one hand, Lincoln dominated his cabinet, on one occasion 
retracting the decision of his first Secretary of War Simon Cameron to 
arm fugitive slaves for the Union army and ultimately dismissing 
Cameron for insubordination.366 Lincoln also made wider use of the 
presidential removal power than any president before him, paying 
great attention to the details of patronage matters even during the 
crisis over Fort Sumter367 and removing 1457 out of a total of 1639 
presidential officers.368 In so doing, as Edwin Corwin notes, Lincoln 
“far surpassed” even Jackson’s “record as a spoilsman”369 Although 
Lincoln made many of these removals in order to ensure the loyalty of 
government officials, he did not hesitate to remove an official on 
purely partisan grounds.370 In fact, so partisan were Lincoln’s 
removals that a noted commentator observed, “If Lincoln had made 
appointments for merit only, the war might have been shortened; on 
the other hand, he might not have preserved a united North to carry on 
the war.”371 The importance of patronage only continued to swell, as 
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the prosecution of the war caused an almost fivefold increase in the 
number of federal employees.372 Lincoln came to regret the 
prevalence of patronage appointments. When facing a throng of 
office-seekers and congressmen in his outer office, Lincoln observed 
that the spoils system might in the course of time become far more 
dangerous to the Republic than the Civil War. Accordingly, Lincoln 
stubbornly resisted members of his own party who wanted to conduct 
a thorough “office sweep” in the beginning of his second term.373 
Doing so demonstrated Lincoln’s personal control over removal 
policy, a conclusion reinforced by an opinion of Attorney General 
Bates.374 Lincoln’s vigorous and partisan use of the removal power, in 
spite of his background as a former Whig, indicates his firm belief in 
the unitariness of the executive and the importance of presidential 
control throughout the executive branch. 
On the other hand, Lincoln offered no objection when Congress 
enacted legislation limiting Lincoln’s power to remove the 
Comptroller of the Currency,375 military officers,376 and consular 
clerks,377 or when the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War 
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delved far into the conduct of the military, examining past and future 
battle plans, the conduct of generals, and even demanding dismissals 
of certain generals on political grounds.378 This committee, formed 
largely because of “Old Republican” (i.e., Whig) dismay over 
Lincoln’s executive assertiveness and Radical Republican fear that 
Lincoln’s approach to the war was insufficiently abolitionist, 
conducted wide-ranging investigations into the conduct of the war by 
the executive branch. Lincoln tolerated the committee and allowed it 
a success when the committee was able to play a role in forcing the 
resignation of Lincoln’s first Secretary of War, the corrupt Simon 
Cameron, and suggest Edwin M. Stanton as Cameron’s successor.379 
Lincoln never directly responded to these attempted congressional 
incursions upon presidential power. Publicly, Lincoln preferred to 
pacify the Committee on the Conduct of the War when possible. In 
private, Lincoln complained, “Powers of the Government are 
unquestionably enlarged by a state of war but is Congress the 
government? I think not . . . . All the powers that Congress possess 
are those granted in the Constitution.”380 Lincoln’s official 
unwillingness to confront the committee was probably more evidence 
of a desire to maintain wartime political consensus than an abdication 
of presidential power. As Binkley notes, Lincoln’s strategy in dealing 
with Congress was “[n]o longer a question of constitutional 
assignments of power but a matter of maneuvering to preserve the 
prestige and prerogatives of the executive office which he considers 
not only constitutionally his but highly essential for the prosecution of 
the war and the salvation of the Union.”381 Lincoln thus chose 
pragmatism over dogmatism in dealing with Congress; he picked his 
constitutional battles with Congress carefully, with an eye towards 
gradual expansion of his overall power to administer the war.382 This 
desire to maintain wartime unity, especially within Republican Party 
ranks, was particularly important for Lincoln in the days leading up to 
the wartime election of 1864.383 
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Thus, it seems reasonably certain that Lincoln’s tolerance of some 
incursions upon the powers of the unitary executive can be explained 
on purely political grounds. If it was expected to concede to Lincoln 
the extraordinary powers that he was asserting, Congress surely 
needed something from which to draw some comfort. Fortunately for 
Lincoln and the nation, Lincoln possessed the political skills to avoid 
the worst of Congress’s challenges without alienating the legislature, 
and he was pragmatic enough to respond to situations flexibly without 
provoking unnecessary fights with Congress. For the purposes of this 
article, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the Lincoln 
administration’s failure to object to instances of congressional 
interference with the unitariness of the executive branch occurred 
when the nation was riven by civil war. Even so, without more 
explicit presidential concessions, mere silence provides only a weak 
basis for finding the existence of an established historical pattern of 
presidential acquiescence, particularly in light of the extraordinary 
powers Lincoln asserted in an unprecedented effort to see to it that the 
laws of the land were faithfully executed. 
Lincoln ran for re-election in 1864 with a unified party behind him. 
Safe from challenge on the left, Lincoln then looked to appease the 
border states by choosing as his running mate Andrew Johnson, the 
military governor of Tennessee.384 Although the “Tennessean had 
spoken of hanging traitors and had favored both emancipation and the 
use of black troops,”385 Johnson was to prove a fatefully bad choice. 
During the campaign, Secretary of War Stanton furloughed loyal 
troops so they could go home to vote for Lincoln, and he “dismissed 
quartermaster officials who campaigned for McClellan [Lincoln’s 
Democratic opponent]. [Stanton and Holt] carefully checked to see 
that anti-Lincoln newspapers and their editors did not get patronage 
jobs or government contracts.”386 Lincoln himself asked General 
Sherman to let loyal troops go home to vote in the important October 
elections in Indiana.387 Lincoln won easily with fifty-five percent of 
the popular vote. 
Lincoln’s party platform in 1864 called for a constitutional 
amendment abolishing slavery, and in the winter of 1864 to 1865 such 
an amendment was passed by Congress with Lincoln’s help.388 
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Lincoln noted in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 
1864 that “[t]he Executive power itself would be greatly diminished 
by the cessation of actual war.”389 A few months later, Lincoln 
became the first president in American history to be assassinated 
when a Southern traitor fired a fatal shot, shouting “Sic Semper 
Tyrannis”—thus always to tyrants.390 Lincoln’s successor, Andrew 
Johnson, abandoned Lincoln’s commitment to equal rights for all 
citizens, which in turn set the stage for the epic battle between the 
President and Congress over the Tenure of Office Act.391 
Lincoln wielded more raw, unilateral power than any president in 
American history before or since. He wielded that power specifically 
to uphold his oath to defend the Constitution and to see to it that the 
laws would be faithfully executed in all of the states. He remained 
silent on a few occasions when Congress transgressed the rights 
accorded to him as the unitary executive, but he always kept his eye 
on what was important, which was winning what should justly be 
called the War of the Rebellion. No president ever did more to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed than Lincoln, and that makes 
him a hero of this history of the unitary executive, his occasional 
lapses notwithstanding. 
B. Andrew Johnson 
Abraham Lincoln was succeeded by one of our worst presidents, 
Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. Johnson was one of only two 
presidents to be impeached, and, as we indicate below, his attempts to 
sabotage congressional Reconstruction might well have represented a 
sufficient failure to execute the law to justify it. However, Johnson’s 
actual impeachment was based on his violation of the unconstitutional 
Tenure of Office Act, which illegally sought to limit the president’s 
removal power. Johnson’s acquittal (by one vote) on this charge was 
due to his strong defense of the unitary executive and to several 
senators who agreed with Johnson’s defense. Importantly, Johnson 
promised key senators that, if acquitted, he would stop sabotaging 
Reconstruction during the balance of his term and that he would 
henceforth faithfully execute all of the laws, even those with which he 
disagreed. 
 
389. Id. at 306. 
390. DONALD, supra note 261, at 597. Sic semper tyrannis was the motto of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
391. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 318. 
  
738 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
Johnson began his political career as a Jacksonian Democrat, and 
he served as a Democrat in the House of Representatives, as governor 
of Tennessee, and as a U.S. Senator.392 As Hans Trefousse writes, 
“Andrew Johnson held three strong prejudices: a bias favoring 
yeoman farmers over the planter elite, the certainty that blacks were 
inferior to whites ‘in point of intellect,’ and a reverence for the 
Constitution, which he believed should be strictly interpreted.”393 
Johnson regarded Jackson as a prophet of the Constitution,394 and he 
adhered to Jackson’s views of the Nullification Crisis when Johnson 
staunchly opposed secession in 1860, something he equated with 
treason.395 A supporter of Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge in 
1860, Johnson was the only senator from a rebel state to remain in 
Congress.396 After Grant drove the Confederates out of Tennessee in 
1862, Johnson became military governor of Tennessee at Lincoln’s 
request.397 
Johnson was added to the Republican ticket in 1864, when the 
Republican Party temporarily renamed itself the Union Party in order 
to attract support from Northern Democrats and border state 
Unionists.398 After Lincoln was assassinated, Johnson tried to assume 
Jackson’s presidential swagger, though “‘common sense’ dictated 
[that he should proceed] with caution and restraint.”399 As Albert 
Castel writes, “Andrew Jackson was [Johnson’s] hero and model,” 
and it did not help that Johnson “inherited from Lincoln what, in 
some respects, was an almost dictatorial presidency.”400 Johnson did 
not understand that as an accidental president, he could not 
immediately step into Jackson’s and Lincoln’s shoes. 
When Johnson rose to the presidency, he faced a nearly impossible 
task. Lincoln had quarreled with Congress over Reconstruction,401 and 
Johnson lacked Lincoln’s finely-honed political skills. Even 
Johnson’s friends described him as proud and overly serious, and 
Johnson’s stubbornness and disinclination to compromise served him 
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poorly.402 Johnson’s reliance on constitutional defenses rather than 
political solutions also distinguished him from Lincoln. 
The first signs of trouble appeared in May 1865 when Johnson 
began to turn his attention to the contentious issue of Reconstruction 
policy. Congress was in recess until December 1865, leaving Johnson 
a window of seven months during which he could act unilaterally, if 
he so chose. Following Lincoln’s example, Johnson believed that his 
war power as commander in chief allowed him to set the terms of 
Reconstruction, particularly because, in Johnson’s view, the Union 
was indestructible and therefore the Southern states’ secession was 
presumptively invalid.403 Johnson argued that, because they had not 
validly seceded, the Southern states were entitled to representation in 
Congress as soon as order could be restored and elections held.404 
Johnson believed his obligation to ensure faithful execution of the law 
required that he shepherd the Southern states back into the Union as 
quickly as possible. Johnson’s honeymoon with Congress was 
extremely short lived,405 and his presidentially-dictated 
Reconstruction has been called “the most spectacular exhibition of 
unilateral national executive authority in American history.”406 
Johnson opened his campaign by issuing a broad pardon to most 
Southerners on May 29, 1865. He appointed a governor of North 
Carolina to call a convention in that state to amend the state’s 
constitution in preparation for its restoration to the Union.407 Similar 
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proclamations for the other seceded states followed.408 Most 
Northerners, accustomed to Lincoln’s unilateralism, including with 
respect to Reconstruction, supported Johnson initially, and only a few 
Radical Republicans called for a special session of Congress.409 
Johnson did all of this in part because he “possessed a Jacksonian 
concept of the president as the tribune of all the people, whereas each 
congressman represented merely a fragment of the people.”410 
Johnson’s proclamations resulted in the Southern states electing 
extremely conservative legislative bodies: 
[S]ome even refused to repeal their secession ordinances, much 
less abolish slavery or repudiate the Confederate debt, as Johnson 
had requested. Instead, [Southern state governments] passed black 
codes virtually remanding the freed people to a position not far 
removed from slavery and elected leading former Confederates—
including Alexander H. Stephens, Jefferson Davis’s vice 
president—to Congress.411 
Johnson responded by urging the Southern states to ratify the 
Thirteenth Amendment,412 which abolished slavery, and by 
suggesting suffrage for a handful of the freedmen who owned 
property and could read. He then granted hundreds of additional 
pardons to former Confederate leaders on generous terms.413 
Why did Johnson, who had denounced secession as treason, do all 
of this? First, he mistakenly thought it his constitutional duty to 
reunite the South with the Union as quickly as possible. Second, he 
wanted to transfer power in the South from the planter aristocracy, 
which he justifiably hated, to a democracy of “plebians and 
mechanics.”414 He was afraid the freed African-Americans would 
remain “bound economically to the big planters, who therefore would 
be able to control them politically.”415 Third, Johnson was, even by 
the standards of his day, a racist. Johnson once told Governor Fletcher 
of Missouri that “[t]his country is for white men . . . and by God, as 
long as I am President, it shall be governed by white men.”416 And 
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fourth, Johnson wanted to be elected president in his own right in 
1868, and he wanted Southern support in that effort.417 
Johnson was sincere in his view of his constitutional obligations, 
but he was also simply wrong. He overlooked a number of points that 
Lincoln might eventually have taken into account had he lived. First, 
Johnson’s war power as commander in chief had ended with the 
cessation of hostilities in April 1865; therefore Johnson never should 
have attempted to formulate a presidential Reconstruction plan 
without congressional input. Johnson’s first action should have been 
to call Congress into a special session, but instead, he effectively 
usurped congressional authority for seven months by planning his 
own Reconstruction. Second, Johnson overlooked the fact that 
although secession had been ineffectual, the Southern states lacked 
Republican forms of government, leaving them unprepared for 
readmission into the Union, a conclusion eventually confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Texas v. White.418 Johnson was thus seriously 
usurping congressional prerogatives when he attempted to launch 
presidential Reconstruction between May and December of 1865. 
Congress reconvened in December 1865 and refused to seat the 
delegations from the Southern states. Congress also immediately set 
up a joint committee on Reconstruction. Both actions were driven by 
Northern concern over the violent mistreatment of freed African-
Americans in the South; revulsion at the Black Codes, which seemed 
to resurrect slavery under a new name; and anger at the lack of 
Southern remorse implicit in the election of officials like Alexander 
Stephens to Congress. Most Northerners and Republicans had been 
willing to grant Johnson and the South the benefit of the doubt, but 
the adoption of the Black Codes in particular caused them to conclude 
that a change in course was necessary. Republicans were also 
concerned at the diminution in their hefty congressional majorities 
that immediate Southern restoration would bring.419 
In February 1866, the first clash between Johnson and Congress 
occurred over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, a moderate Republican 
measure originated by Senator Lyman Trumbell of Illinois.420 The Bill 
was designed to benefit the freed African-Americans in the South by 
extending the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which had been slated to 
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expire, increasing the number of its agents, setting aside land for loyal 
African-Americans and whites, and empowering the Bureau to protect 
the rights of African-Americans through military tribunals. Johnson 
vetoed the Bill because he had constitutional objections to its 
extension of military power in peacetime and its invasion of areas 
reserved to civilian authorities and the courts.421 In a speech on 
February 22, 1866, Johnson celebrated his veto by denouncing 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Charles Sumner as 
being as traitorous as Jefferson Davis.422 Northerners were outraged at 
Johnson’s suggestion, and many people concluded “that [Johnson] 
had been drunk again.”423 
February turned to March, and Congress, still trying to exercise its 
powers under the Guarantee Clause and to enforce the newly-ratified 
Thirteenth Amendment, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.424 
Again, Johnson vetoed the Bill on constitutional grounds.425 This 
severed the final links between the moderate Republicans in Congress 
and the President, and for the first time in American history, Congress 
overrode a presidential veto.426 The vetoes of the moderate-backed 
Freedmen’s Bureau and the Civil Rights Acts had led to a situation 
such that by the middle of 1866, in the words of historian Hans 
Trefousse, it was “evident to all” that “the President had finally 
declared war on Congress.”427 The House of Representatives initiated 
impeachment proceedings against Johnson, but the proceedings were 
not successful.428 While Johnson ought to have recognized that his 
understanding of Congress’s constitutional powers was seriously 
flawed, he failed to reach that conclusion. 
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Jean Edward Smith, a biographer of Ulysses S. Grant, reports that 
by the summer of 1866, Johnson was asking his new attorney general, 
Henry Stanbery, for an opinion as to the legitimacy of the 39th 
Congress.429 Smith writes: 
Rumors swirled that the president contemplated recognizing a new 
Congress made up of Southern representatives and cooperative 
Northern Democrats. In fact, [Johnson] posed such a possibility to 
Grant to gauge his reaction. The general in chief did not mince 
words. “The army will support the Congress as it now is and 
disperse the other.”430 
By mid-October, Smith claims that Grant was afraid of a 
presidential coup before the fall elections and resolved not to leave 
Washington to attend an aide’s wedding in Illinois.431 Nor was Grant 
the only Lincoln appointee who remained vigilant for fear of what 
Johnson might attempt. Secretary of War Stanton also stayed in office 
to control Johnson’s cabinet and thereby prevent the President from 
doing any more mischief. In the summer of 1866, Congress was 
already so distrustful of Johnson that it reduced the size of the 
Supreme Court from ten to seven to ensure that Johnson would be 
unable to make any appointments to that august body.432 
Johnson spent the balance of 1866 wielding the removal power 
vigorously to reward his few friends and to punish his foes, backed by 
additional attorney general opinions supporting his constitutional 
right to do so.433 “During the last six months of 1866 Johnson . . . 
replaced almost seventeen hundred postmasters, three-quarters for 
political reasons. Postmasterships were the heart of the nation’s 
patronage system and the Republicans responded with alarm.”434 
Johnson made such liberal use of his constitutional removal powers in 
an attempt to organize a new political party around himself and his 
conservative Reconstruction policies.435 Patronage loomed as a 
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particularly powerful weapon in the South, where virtually every 
federal job lay vacant.436 Thomas Nast depicted Johnson in one 
cartoon as “King Andrew, sitting on a throne watching the beheading 
of a group of well-known Radicals.”437 
Members of Congress took several steps to control Johnson’s use 
of his removal powers. In a few cases, they attempted to pressure 
Johnson into removing certain officers whom they found 
objectionable.438 In 1867, at the request of Secretary of War 
Stanton,439 Congress attached a rider to the Army Appropriations Act 
purporting to limit Johnson’s control over the military. In blatant 
violation of the president’s removal power and his authority as 
commander in chief, the rider provided that “[t]he General of the 
Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or 
assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters without the 
previous approval of the Senate.”440 Johnson complained bitterly 
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about the Army Appropriations rider, protesting justifiably that its 
provisions “in certain cases virtually [deprived] the President of his 
constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army,” and 
thus “were out of place in an appropriation act.”441 However, given 
the necessity of military appropriations during Reconstruction, 
Johnson felt “constrained to return the bill with [his] signature, but to 
accompany it with [his] protest against the sections which [he had] 
indicated.”442 
Johnson was right that this provision was unconstitutional, but the 
problem the legislation tried to remedy had been triggered by 
Johnson’s refusal to recognize Congress’s power with respect to 
Reconstruction, and its powers under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to eliminate badges of slavery. Once Johnson and 
Congress were reduced to fighting over keeping Grant in charge of 
the army, the situation was beyond repair. At this point, impeachment 
was likely inevitable.443 
By the winter of 1867, Congress was concerned that every 
Southern state had rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. Thinking a 
fresh start on Reconstruction necessary, Congress passed the First 
Reconstruction Act,444 a sweeping measure that employed Congress’s 
valid Guarantee Clause powers to reconstruct the South. This bill also 
made adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern states a 
requirement for their representation in Congress and for their freedom 
from continued military occupation.445 Johnson vetoed the bill, but it 
was passed over his veto. Believing the Military Reconstruction Act 
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unconstitutional, Johnson proceeded to try to undermine both the 
legislation and Reconstruction itself.446 This only led Congress to pass 
two more Military Reconstruction Acts to deal with Johnson’s efforts 
at sabotage.447 
The stage was thus set for one of the great confrontations between 
the president and Congress in American history. It is arguable that 
Congress should have impeached and removed Johnson from office 
for failing to recognize congressional power to proceed with 
Reconstruction under the Guarantee Clause and failing to ensure that 
the laws dealing with Reconstruction were faithfully executed. 
Though the standard for impeachment and removal of a president 
must be set very high, by November 1866, Johnson was already in a 
virtual war with Congress and could not be reined in by ordinary 
means. The problem was that rather than remove Johnson for 
unconstitutionally impeding Reconstruction and threatening 
congressional authority, Congress responded by passing 
unconstitutional legislation that would tie Johnson’s hands with 
respect to the removal power. As we shall see, this error in focus 
would ultimately prove Congress’s undoing. 
C. The Tenure of Office Act and the  
Impeachment of Andrew Johnson 
The most sweeping limitation placed on President Johnson’s 
removal power was the Tenure of Office Act.448 Passed during the 
winter of 1867 along with the First Military Reconstruction Act, the 
Tenure of Office Act specifically provided that all civil officers 
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate would hold office 
until their successors were confirmed by the Senate.449 If the Senate 
was in recess, the president was permitted to suspend an executive 
officer so long as he reported the reasons for the suspension to the 
Senate within twenty days of its return to session. If the Senate failed 
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Reconstruction Act, Johnson, as usual, ventured way beyond them, denouncing the whole 
Act as unconstitutional, which, in our opinion, it was not. Concern over the 
constitutionality of aspects of the Act led congressional Republicans to take extreme 
measures to prevent it from being tested in the courts. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
447. Act of March 23, 1867 (Second Reconstruction Act), ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of July 
19, 1867 (Third Reconstruction Act), ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14. 
448. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867); see also TREFOUSSE, supra 
note 402, at 43-45; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 147. 
449. § 1, 14 Stat. at 430. 
  
No. 3] The Unitary Executive 747 
to concur in the suspension, the officer would be restored to his 
position.450 With an eye towards impeachment, the statute specifically 
designated violations of the Act as “high misdemeanor[s].”451 
While the House and the Senate agreed that the Act should apply to 
inferior executive officers, the two chambers split sharply over the 
applicability of the Act to the heads of the departments. The Senate 
believed that the president should have a cabinet of his own choosing, 
and it specifically included a provision excluding cabinet members 
from coverage under the Act and twice rejected amendments to delete 
this exception.452 Senators in favor of the exception emphasized that 
the department heads were the president’s confidential advisers and 
thus should be in harmony with the president’s basic policies.453 
Representative Thomas Williams, the primary sponsor of the Tenure 
of Office Act in the House, disagreed, arguing that including the 
heads of departments within the scope of the Act was “essential to the 
symmetry of the bill,” since the policies which underlay the bill in the 
first place applied with even greater force to the heads of 
departments.454 The majority of the House acceded to Representative 
Williams’s position and struck the Senate’s exception for cabinet 
members.455 
 
450. § 2, 14 Stat. at 430. Congress also tried to stem the abuse of recess appointments 
by providing that if the Senate did not confirm a recess appointment by the end of the 
following session, that office “shall remain in abeyance, without any salary, fees, or 
emoluments” until properly filled with the advice and consent of the Senate. § 3, 14 Stat. 
at 431. 
451. § 9, 14 Stat. at 432; see also STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150. 
452. The Senate bill, as originally reported by the Joint Committee on Retrenchment, 
contained an exception for “the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, 
and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General.” CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 382 (1867). The Senate rejected an amendment by a vote of thirteen 
to twenty-seven that would have eliminated the exception for Cabinet members. Id. at 548. 
After the House of Representatives had returned the bill without this provision, the Senate 
voted seventeen to twenty-eight to reject the House’s amendment and to insist on its 
original version of the bill. Id. at 1047. 
453. Id. at 382-84 (statements of Senators George F. Edmunds, Charles R. Buckalew, 
George H. Williams, and William Pitt Fessenden); id. at 388 (statement of Sen. Reverdy 
Johnson); id. at 1045-46 (statement of Sen. John Sherman). 
454. Id. at 937. Williams offered similar arguments during the debate on an early House 
version of the bill, warning that excluding the heads of departments “would destroy the 
very essence of the bill.” Id. at 71 (debating H.R. 664, 39th Cong. (1866)). 
455. The House passed the amendment deleting the Senate’s exception for Cabinet 
members by a vote of 82 to 63. Id. at 969-70. Representative Williams’s victory did not 
come easily, as he was defeated in his first three attempts to have this amendment 
approved. Just two months earlier, the House had ignored Williams’s objections and voted 
fifty-seven to forty-six to include an exception for Cabinet members in the House’s 
version of this bill. Id. at 73. The next day, the House voted seventy-seven to eighty-one to 
reject Williams’s subsequent amendment to delete this exception. Id. at 94. Lastly, just the 
day before the House finally accepted Representative Williams’s amendment, it rejected it 
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The conference committee on the Act attempted to resolve this 
disagreement by drafting compromise language. This language 
dropped the Senate’s exception for cabinet members, substituting a 
proviso stating that cabinet members “shall hold their offices . . . for 
and during the term of the President by whom they may have been 
appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”456 Senator John Sherman, 
head of the Senate conferees and the author of the compromise 
language, specifically informed the Senate that “its language is so 
framed as not to apply to the present President” and that “it would not 
prevent the present President from removing the Secretary of War, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State.”457 On the basis of 
this understanding, the Senate passed the conference report by a wide 
margin, and after the House did the same, the bill was sent to 
President Johnson for his consideration.458 
The cabinet, having been convened by Johnson to advise him on 
the bill, unanimously believed that the bill was unconstitutional and 
recommended that the President veto it.459 Johnson later noted that 
Secretary of War Stanton’s “condemnation of the law was the most 
elaborate and emphatic”; Stanton cited constitutional provisions, 
congressional debates, Supreme Court decisions and consistent 
historical practice for the proposition that the Constitution vests the 
removal power in the president.460 The strength of Stanton’s opinion 
and his mastery of the issues led the ever-crafty Johnson to ask him to 
draft the veto message, but pleading physical infirmity, Stanton 
demurred, and the message was actually drafted by Secretary of State 
Seward with Stanton’s help.461 
                                                                                                                            
by a vote of seventy-six to seventy-eight. Id. at 943. Only after a colleague successfully 
moved to reconsider this initial rejection did Representative Williams finally see his 
amendment actually pass. Id. at 969. 
456. Id. at 1340 (House); id. at 1514 (Senate). The conference report was endorsed by 
all the conferees except Senator Buckalew. See id. at 1514-15. 
457. Id. at 1516. 
458. The House voted 111 to 41 in favor of the conference report. Id. at 1340. The 
Senate adopted the conference report by a vote of 22 to 10. Id. at 1518. 
459. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210. Johnson 
mentioned the Cabinet’s unanimous belief in the Act’s unconstitutionality several times. 
See Andrew Johnson, Message to the Senate (Dec. 12, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, 
supra note 57, at 3781, 3785 [hereinafter Johnson, Stanton Suspension]; Andrew Johnson, 
Message to the Senate (Feb. 22, 1868), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, supra 
note 59, at 3820, 3823, 3825 [hereinafter Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest]. 
460. Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3785. 
461. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202-03; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210. See 
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the Senate (Mar. 2, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, 
supra note 57, at 3690 [hereinafter Tenure of Office Act Veto]. See also CASTEL, supra 
note 392, at 113 (stating that “Seward and Stanton’s collaboration produced a veto 
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The Veto Message relied heavily on the fact that since 1789, it had 
been the unbroken practice of both Congress and the president to 
construe the Constitution as conferring the removal power on the 
president, much as this article has suggested. The Message stated: 
“That the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President 
of the United States is a principle which has been not more distinctly 
declared by judicial authority and judicial commentators than it has 
been uniformly practiced upon by the legislative and executive 
departments of the government.”462 Johnson noted that the Decision 
of 1789 had settled the constitutional basis of the president’s power to 
remove and that this resolution had thereafter been accepted by both 
the Supreme Court and learned legal commentators.463 Thus “[a] trial 
of nearly eighty years, through the vicissitudes of foreign conflicts 
and of civil war” and a renewed challenge during the administration 
of Andrew Jackson had proven the propriety of the Decision of 
1789.464 
Johnson also defended his veto on structural grounds: 
It can not be doubted that the triumphant success of the 
Constitution is due to the wonderful wisdom with which the 
functions of government were distributed between the three 
principal departments—the legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial—and to the fidelity with which each has confined itself or 
been confined . . . within its peculiar and proper sphere.465 
Since the preservation of such a system depended on 
“maintain[ing] the integrity of each of the three great departments 
while preserving harmony among them all,” it was “indispensable” 
that the executive branch be “capable . . . of executing the laws and, 
within the sphere of executive action, of preserving, protecting, and 
defending the Constitution of the United States.”466 Johnson therefore 
concluded: 
Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the 
Executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the 
concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in 
                                                                                                                            
message filled with arguments and precedents that convinced most constitutional 
observers then (and since) that the tenure bill was a rape of presidential powers”). Hans 
Trefousse, however, has suggested that Stanton’s support for the veto was insincere and 
that President Johnson, aware of this duplicity, only asked Stanton to write the veto 
message to embarrass him. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79. 
462. Johnson, Tenure of Office Act Veto, supra note 461, at 3691. 
463. Id. at 3693-95. 
464. Id. at 3693, 3695. 
465. Id. at 3695. 
466. Id. at 3695-96. 
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the arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed 
necessity of the times for changing those opinions.467 
Notwithstanding these objections, Congress summarily overrode 
Johnson’s veto, and the Tenure of Office Act became law.468 
The conflict between the legislative and executive branches over 
the Tenure of Office Act reached full boil when Johnson removed 
Stanton as Secretary of War. A holdover from the Lincoln 
administration who had stayed on long after the other Republican 
cabinet members had resigned in protest of Johnson’s policies, 
Stanton had close ties to many of the Republicans in Congress and 
often acted as their spy.469 Given the War Department’s central role in 
Reconstruction, Johnson could not long tolerate Stanton’s Republican 
and congressional sympathies.470 After a series of events underscored 
Stanton’s estrangement from the administration,471 Johnson 
 
467. Id. at 3696. Johnson also criticized the Tenure of Office Act in his Third Annual 
Message, in which he declared: 
The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable, 
dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution, but under [the Tenure of Office Act] 
the utmost he can do is to complain to the Senate and ask the privilege of 
supplying his place with a better man . . . . I am entirely persuaded that under 
such a rule the President cannot perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing 
the laws faithfully executed. 
Andrew Johnson, Third Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra 
note 57, at 3756, 3767-68. The effect of such a system would be “that official malfeasance 
should become bold in proportion as the delinquents learn to think themselves safe,” 
which would “almost destroy . . . official accountability” and “disable [the President] most 
especially from enforcing that rigid accountability which is necessary to the due execution 
of the . . . laws.” Id. at 3767-68. Moreover, the Senate was institutionally poorly suited to 
judge removals, since unlike the President, who was “responsible to the whole people,” the 
Senate is “a tribunal whose members are . . . responsible . . . to separate constituent 
bodies.” Id. at 3768. Johnson concluded: 
Therefore it was that the framers of the Constitution left the power of removal 
unrestricted, while they gave the Senate a right to reject all appointments which 
in its opinion were not fit to be made. A little reflection on this subject will 
probably satisfy all who have the good of the country at heart that our best course 
is to take the Constitution for our guide, walk in the path marked out by the 
founders of the Republic, and obey the rules made sacred by the observance of 
our great predecessors. 
Id. at 3769. 
468. The House voted 133 to 37 to override the president’s veto. CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1739 (1867). The Senate vote was 35 to 11. Id. at 1966. During March of 
1867, while this controversy boiled, Secretary of State Seward found time to buy Alaska 
from the Russians. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 120-21. 
469. REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 212; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 36, 78. 
470. BERGER, supra note 407, at 270-71; CORWIN, supra note 293, at 24. 
471. Johnson specifically pointed to Stanton’s opposition to Johnson’s vetoes of the 
D.C. suffrage bill and the Reconstruction Acts and his failure to inform Johnson about the 
August 30, 1866 riots in New Orleans. Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 
3787-90; see also MANTELL, supra note 428, at 81; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 212; 
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79. As further evidence of the falling out between Johnson 
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suspended Stanton on August 12, 1867, and appointed Grant as 
interim secretary.472 “It is a tribute to Grant’s diplomatic skill—a trait 
with which he is seldom credited—that he was able to push 
Reconstruction and at the same time maintain amicable relations with 
the president.”473 
Stanton surrendered the office only grudgingly: 
Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the 
advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to 
suspend me from office as Secretary of War . . . . But inasmuch as 
the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been 
appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the 
appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to 
superior force.474 
Although there was considerable doubt whether the Tenure of 
Office Act was constitutional and whether the Act even applied to 
Stanton, the President nonetheless complied with its requirements, 
submitting the reasons for Stanton’s suspension to the Senate 
immediately after it resumed session in December, along with an 
extended message renewing his attack on the Tenure of Office Act as 
an unconstitutional infringement on the unitary power of the 
executive.475 As Johnson maintained: 
[T]he President is the responsible head of the Administration, and 
                                                                                                                            
and Stanton, historians have also pointed to Stanton’s differences with the President over 
statehood for Nebraska and Colorado, TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79, as well as his 
failure to inform Johnson of Mary Suratt’s petition for clemency before she was executed 
for conspiring in Lincoln’s assassination. Id. at 81; NOEL B. GERSON, THE TRIAL OF 
ANDREW JOHNSON 84 (1977). 
472. The suspension message was terse: 
Sir: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office 
as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to 
the same. You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day 
been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all 
records, books, and other property now in your custody and charge. 
Letter from Andrew Johnson to Edwin M. Stanton (Aug. 12, 1867), reprinted in Johnson, 
Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3781. See generally BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 
96-98; CASTEL, supra note 392, at 132-37; MANTELL, supra note 428, at 81; TREFOUSSE, 
supra note 402, at 80-81. 
473. SMITH, supra note 416, at 435. 
474. Letter from Edwin M. Stanton to Andrew Johnson (Aug. 12, 1867), reprinted in 
Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3782. 
475. Johnson justified his suspension of Stanton on non-constitutional grounds as well, 
noting that it was far from clear that the statute by its own terms even applied to the 
current members of the cabinet. As Johnson observed, at that time “it seemed to be taken 
for granted that as to those members of the cabinet who had been appointed by Mr. 
Lincoln their tenure of office was not fixed by the provisions of the act.” Johnson, Stanton 
Suspension, supra note 459, at 3785. 
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when the opinions of a head of Department are irreconcilably 
opposed to those of the President in grave matters of policy and 
administration there is but one result which can solve the 
difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation.476 
Because “[i]t is the President upon whom the Constitution 
devolves, as head of the executive department, the duty to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed,” the president must be “allowed to select 
his agents” and “ought to be left as free as possible in the matter of 
selection and of dismissal.”477 Any other rule would “reverse the just 
order of administration and . . . place the subordinate over the 
superior.”478 
At the same time he suspended Stanton and temporarily replaced 
him with Grant, Johnson also took a series of removal actions to 
undercut congressional Reconstruction policies by replacing the most 
radical of the military governors with more conservative generals.479 
This tactic proved to be very effective. “Stung by the reaction in the 
South, Senate Republicans recognized that Johnson, by deft use of his 
appointing authority, was on the verge of overturning 
Reconstruction.”480 Despite his decisive actions, Johnson was put on 
the defensive when Congress assembled in December, with much talk 
of his being impeached and temporarily suspended from acting as 
president. Jean Edward Smith reports that Johnson was determined to 
find out where the army stood on this: 
More precisely, where did the general in chief stand? To find out, 
Johnson called on Grant at the War Department. By now, Grant 
had come to detest Johnson, but his duty was clear. He told the 
president he would resist any effort to depose or arrest him prior to 
the conclusion of an impeachment trial. The constitutional process 
would be protected. Grant then took it upon himself to inform 
 
476. Id. at 3787. 
477. Id. at 3790. 
478. Id.; see also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 451, 453. 
479. Johnson began on August 17, 1867 by recalling General Philip H. Sheridan, an 
avowed Radical, from his post as military governor of Texas and Louisiana, replacing him 
first with General George H. Thomas and later with Winfield S. Hancock, one of the most 
conservative generals in the army. Two weeks later, he replaced General Daniel Sickles, 
another well-known Radical, as military governor of the Carolinas. Johnson finally 
finished his housecleaning in December, when he removed General John Pope as military 
governor of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, and General Edward O.C. Ord as military 
governor of Mississippi and Arkansas. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 139-42; TREFOUSSE, 
supra note 402, at 82, 116; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 452; MANTELL, supra 
note 428, at 36, 75; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 148-49. 
480. SMITH, supra note 416, at 445. 
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congressional Republicans of his view.481 
At that point, the efforts by Thaddeus Stevens to suspend Johnson 
were thwarted. 
The Senate eventually responded sharply to Johnson’s actions, 
declining to approve Stanton’s removal by a vote of thirty-five to six 
on January 13, 1868, although many senators abstained because they 
did not believe that the Tenure of Office Act applied to Stanton.482 To 
Johnson’s dismay, Grant vacated the Department of War after the 
Senate vote; Johnson had wanted him to stay there to precipitate a 
judicial determination of the Act’s constitutionality.483 Johnson was 
convinced that if he could just get the Tenure of Office Act dispute 
into the courts, he would win.484 Johnson and Grant quarreled 
publicly, and Grant essentially called the President a liar who had set 
out to defame Grant’s character.485 Stanton resumed his position in 
the War Department despite physical and financial problems, because 
he believed that his influence was needed to combat the President and 
to protect democracy.486 
Despite this setback, Johnson remained determined to get rid of 
Stanton. Ignoring his advisers’ warnings, Johnson removed Stanton 
from office on February 21, 1868,487 appointing Adjutant General 
 
481. Id. at 444. 
482. S. EXEC. J., 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1868); see also MANTELL, supra note 
428, at 83; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 215; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 123; 
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 98-99 (noting the abstentions of Senators Sherman, Grimes, 
Henderson, Ross, Sprague, and Van Winkle). 
483. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 82-83; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 125-26. 
Historians have suggested that Grant wavered in his resolve to give Johnson the court 
challenge he desired because of the potential fines and imprisonment he faced for violating 
the Tenure of Office Act. Johnson’s contention that he suspended Stanton under his 
constitutional powers rather than under the Tenure of Office Act was undercut by his 
forwarding of his reasons for the suspension to the Senate in compliance with the Act. See 
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 97-98; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 453. 
484. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 169. 
485. SMITH, supra note 416, at 451. 
486. Id. at 223. 
487. The removal message was as terse as the previous suspension message: 
On the 12th day of August, 1867, by virtue of the power and authority vested in 
the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I suspended 
Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary War. In further exercise of the 
power and authority so vested in the President, I have this day removed Mr. 
Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as 
Secretary of War ad interim. 
Andrew Johnson, Message to the Senate (Feb. 21, 1868), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra 
note 57, at 3819; see also STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 
133 (noting that Attorney General Stanbery, among others, strongly urged against 
Stanton’s removal and that Johnson did not consult with his cabinet before acting). 
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Lorenzo Thomas as interim secretary.488 This time the high-spirited 
Stanton refused to recognize the President’s action, swearing out a 
complaint for Thomas’s arrest and barricading himself inside the War 
Department.489 The stakes for the Radical Republicans were high, for 
if Johnson were able to name an anti-Reconstruction Secretary of 
War, “[i]t would mean the loss of their power in the South and 
eventually in the nation.”490 
Congressional Republicans used the president’s defiance to rally 
their supporters. Senator Charles Sumner sent a one-word telegram to 
Stanton, advising him, “Stick,” while other senators went to the War 
Department to encourage Stanton to defy the order.491 “At Stanton’s 
urgent request Grant stationed extra troops at the War Department; in 
addition, Senator Chandler and Representative John A. Logan posted 
over one hundred volunteers in the basement of that building.”492 
Meanwhile, the Senate voted twenty-eight to six in favor of a 
resolution declaring “[t]hat under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of 
War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that 
office ad interim.”493 Johnson responded the following day with a 
 
488. Thomas was hardly Johnson’s first choice. Johnson appointed Thomas only after 
General William T. Sherman rebuffed Johnson’s attempt to prepare him for the position by 
establishing a new Army of the Atlantic, headquartered in Washington, D.C. and under 
Sherman’s command, and by nominating him for a promotion to General of the Army. 
Sherman’s reluctance at becoming embroiled in politics led him to ask his brother, Senator 
John Sherman, to oppose his nomination. Disappointed, Johnson relented. BENEDICT, 
supra note 435, at 99-100; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 455; MANTELL, supra 
note 428, at 85; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 128. Johnson also approached John Potts, 
chief clerk of the War Department, as a possible interim Secretary, but Potts refused. 
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 132. 
489. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 350-52, 356; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150; 
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 133, 135-36. Thomas ended up being a poor choice as 
interim Secretary of War. Described as “old, garrulous, and vainglorious” and having “no 
influence with the army,” Thomas celebrated his elevation by attending a masked ball, at 
which he offered an inebriated boast that he would oust Stanton by force if necessary. A 
comical situation developed when Thomas, after being arrested and making bail, 
confronted Stanton at the War Department. The two exchanged requests for the other to 
leave, after which a hungover Thomas complained that he had had nothing to eat or drink 
all morning. After drinking shots of whiskey together, Thomas admonished Stanton, “The 
next time you have me arrested, please do not do it before I get something to eat.” Thomas 
then retreated, leaving Stanton in possession of the War Department. DEWITT, supra note 
370, at 354-56; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 136. 
490. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 156. 
491. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 101-02; DEWITT, supra note 370, at 347; 
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 134. 
492. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 176; see also SMITH, supra note 416, at 453. 
493. The resolution is reprinted in Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest, supra note 459, 
at 3820, and 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE 
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF 
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protest against the Senate’s resolution, complaining that the Decision 
of 1789 had determined that Congress had no right to interfere with 
the president’s constitutional power of removal. He said: 
The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as 
established by every President who has exercised the office, and 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have 
settled the question in favor of the power of the President to 
remove all officers excepting a class holding appointments of a 
judicial character. No practice nor any decision has ever excepted a 
Secretary of War from this general power of the President to make 
removals from office.494 
The Senate was disinclined to listen to such arguments, however, and 
Johnson’s words fell on deaf ears. 
In the House, Thaddeus Stevens rallied the president’s opposition 
with the cry, “If you don’t kill the beast, it will kill you.”495 The 
House immediately commenced impeachment proceedings against 
Johnson, adopting on February 24, in a strict party vote of 126 to 47, 
a resolution stating “[t]hat Andrew Johnson, President of the United 
States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.”496 
The House subsequently adopted eleven somewhat impenetrable 
articles of impeachment on March 2 and March 3, 1868, although the 
fact that Congress chose first to impeach and later to decide the 
grounds for impeachment boded ill for how well those charges would 
stand up to legal scrutiny.497 Although the President was also accused 
of “bringing Congress into disrepute and failing to carry out the 
Reconstruction Acts,”498 the primary charges focused on Johnson’s 
alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act by removing Stanton.499 
The House appointed Stevens, John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, 
Benjamin F. Butler, John A. Logan, Thomas Williams of 
                                                                                                                            
REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 156-57 (1868); see also 
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 102-03; LABOVITZ, supra note 428, at 57; REHNQUIST, 
supra note 309, at 145, 216; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 135. Many Republicans 
abstained from this vote perhaps in an attempt to discourage impeachment proceedings. 
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 103. 
494. Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest, supra note 459, at 3820. 
495. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 135. 
496. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400 (1868); see also HYMAN & WIECEK, 
supra note 293, at 456; MANTELL, supra note 428, at 87; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 
217; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 137. 
497. See STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150. 
498. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 130. 
499. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1612-18, 1642 (1868); see also HYMAN & 
WIECEK, supra note 293, at 456; LABOVITZ, supra note 428, at 58-62; REHNQUIST, supra 
note 309, at 218; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 138-39. 
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Pennsylvania, and James F. Wilson as managers.500 The President, for 
his part, selected a distinguished array of counsel for his defense, 
including Attorney General Henry Stanbery, who resigned in order to 
represent the Johnson; former Supreme Court Justice and Dred Scott 
dissenter Benjamin R. Curtis; future Attorney General and Secretary 
of State William M. Evarts; and war Democrats Thomas A.R. Nelson 
and William S. Groesbeck.501 The trial was on. General in Chief 
Grant, who had done so much to uphold congressional Reconstruction 
when Johnson was trying to kill it, came out in favor of impeachment 
and removal.502 
After a drawn out trial in which grand and petty politics played as 
important a role as legal principles,503 Johnson was acquitted by a 
single vote.504 The following day, Stanton resigned as Secretary of 
 
500. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1618-19 (1868). Bingham was selected as 
chairman, but not without intrigue. Initially, Stevens was tapped to chair the committee 
with Butler replacing him when Stevens’s illness prevented him from so acting. Bingham 
was incensed, shouting “I’ll be damned if I serve under Butler.” When the committee 
turned to Boutwell as chair, Bingham again threatened to quit the committee and finally 
succeeded in being named chairman. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 113-14. 
501. See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 493, at 18-19 (1868). Groesbeck 
joined the president’s defense team only after former Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black 
withdrew. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 457; MANTELL, supra note 428, at 
89; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 222, 225; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 150. 
502. Smith notes: 
Grant supported conviction because (among other things) he thought Johnson 
created too much turbulence in his wake. Writing to his old friend Charles Ford, 
the general allowed as how he thought the president’s removal would “give 
peace to the country.” . . . But it was Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri to 
whom Grant may have confided his deepest reason. Riding alongside Henderson 
on a streetcar shortly before the vote, Grant said, “I would impeach him because 
he is such an infernal liar.” 
SMITH, supra note 416, at 454; see also CASTEL, supra note 392, at 191 (describing how 
Grant urged Senators Trumbull, Fessenden, Henderson, and Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of 
New Jersey—all swing Senators—to vote guilty). 
503. The range of conflicts of interest involved in Johnson’s impeachment trial was 
staggering. One of the triers of Johnson’s impeachment, Senator Patterson of Tennessee, 
was in fact Johnson’s son-in-law, while Senator Peleg Sprague was the son-in-law of 
Chief Justice (and presidential hopeful) Chase, who presided over the impeachment trial. 
Moreover, the fact that Johnson’s impeachment would have elevated Senate President pro 
tempore Ben Wade made a number of Senators hesitant to convict Johnson, some 
objecting to Wade’s policies and others objecting out of personal enmity. The rivalry 
between Wade and Chase also may have had an impact on the trial, as Chase would have 
gone to great lengths to avoid doing anything which would inure to the benefit of Wade. 
House Manager Benjamin Butler had long resented Grant’s having removed him from his 
generalship and reportedly attempted to manipulate the trial’s timing in order to frustrate 
Grant’s candidacy for president. And finally, Managers Boutwell and Bingham feuded 
throughout the trial, inhibiting the prosecution from the beginning. See generally 
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 126-43 (describing the political atmosphere of the 
impeachment trial); TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 175-79 (noting the discomfort with 
Wade and its effects on the trial). 
504. In the end, the Senate voted on only three of the articles. In each article, the Senate 
  
No. 3] The Unitary Executive 757 
War. Johnson nominated in his place General John M. Schofield, a 
well-known moderate whose name had been mentioned as Stanton’s 
likely successor during the impeachment trial to allay the concerns of 
certain senators about Johnson’s intentions should he be acquitted.505 
In the aftermath of the impeachment, both houses of Congress 
launched investigations into its failure, but neither uncovered 
anything substantial.506 The Senate exacted a measure of revenge on 
Stanbery, refusing to reconfirm him as attorney general for his 
defense of the President, although the Senate did relent in confirming 
Evarts as attorney general.507 In the summer of 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was declared ratified, even though “Johnson had Seward 
word the July 20 announcement . . . in such a way as to cast doubt on 
the legality of the ratifying process.”508 
After failing to receive the Democratic presidential nomination in 
1868 and registering one final challenge to the Tenure of Office 
Act,509 Johnson returned to his home in Tennessee. Strikingly, 
Johnson and Grant refused to ride together in the same carriage to 
                                                                                                                            
exonerated the President by a vote of thirty-five to nineteen, one vote shy of the necessary 
two-thirds majority. The Senate subsequently adjourned sine die without voting on the 
other articles. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 192-93. 
 Divining the constitutional significance of Johnson’s acquittal is further complicated by 
the myriad rationales underlying particular Senators’ votes. While some Senators based 
their decision on the Constitution, it is clear that others based their decision on statutory 
grounds. Moreover, other Senators admittedly ignored the evidence and the legal 
principles and openly based their votes on purely political considerations. See BENEDICT, 
supra note 435, at 110, 126, 140, 152-57, 178-79; May, supra note 243, at 915-18. 
 Much has been made concerning the closeness of the vote and the courage of the so-
called “recusants”—the Republican Senators who voted for acquittal. See, e.g., BENEDICT, 
supra note 435, at 181 (citing JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 126-51 (1956)). 
However, the vote may not have been as close as it seemed; as many as four senators may 
have stood ready to switch their votes if needed to acquit the president. TREFOUSSE, supra 
note 402, at 169. Furthermore, the Republicans’ disapprobation towards the recusants was 
short lived. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 181-83 (citing Ralph J. Roske, The 
Seven Martyrs?, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 323, 323-30 (1959)); TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 
167 (citing Roske, supra). 
505. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 100. 
506. Id.; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 240; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 169-70. 
507. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 100; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 172. 
508. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 205-06. 
509. In his Fourth Annual Message, Johnson complained: 
Under the influence of party passion and sectional prejudice . . . acts have been 
passed not warranted by the Constitution . . . . Experience has proved that [the 
Tenure of Office Act’s] repeal is demanded by the best interests of the country, 
and that while it remains in force the President can not enjoin that rigid 
accountability of public officers so essential to an honest and efficient execution 
of the laws. Its revocation would enable the executive department to exercise the 
power of appointment and removal in accordance with the original design of the 
Federal Constitution. 
Johnson, Fourth Annual Message, supra note 542, at 3871. Johnson also called for the 
repeal of the Army Appropriations Act rider. Id. at 3871-72. 
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Grant’s inauguration ceremony, marking only the third time in 
American history that a president has declined to attend the 
inauguration of his successor.510 Although Johnson was unsuccessful 
in his bids for the Senate in 1871 and the House in 1872, he once 
again won election to the Senate in 1874. News of his election caused 
a stir and The Nation “stated that Johnson’s ‘personal integrity was 
beyond question’ and that his ‘respect for the law and Constitution 
[had] made his Administration a remarkable contrast to that which 
succeeded it.’”511 After making one last speech criticizing Grant for 
constitutional violations of federalism, Johnson died on July 31, 
1875.512 He left “having contributed to keeping the South a ‘white 
man’s country’ for several more generations. For this reason, from his 
point of view and considering his prejudices, his administration 
wasn’t wholly unsuccessful.”513 
There can be no doubt about Johnson’s constitutional position with 
respect to the unitary executive. Johnson repeatedly and correctly 
condemned both the Tenure of Office Act and the Army 
Appropriations rider as improper invasions of the unitary executive, 
marking an abrupt end to whatever limited acquiescence in a non-
unitary vision of the executive branch had begun during the Lincoln 
administration. Johnson prevailed in his battle with Congress, 
although by but a single vote. But even had politics prevailed and 
Johnson been impeached of this unjustifiable charge, it would not 
alter the significance of Johnson’s opposition for the purposes of 
coordinate construction. Johnson merely becomes a link in the chain 
of presidents throughout this period who generally opposed almost all 
congressionally-imposed infringements upon their prerogatives. 
Admittedly, Lincoln remained silent in the face of a few limited 
intrusions on his authority. Yet because these presidents generally 
took vigorous steps to protect the unitary power of the executive 
branch, minor deviations fail to undercut any inference of 
acquiescence. Therefore, when the conduct of all the chief executives 
of this period is taken as a whole, the leaders’ commitment to the 
unitary executive is clear. 
 
510. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 211; SMITH, supra note 416, at 466. 
511. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 216. 
512. See BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 183; DEWITT, supra note 370, at 627-28; 
GERSON, supra note 471, at 144-45. 
513. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 130. 
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IV. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE GILDED AGE, 1869-1889 
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson and the passage of the 
Tenure of Office Act led directly to a weakened presidency during the 
period between 1869 and 1889. The presidents in office during those 
years were hampered by a Congress that had gotten quite used to 
functioning as the government itself during the heady years of the 
Johnson presidency. Presidents Ulysses S. Grant, Rutherford B. 
Hayes, James A. Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, and Grover Cleveland 
fought back, and the Tenure of Office Act was ultimately repealed 
during the first Cleveland administration. This marks a great victory 
for the theory of the unitary executive and demarcates the period 
between 1869 and 1889 as one during which presidents refused to 
acquiesce in non-unitary constructions of presidential power. The 
history of this period begins with the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant. 
A. Ulysses S. Grant 
Ulysses S. Grant was the only president to serve eight consecutive 
years in the White House between the terms of Andrew Jackson and 
Woodrow Wilson. He became president after having served as 
General in Chief for the entire Johnson administration, a position 
which allowed Grant to play a major administrative role in 
determining the course of Reconstruction. Indeed, it could be said that 
after Abraham Lincoln was shot in the waning days of the Civil War, 
it was Grant who held things together, received the surrender of the 
Confederate forces, demobilized the Union army, and presided over 
Reconstruction. 
Grant’s initial presidential election in 1868 against the frail and 
colorless Horatio Seymour, ex-Governor of New York, was a rout. 
Americans greeted Grant’s replacement of the annoying and 
controversial Andrew Johnson with great relief.514 They were thrilled 
to see that Grant arrived in office owing nothing to the political 
powers of the day and being deeply familiar with the issues of 
domestic policy from his years as Andrew Johnson’s chief military 
officer.515 In a real show of independence, President-elect Grant went 
about picking his initial cabinet totally on his own and in secret, “in 
the same methodical way” he had planned his military campaigns.516 
Grant immediately differentiated himself from Andrew Johnson by 
 
514. SMITH, supra note 416, at 461. 
515. Id. at 464. 
516. Id. at 465. 
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pledging in his inaugural address, “I will always express my views to 
Congress, and when I think it advisable, will exercise the 
constitutional privilege of interposing a veto. But all laws will be 
faithfully executed whether they meet my approval or not.”517 There 
would be no massive failure to ensure faithful execution of the law 
under Grant as there had been under Johnson. 
Grant’s first cabinet picks were very promising. Grant selected 
Hamilton Fish as Secretary of State, George Boutwell as Secretary of 
the Treasury, and Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar as Attorney General, all 
of whom served with great distinction.518 His initial picks for 
Secretary of the Interior and the Postmaster General were also well 
received, and he surprised people by graciously appointing former 
Confederate General James Longstreet to be Surveyor of Customs of 
the port of New Orleans.519 Grant also stunned the nation by picking a 
full-blooded Seneca Indian, Ely S. Parker, as his first commissioner 
of Indian affairs.520 Succeeding in revolutionizing the government’s 
Indian policy, Grant emphasized peace with the Indians and appointed 
Quakers and religious figures to deal with Indian matters.521 Given 
Grant’s later problems with Gilded Age corruption, it is worth 
emphasizing that his initial cabinet picks were all superb; they were 
his own men with no links or debts to party bosses.522 
Grant’s first big fight with Congress was to come over repeal of the 
infamous Tenure of Office Act, the statute that had nearly wrecked 
Andrew Johnson’s presidency. In some ways, it is surprising and 
striking that Grant started out his administration with this fight over 
presidential prerogatives. Grant on occasion expressed limited views 
of presidential power, asserting that the president was an 
 
517. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
518. Id. at 468-72. 
519. See id. at 472, 522. 
520. Id. at 472-73. 
521. Id. at 473, 526-27; GEOFFREY PERRET, ULYSSES S. GRANT: SOLDIER & 
PRESIDENT 423-25 (1997). 
522. PERRET, supra note 521, at 381. After his retirement, while traveling around the 
world with a journalist, a chastened Grant admitted that the president could not always 
appoint his own men but had to defer sometimes to Congress. Grant said:  
An Executive must consider Congress . . . . It has become the habit of Congressmen to 
share with the Executive in the responsibility of appointments . . . . It is simply a 
custom that has grown up, a fact that cannot be ignored. The President very rarely 
appoints, he merely registers the appointments of members of Congress. In a country 
as vast as ours the advice of Congressmen as to persons to be appointed is useful, and 
generally for the best interests of the country.  
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901, at 24 (1958) (quoting 2 JOHN 
RUSSELL YOUNG, AROUND THE WORLD WITH GENERAL GRANT 265-66 (1879)). 
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“administrative officer” who was, “except on rare occasions[,] 
disposed to accept without question the work of Congress as the 
authoritative expression of the will of the American people.”523 Some 
in Congress might have hoped that the hero of Appomattox would 
meekly accept whatever limitations on his power Congress cared to 
enact. But Grant was no pushover, and he fully and vigorously 
defended the unitary power of the executive. Ultimately supported by 
an opinion by his Attorney General affirming his authority to review 
the decisions of his subordinates,524 Grant asserted his authority over 
his department heads, in one case overruling a decision made by the 
Secretary of the Interior.525 
Furthermore, Grant wasted no time at all in criticizing the Tenure 
of Office Act. In his first annual message, Grant challenged the Act’s 
constitutionality, averring that “[i]t could not have been the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution, when providing that appointments 
made by the President should receive the consent of the Senate, that 
the latter should have the power to retain in office persons placed 
there by Federal appointment against the will of the President.” 
Noting further that the Act was “inconsistent with a faithful and 
efficient administration of the Government,” Grant took the occasion 
“to earnestly recommend [its] total repeal.”526 
Grant’s biographer Jean Edward Smith notes: 
Eighteen sixty-nine was a time of legislative supremacy in the 
United States, and America’s solons were reluctant to surrender the 
power they had wrested from the executive. The Republicans had 
used the [Tenure of Office Act] to thwart Johnson’s power to 
remove subordinates and it was now a matter of senatorial 
prerogative. When Grant indicated that he wanted the statute 
repealed, the Senate leadership circled the wagons. On March 2, 
the next-to-the-last day of Johnson’s term, the upper house voted 
down a bill to repeal the act, 35-15. Two thirds [sic] of the Senate 
served notice it had no intention of yielding its authority. “I wish to 
leave the President-elect free to the full and useful exercise of the 
 
523. See BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 159; WHITE, supra note 522, at 23. 
524. See 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 94, 104 (1876). Earlier opinions authored by Attorney 
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525. Cross, supra note 311, at 489 n.31 (citing MARY BURKE HINSDALE, A HISTORY 
OF THE PRESIDENT’S CABINET 324 (1911)). 
526. Ulysses S. Grant, First Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1869), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, 
supra note 57, at 3981, 3992; see also FISHER, supra note 293, at 57; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 20, at 1100; WHITE, supra note 522, at 29; Fisher, supra note 375, at 72; Warren, 
supra note 246, at 24. 
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good judgment and good qualities which we all ascribe to him,” 
said New York’s Roscoe Conkling. “At the same time, I wish . . . 
to preserve the position which the Senate has maintained in the last 
and most dire emergency known in our jurisprudence.”527 
Most incoming presidents of the United States faced with a two-
thirds majority of the Senate opposed to a policy priority might give 
up, but not Grant. To add some muscle to his request, Grant 
threatened not to make any additional nominations until Congress had 
acted on the matter.528 As Jean Smith writes: 
When the new Congress convened following Grant’s inauguration, 
another effort was made to repeal the statute. Led by Congressman 
Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, now one of Grant’s staunchest 
supporters, the House voted overwhelmingly in early March to 
overturn the act. Once again the Senate balked. Grant responded by 
announcing that until the law was repealed he would enforce it 
vigorously. He would not remove any of Johnson’s appointees and 
would only fill offices that were vacant. The effect of the 
president’s announcement was to deny Congress the spoils it was 
expecting. There would be no new postmasters, pension clerks, or 
customs collectors until the Senate acted. Grant was scarcely the 
political babe in the woods sometimes depicted. By halting 
patronage appointments the president was using the one weapon 
the senators understood. Even Roscoe Conkling now suggested 
compromise.529 
The Senate reluctantly approved compromise legislation permitting 
the president to suspend any executive officer during the recess of the 
Senate without providing his reasons to the Senate, so long as the 
president informed the Senate of any such suspensions. The 
suspension, however, would not be fully effective until the Senate 
confirmed the president’s choice of a successor.530 This meant that the 
president could remove an official simply by nominating and getting 
confirmation for a successor. “Grant was satisfied. Rather than fight a 
protracted struggle for total repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, he 
signed the new measure on April 6.”531 Partial repeal of the infamous 
Tenure of Office Act thus became one of the very first new laws 
 
527. SMITH, supra note 416, at 479. Other prominent opponents included Senator 
Charles Sumner. Id. at 504. 
528. 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1100. 
529. SMITH, supra note 416, at 479. 
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70, at 192; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1101-05; WHITE, supra note 522, at 29-30; 
TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 208; Fisher, supra note 375, at 72. 
531. SMITH, supra note 416, at 480. 
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enacted under the leadership of the Grant administration. Henry 
Adams was to note prophetically, however, that “[t]he mere repeal of 
the Tenure-of-Office Bill cannot at once restore its [presidential] 
prestige, or wrest from Congress the initiative which Congress is now 
accustomed to exercise. The Senate has no idea of abandoning its 
control of power.”532 
Grant’s strong objections to the Tenure of Office Act represent an 
incredibly important assertion of the president’s sole authority to 
execute the laws. But sadly, Grant’s record with regard to the unitary 
executive was not completely consistent. Somewhat curiously, Grant 
failed to maintain his commitment to the principles of the unitary 
executive when Congress enacted statutes modeled on the Tenure of 
Office Act requiring Senate consent for removals of deputy 
postmasters.533 These statutes were to be declared unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States,534 the landmark case on 
the unitary executive. Perhaps Grant thought that deputy postmasters 
were not policymaking officials and so the theory of the unitary 
executive did not apply.535 Or maybe he just had other, bigger battles 
to fight. The fairest interpretation, given Grant’s record, is that his 
administration took no consistent position, either in favor of or 
opposed to total presidential control of the removal power. 
Grant made a brief effort to effect civil service reform. With 
Grant’s encouragement, Congress passed a bill in 1871 establishing a 
Civil Service Commission to which Grant named the illustrious editor 
of the Chicago Tribune, Joseph Medill. Grant tried to put civil service 
reform in place, but Congress cut off all appropriation for the matter 
and reform died until 1883, when the Pendleton Act was finally 
passed.536 
In other areas of public policy, Grant was vigorous, able, and 
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thoroughly in charge, just as he been as a general. Grant personally 
broke Jay Gould’s and Jim Fisk’s effort to corner the gold market on 
Black Friday, September 24, 1869, by decisively directing his 
Treasury Secretary to sell government gold as soon as Grant learned 
of what Gould and Fisk were doing.537 “Grant’s role was 
decisive . . . . [He personally] had given the crucial order.”538 
In the area of foreign policy, Grant worked with his exceptional 
Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, who would remain with him for all 
eight years of his presidency, to conclude the Treaty of Washington 
with Great Britain. “Grant’s role in American diplomacy was not 
unlike that of Eisenhower almost a century later. Both . . . delegated 
day-to-day operations to their secretary of state. Yet both made the 
final decisions and set the course.”539 Striving to make peace with the 
Indians, Grant again behaved like Eisenhower, who, as a former 
general, was able to make peace in Korea.540 Grant’s empathy with 
African-Americans in the South specifically carried over to the 
Indians,541 and Grant persisted with his peace policy until George 
Custer’s defeat at the Battle of Little Big Horn in 1876 made the 
policy unsustainable. 
Grant ultimately delegated matters regarding the Indians to his 
secretaries of the interior and his commissioners of Indian affairs. 
Grant’s military style of delegation in all matters of governance was 
hailed by former General Rutherford Hayes, who noted Grant’s 
emphasis on officer accountability, saying “Grant’s leadership and 
rule is beyond question.”542 Senator John Sherman complained that 
Grant “regarded [the] heads of departments as mere subordinates” and 
lamented that “the limitation of the power of the President [over 
cabinet members] is one that an army officer, accustomed to give or 
receive orders, finds difficult to understand and observe when elected 
President.”543 
Grant’s leadership style also led him to delegate authority over 
Reconstruction to his attorneys general and secretaries of war, who 
were a mixed bunch. Three of Grant’s Attorneys General—
Rockwood Hoar, Amos T. Akerman, and Alphonso Taft—were 
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superb, with Akerman being the best. Akerman undertook to protect 
the freedmen with gusto, and as one historian put it, “no attorney 
general before or since ‘has been more vigorous in the prosecution of 
cases designed to protect the lives and rights of black Americans.’”544 
Attorneys General George Williams, who left office in a scandal, and 
Edward Pierrepont, who refused to protect African-Americans in the 
South, were much more problematic. Fortunately for Reconstruction, 
Grant took a special personal interest in the fate of the freedmen, and 
he began his tenure by working “mightily to secure adoption of the 
Fifteenth Amendment,”545 which was proposed by Congress on 
February 27, 1869 and ratified on March 30, 1870. 
Unfortunately, the South responded to the Fifteenth Amendment 
with a wave of violence—directed by the Ku Klux Klan—targeted at 
the freed slaves. Grant responded immediately, and in May 1870, 
Congress passed the first of three Enforcement Acts to counter 
terrorist violence. In June 1870, Grant brought Akerman to 
Washington to fight the Klan, and Congress took the momentous step 
of establishing a Department of Justice on the same level as other 
cabinet departments.546 Previously, the attorney general had been a 
one-man operation and simply served as an advisor to the president. 
By creating a full scale Justice Department with numerous lawyers 
and for the first time a Solicitor General—the famous Benjamin 
Bristow—the Grant administration greatly enhanced the president’s 
ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The creation 
of the Department of Justice was a major step in protecting 
presidential prerogatives and in enhancing the unitariness of the 
executive,547 although it would take some time before the Department 
was able to consolidate its control over the enforcement of the federal 
law.548 Henceforth, Justice Department staff lawyers would be able to 
supervise “the work of the United States attorneys and federal 
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marshals throughout the country.”549 
The team of Akerman and Bristow quickly racked up a very 
impressive record in battling the Ku Klux Klan, securing nearly one 
thousand indictments in the early 1870s, of which fifty-five percent 
ended in convictions.550 Congress passed a second Enforcement Act 
in 1871, and Grant fought vigorously to prevent the Klan from, in 
effect, reversing the decision at Appomattox.551 Grant suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus in nine lawless counties of South Carolina and 
sent military reinforcements to that state. Akerman “gave full credit to 
the president. No one, he told a friend, was ‘better’ or ‘stronger’ than 
Grant when it came to enforcing anti-terrorist measures.”552 By the 
end of his administration, “Grant stood watch over the South almost 
alone. His cabinet was uninterested, [General in Chief William T.] 
Sherman was dubious, the Supreme Court had eviscerated the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the public was more 
interested in reconciliation than Reconstruction.”553 Grant said, in 
retrospect, that the South should have been kept under military rule 
longer.554 The problem was that “the best chance of forcing 
fundamental change on the South was in the immediate aftermath of 
the war. Johnson had wasted that opportunity and, as so often in 
politics, once the initial impetus has passed from an attempted reform, 
it is virtually impossible to regenerate it.”555 When the nation 
repudiated Reconstruction in 1876, “Grant’s reputation suffered 
severely.”556 
In the re-election campaign of 1872, Grant was opposed by liberal 
Republican Horace Greeley, who was also endorsed by the 
Democrats. “Grant’s treatment of the South became the central issue 
of the campaign,”557 and he was re-elected with fifty-six percent of 
the popular vote. The highpoint of Grant’s presidency came in 1872, 
and as “happened with Franklin Roosevelt after his landslide win in 
1936 and Ronald Reagan during his second term, hubris led to 
mistakes, and mistakes to poor administration, corruption, and 
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scandal.”558 Unfortunately and inexcusably, “Grant sat back benignly 
while administration officials shamelessly exploited their positions 
for personal gain.”559 
Geoffrey Perret ably summarizes Grant’s scandal problem when he 
reports that “[f]ew people ever thought [Grant] was personally on the 
take. On the contrary, Grant is often portrayed as a gullible, naive 
man far out of his depth, taken advantage of by people a lot smarter 
and greedier than he was.”560 The Credit Mobilier Affair erupted, and 
stained the government’s reputation, although all the scandalous 
transactions occurred before Grant became president.561 Congress 
meanwhile made a sordid effort to raise its pay retroactively, which 
hurt its standing with the public.562 Two second-term cabinet 
secretaries, William Richardson at Treasury and George Williams at 
Justice, resigned in scandal,563 and throughout it all “Grant’s loyalty 
to his appointees went beyond prudence.”564 By November of 1874, 
the Democrats recaptured the House of Representatives and gained 
ten seats in the Senate.565 Grant responded to his critics in his annual 
message to Congress, pledging that so long as he remained president, 
“all the laws of Congress and the provision of the Constitution . . . 
will be enforced with rigor.”566 
Another highlight of Grant’s second term was the elevation of the 
exceptionally able reformer Benjamin Bristow as Secretary of the 
Treasury. Bristow, who was very ambitious and who sought the 
presidency in 1876, used his office to bust up the Whiskey Ring—a 
corrupt conspiracy with tentacles reaching to Orville Babcock, one of 
Grant’s closest aides. Grant broke with Bristow and unwisely 
defended Babcock, who was guilty. The episode tarred Grant’s 
reputation as he left office. More scandals erupted, this time involving 
Interior Secretary Columbus Delano567 and Secretary of War William 
Belknap.568 Although he greatly liked Belknap, whom he had known 
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since his army days, Grant saw his obligation to ensure that the laws 
were faithfully enforced, and he ordered the attorney general to 
launch a criminal investigation of his own cabinet members.569 
Grant’s final test as president came with the disputed presidential 
election of 1876, during which he remained calm and nonpartisan. 
“He comes up to the mark so grandly on great occasions” wrote 
Rockwood Hoar, Grant’s first attorney general, “that I wish he were 
more careful of appearances in smaller matters.”570 In February 1877, 
as the crisis reached its peak, “Grant’s calm visage in the White 
House reassured the nation. His reputation for firmness, his 
evenhandedness during the crisis, his personal honesty and respect for 
the law, plus his known determination to maintain the peace, 
contributed to a lessening of tension.”571 Michael Les Benedict reports 
that Grant’s “reputation . . . rebounded strongly as he remained calm 
and resolute [during the crisis of 1876, and as he] made clear that he 
wouldn’t tolerate violence, nor would he use force to install 
Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes.”572 In a series of informal 
conversations during late February, Hayes’s men agreed to end 
Reconstruction and withdraw the army from the South to smooth the 
way for Hayes’s peaceful inauguration. Grant had nothing to do with 
any of this. “Having wrestled with the South for sixteen years, he 
recognized his obligation to leave the matter to his successor.”573 
Several features of the Grant administration were a triumph for the 
unitary executive. In particular, the partial repeal of the Tenure of 
Office Act and the creation for the first time in American history of a 
Department of Justice were big victories. Also, Grant’s vigor in 
taking care to enforce the civil rights laws in the South deserves note 
and differentiates him from Andrew Johnson, his disgraced 
predecessor. Finally, Grant’s supervision of policy in many fields, 
including foreign affairs, civil service reform, and Indian policy, 
bespeak a commitment to mastering the details of his presidential 
duties. In our judgment, Grant is a wrongly maligned president; 
though he made some significant mistakes, some of which led to 
scandals, Grant got the big questions of his day right. His reputation 
has wrongly suffered because of his failed efforts to make 
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Reconstruction work one hundred years ahead of its time. 
B. Rutherford B. Hayes 
Rutherford B. Hayes was a strong-willed man who made a 
determined effort, under exceptionally difficult circumstances, to 
bolster presidential power. Hayes became president in 1877, after the 
Democrats had captured the House of Representatives in the 1874 
mid-term elections and maintained control in the elections of 1876. 
The power of the Republican Party was at low point by 1876 because 
of the economic depression resulting from the Panic of 1873,574 
because of the scandals in the second Grant administration, and 
because of public ennui with Republicans after sixteen years of their 
rule. This ebbing of the tide of Republican power was reflected in the 
presidential election of 1876, in which Hayes decisively lost the 
popular vote contest to Democrat Samuel Tilden.575 Yet Tilden was 
left one vote short of victory in the Electoral College, receiving 184 
electoral votes to Hayes’s 166, with nineteen votes from Southern 
states in dispute.576 To resolve the contest, a special Electoral 
Commission of fifteen senators, representatives, and Supreme Court 
justices was appointed with eight Republican members and seven 
Democrats.577 By a straight, party-line vote, the Commission 
eventually gave all nineteen disputed electoral votes and the 
presidency to Hayes. The Democratically-controlled House revolted 
and refused to approve the results. Hayes finally broke the deadlock 
by offering to withdraw all federal troops from the South and to end 
Reconstruction in return for Democratic support for his election. The 
House Democrats acceded to this “Corrupt Bargain,” and Hayes 
assumed office.578 
After the Electoral Commission awarded him the presidency, 
Hayes set about picking a cabinet, and astonishingly under the 
circumstances, resolved to do this completely independent of 
Congress.579 Hayes also decided not to offer cabinet positions to those 
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who had competed with him for the Republican presidential 
“nomination, to their satellites, or to members of Grant’s cabinet.”580 
He asked the able Senator John Sherman to be Secretary of the 
Treasury and the superb lawyer William Evarts to be Secretary of 
State. Leading Republican civil service reformer Carl Schurz got the 
Interior Department, and Southerner David Key was appointed 
Postmaster General to appease Southern Democrats still seething over 
the disputed presidential election.581 As Leonard White reports, 
“Powerful Senators had expected to be consulted. They were not.”582 
White further notes: 
The Senate oligarchy promptly accepted the challenge, declined to 
confirm as a matter of courtesy, and sent the nominations to 
committees, not even excepting their fellow Senator, John 
Sherman. A storm of public indignation swept across the country 
and shortly thereafter the Senate confirmed all the nominations. 
“For the first time since the Civil War,” [historian Wilfred] 
Binkley wrote, “the Senate had been vanquished on a clear-cut 
issue between it and the President. The upper House had passed its 
zenith.”583 
Hayes thus came into office with a striking show of independence and 
pro-reform sentiment. He was off to a good start. 
Hayes’s inaugural address called for the South to have “wise, 
honest, and peaceful local self-government,”584 a euphemism for 
withdrawing federal troops and abandoning the rights of African-
Americans. He also called for “thorough, radical, and complete” civil 
service reform.585 The address, coupled with his cabinet appointments 
and the fact he was not Grant, led to “[s]upport from the educated and 
cultivated elite who thought of itself as ‘the best people.’”586 
Abandoning African-Americans in the South did not bother James 
Russell Lowell, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Charles W. Eliot, 
Francis James Child, and Charles Eliot Norton, who all wrote the 
President to express their approval for the course he had set.587 
Hayes’s practice as president was untrue to his Whig origins, as “he 
moved away from the Whig ideal of a weak president who would be 
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subservient to Congress, deferential to his cabinet, and would allow 
virtual autonomy to heads of departments.”588 Historian Ari 
Hoogenboom writes: 
Hayes identified with John Quincy Adams in his struggles with 
Congress, his patronage policies, and his desire to use national 
power to foster education. Hayes, however, was a much better 
politician than Adams. By working hard at being president and by 
fighting a number of battles with Congress, Hayes would reverse 
the ascendancy of Congress, the independence of cabinet members, 
and the decline of the presidency.589 
Hayes relied on and trusted his cabinet, meeting with them twice a 
week, for two hours each time, and daily during crises. Everything—
big and small—was discussed at these cabinet meetings, but “Hayes 
made the decisions, and on occasion he imposed his will upon 
reluctant department heads, including Sherman, Evarts, and Schurz, 
who were the strongest cabinet members.”590 
From the start of his administration, in March 1877, Hayes 
confronted the question of what to do about faithfully executing the 
laws in the South. He thought the federal troops who were then 
upholding Republican governments in South Carolina and Louisiana 
were counterproductive.591 Hoogenboom writes, “Attracted to a 
policy that would woo conservative Southerners, Hayes became 
willing, if need be, to abandon white carpetbaggers and scalawags. He 
rationalized that their corrupt course had forfeited their claims on the 
Republican party and the federal government for protection . . . .”592 
Hayes urged education for the freed African-Americans, but Congress 
would never appropriate funds for this purpose. Moreover, Hayes 
dreamed of governing the South with a new coalition of resurrected 
white Southern Whigs and freed African-Americans. 
The key decision was whether to leave federal troops in place. 
Hayes’s hands in this regard were tied by the Democratic House of 
Representatives, which was refusing to appropriate money to keep the 
army in the South.593 Rather than fight with the House, as Hayes 
successfully did on other occasions, he capitulated. At a cabinet 
meeting on March 22, 1877, Hayes confirmed his intention to pull the 
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federal troops out of South Carolina.594 By late April, Hayes was also 
withdrawing federal troops from Louisiana, and as soon as the forces 
had departed, the Democrats took over the Statehouse.595 Democrats 
argued to white Southerners that Hayes deserved no credit for doing 
something they had made him do, and Hayes failed to receive desired 
support from white former-Whigs in the South.596 Former Attorney 
General Amos T. Akerman “observed that Hayes’s course amounted 
to combating ‘lawlessness by letting the lawless have their own 
way.’”597 William Lloyd Garrison and Benjamin Wade denounced 
Hayes’s new Southern policy, but Hayes felt constrained by the 
Democratic House’s refusal to make military appropriations.598 
Beacon Hill patricians had fewer qualms about the shift. In June 
1877, Hayes received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from 
Harvard, where Oliver Wendell Holmes published a poem hailing him 
as a “Healer of Strife!”599 
The Hayes administration also witnessed the enactment of the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.600 This law, which remains on the 
books to the present day, limits the use of federal troops for ordinary 
law enforcement.601 The Act has been interpreted to forbid “direct and 
active participation [of troops] in traditional civilian law enforcement, 
like making arrests or conducting searches.”602 More “passive 
assistance, like providing equipment, training and advice” is 
allowed.603 The Posse Comitatus Act reflected Democratic anger over 
the role federal troops played in the South during the Hayes-Tilden 
election, and their guarding polling places, arresting members of the 
Ku Klux Klan, disrupting illegal whiskey production, and putting 
down labor unrest.604 One hundred and twenty years after its 
enactment, the administration of President George W. Bush was to 
consider asking for modification of the Posse Comitatus Act to 
facilitate the use of the military in anti-terrorist law enforcement 
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efforts.605 
Hayes hoped Southerners would honor their pledges to him that 
they would observe the voting rights of African-Americans, but this 
was not to be. Hayes’s own Christian outlook blinded him to the 
“pervasiveness and the viciousness of racial prejudice in southern 
politics and society.”606 A good man himself, Hayes’s imagination 
failed him when it came time to imagine how unconstrained white 
Southerners would behave. By the time of the mid-term elections of 
1878, “Hayes candidly noted that despite solemn pledges to uphold 
the constitutional rights of all their citizens, South Carolina and 
Louisiana, by legislation, fraud, intimidation, and ‘violence of the 
most atrocious character,’ had prevented blacks from voting.”607 In 
part as a result, the Democrats took control of the Senate, in addition 
to retaining their control of the House of Representatives. Not 
surprisingly, Congress was to ignore Hayes’s pleas for money to 
enforce the federal election laws.608 
Hayes’s failures with respect to sectional politics did not stop him 
from strongly defending and reasserting the president’s sole authority 
over the execution of the law. In fact, Hayes soon became embroiled 
in two landmark battles with Congress over the unitary executive. The 
first of these was the extraordinary battle of wills between Hayes and 
the House of Representatives over federal election law that amounted 
to Hayes’s finest moment in the White House. Southerners in control 
of the House tried repeatedly to repeal Reconstruction-era legislation 
that authorized the president to use federal troops to protect the rights 
of black voters.609 The Democrats attempted to accomplish this 
objective by attaching riders to unrelated appropriations bills.610 
Hayes anticipated the attack, and was fully set and determined to 
preserve both the civil rights laws and presidential prerogatives. 
White reports that Hayes wrote in his diary on March 18, 1879: 
An important struggle then begins. The Democrats will attempt 
coercion of the President to secure a repeal of legislation which I 
deem wise and important. This is to place the Executive “under the 
coercive dictation” of a bare majority of the two Houses of 
Congress . . . . It is a “measure of coercion”, a revolutionary 
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measure . . . . No precedent shall be established with my consent to 
a measure which is tantamount to coercion of the Executive.611 
If riders repealing the test oath and prohibiting the use of federal 
troops at elections were attached, Hayes wrote “that he would not 
even consider the merits of the bills so presented.”612 James Rawley 
describes what followed: 
On April 29, 1879, an outraged Hayes vetoed an army 
appropriations measure carrying such a rider. A month later, the 
Democrats passed a bill prohibiting federal troops from serving as 
peacekeepers at polls unless requested to do so by a state. Hayes 
hurled back another successful veto. In all, Congress passed seven 
such bills, five saddled with riders repealing the elections laws and 
two designed to circumvent them. With his seven vetoes, Hayes 
fulfilled his oath to enforce the nation’s laws and moreover 
increased unity within the Republican party as members rallied to 
his support.613 
Hayes objected to the use of the riders as an unconstitutional 
attempt to force his hand on repeal of the so-called Force or 
Enforcement Acts.614 The Democrats were in a quandary as it 
gradually became clear that “Hayes’s vetoes were strengthening him 
and his party . . . and had helped [the Republicans] prepare for the 
1880 presidential campaign.”615 Hayes was able to savor a victory 
over Congress, but “he knew that his southern policy had failed.”616 
Leonard White concludes: 
[The battle over the riders] was a clean-cut victory for the 
President and a powerful precedent against congressional 
encroachment on the executive power by means of appropriations 
riders. The action was defensive and protective, but it was 
important. Congress was forced to enact the long-delayed 
appropriations acts without imposing its will on the President; the 
integrity of the veto power was sustained; and the popularity of an 
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unpopular president was repaired.617 
White observes that only “the courage and stubbornness of Hayes 
halted this House aggression on executive power,” and he concludes 
that “the House lost prestige in the battle of the riders.”618 
Hayes’s clash with the House of Representatives over the 
appropriations riders was matched by a scuffle with the Senate over 
the presidential prerogatives of removal, nomination, and 
appointment. Hayes came into office with civil service reform and the 
ending of the spoils system as primary objectives.619 In addition to 
wanting to end the congressional practice of dictating nominations to 
the executive, Hayes also wanted to end the practice of 
“assessments,” in which federal workers were asked to contribute two 
to seven percent of their annual salary for campaign funds. As a 
member of Congress, Hayes had supported legislation that would 
have required that those who performed best on an open competitive 
examination be appointed to the civil service. Now that as president, 
he supervised a bureaucracy of 100,000 employees, Hayes was no 
less eager to make civil service reform a reality.620 In April 1877, 
shortly after taking office, Hayes had Treasury Secretary John 
Sherman appoint a special commission to investigate the corrupt New 
York Customhouse, and commissions were also appointed to 
investigate corruption at the Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San 
Francisco customhouses.621 The New York Commission was headed 
up by John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice. Jay recommended 
sweeping changes, and Hayes ordered the reluctant Sherman to 
implement Jay’s recommendations.622 In June 1877, Hayes issued an 
order prohibiting federal employees from engaging in any political 
activity aside from voting and public speaking.623 This sweeping 
presidential order exacerbated the growing factionalism of the 
Republican Party by irritating the so-called Stalwart wing of the 
party, led by powerful New York Senator Roscoe Conkling, a close 
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ally of former President Grant.624 
Matters came to a head when Hayes sought to replace Chester A. 
Arthur, the collector of the New York Customhouse, and Alonzo 
Cornell, the naval officer of the New York Customhouse, both key 
Conkling allies. When Arthur and Cornell refused to resign, Hayes 
“sent the names of their successors to the Senate for confirmation, 
nominations which were greeted with derisive laughter and referred to 
the Committee on Commerce, of which Senator Conkling was 
chairman. The committee reported adversely, and the nominations 
were rejected.”625 The Senate was fortified in taking these actions by 
the amended Tenure of Office Act, which of course was still in place. 
Hayes wrote in his diary, “I am now in a contest on the question of 
the right of Senators to control nominations . . . . But I am right, and 
will not give up the contest.”626 In the summer of 1878, “Hayes 
summarily dismissed Arthur and Cornell, made recess appointments, 
and in December again sent in his nominations for these vacant posts. 
Conkling held up action for two months, but finally defeated himself 
by his unrestrained attacks on the President. The Senate voted to 
confirm on February 3, 1879.”627 Hayes had won as big a victory over 
the Senate on presidential prerogatives of nomination and 
appointment as he was to win over the House on appropriations 
riders. 
The key to Hayes’s victory over Conkling was his refusal to back 
down on the removal of Arthur and Cornell from their posts at the 
New York Customhouse. Hayes resolved that, no matter what the 
Senate did with his nominees, “In no event will the old incumbents be 
allowed to return to their former places, if I have power to prevent it, 
and as to that I am not in doubt.”628 Thus armed with the removal 
power, Hayes reclaimed presidential control over the prerogatives of 
nomination and appointment. At the end of his term, Hayes described 
his victory in his diary as follows: 
The end I have chiefly aimed at has been to break down 
congressional patronage, and especially Senatorial patronage. The 
contest has been a bitter one. It has exposed me to attack, 
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opposition, misconstruction, and the actual hatred of powerful 
men. But I have had great success. No member of either house now 
attempts even to dictate appointments. My sole right to make 
appointments is tacitly conceded. It has seemed to me that as 
Executive I could advance the reform of the civil service in no way 
so effectively as by rescuing the power of appointing to office 
from the congressional leaders. I began with selecting a Cabinet in 
opposition to their wishes, and I have gone on in that path steadily 
until now I am filling the important places of collector of the port 
and postmaster at Philadelphia almost without a suggestion even 
from Senators or Representatives!629 
Hayes’s removals of Arthur and Cornell would prove the exception 
and not the rule. Although Hayes employed his removal power to 
ensure that certain key positions were occupied by officials loyal to 
him, as a long-time supporter of civil service reform, Hayes was 
committed to using the removal power more sparingly than had his 
immediate predecessors, observing in his first annual message that he 
had “endeavored to reduce the number of changes in subordinate 
places usually made upon the change of the general 
administration.”630 Hayes regarded “congressional demands for 
patronage [as] not only a great evil, but also [as] a usurpation of 
executive prerogatives.”631 In general, Hayes’s “reluctance to fire able 
civil servants” to promote political friends “marks him as the least 
partisan president between John Quincy Adams and Theodore 
Roosevelt.”632 The opinions of his attorneys general underscored that 
his reticence to remove was based on matters of policy and did not 
mark a deviation from the position asserted by previous presidents 
regarding the removal power’s constitutional basis.633 
In other areas of domestic policy, Hayes took several notable 
actions to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. In the 
summer of 1877, when there was great labor unrest following a 
railroad workers’ strike, Hayes ordered federal troops to restore order 
in West Virginia and in Pittsburgh, “where local militiamen had sided 
with the strikers. Although Hayes pursued these deployments 
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cautiously, they nevertheless made him the first president since 
Andrew Jackson to use troops in a labor dispute. The mere presence 
of the troops quelled the violence.”634 Grant was critical of Hayes for 
excessive caution and argued that the strike “should have been put 
down with a strong hand and so summarily as to prevent a like 
occurrence for a generation.”635 Hayes also pardoned one person 
prosecuted for sending pornography through the mails, but he 
declined to pardon another victim because he did not think the 
pardoning power should “be used to nullify or repeal statutes, nor to 
overrule the judgments of the Courts.”636 
Hayes asserted the president’s power to control the executive 
branch even more directly in his third annual message, in which he 
strongly attacked the notion that inferior federal officials had any 
executive authority which was separate and apart from that of the 
president.637 In Hayes’s opinion, the sole responsibility of subordinate 
officers was to “their superior in official position.”638 Hayes 
elaborated: “It is their duty to obey the legal instructions of those 
upon whom that authority is devolved, and their best public service 
consists in the discharge of their functions irrespective of partisan 
politics. Their duties are the same whatever party is in power and 
whatever policy prevails.”639 
In order to depoliticize the process, Hayes recommended that 
Congress develop clear qualifications to govern the appointment and 
removal of lower executive officials.640 But the earlier portions of 
Hayes’s address, quoted above, made it clear that under any such 
proposal, failure to follow the directions of higher-ranking executive 
officials must necessarily constitute proper grounds for removal. Any 
doubts in this regard were eliminated the following year in Hayes’s 
fourth annual message, in which he explicitly called for the outright 
repeal of the nefarious Tenure of Office Act.641 In Hayes’s opinion, 
the president would be the sole judge of who should continue to serve 
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in the executive branch without any interference from the Senate. 
Hayes’s most important action in foreign affairs came with his 
anticipation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in a 
special message of March 8, 1880, where he declared it was 
American policy to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans under American control. Like the Monroe Doctrine itself and 
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, this was a major assertion of 
presidential power in setting national policy.642 Hayes ultimately fired 
Navy Secretary Thompson for collaborating with a French company 
seeking to build such a canal.643 
In his fourth and final annual message to Congress, delivered on 
December 8, 1880, Hayes urged Congress to investigate violations of 
the Fifteenth Amendment and to appropriate funds for prosecuting 
those who were depriving African-Americans of their voting rights.644 
Hayes attacked the spoils system as an unconstitutional encroachment 
on the president’s appointment power, and, as noted above, he called 
for repeal of the Tenure of Office Act.645 
When the 1880 election arrived, Hayes, who had declared himself 
in favor of one six-year, non-renewable term for the president,646 was 
not a candidate for reelection. This was a source of relief to 
Republican politicians, who found Hayes’s intra-party fight with 
Conkling and his pro-Southern policy not to their liking. Hayes had 
never overcome the taint of his disputed election, and his final two 
years in office, during which he confronted a Democratic Senate and 
House, had been stormy indeed. Hayes was a great president from the 
perspective of unitary executive theorists, but a lousy one from the 
perspective of Republican politicos. 
In sum, Hayes rose above the circumstances of his election to 
become a strong president, especially when one considers that the 
Democrats controlled the Senate for two years of his presidency and 
the House for its entirety. The great disaster of Hayes’s presidency 
was, of course, his withdrawal of federal troops from the South and 
the ending of Reconstruction. But in terms of restoring the power and 
prestige of the presidency, Hayes deserves praise. He beat the House 
on appropriations riders and the Senate on appointments. He also laid 
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the groundwork for civil service reform. 
The price of restoring some presidential power that had been lost 
by previous administrations was high. The removal of Arthur and 
Cornell had monopolized the attention of the administration for nearly 
eighteen months. It became clear that the Senate’s continued 
involvement in executive removals through the amended Tenure of 
Office Act would remain a significant obstacle to the president’s 
control over the execution of the laws until it was repealed. 
C. James A. Garfield 
James A. Garfield was elected to the House of Representatives in 
1862, where he served as a Radical Republican member until his 
election to the presidency.647 In 1868, he favored the impeachment of 
President Andrew Johnson.648 From 1871 to 1875, Garfield was 
chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, a post 
that taught him a great deal about the workings of the U.S. 
government.649 While in the House, Garfield exhibited an 
unsurprising pro-Congress bias. He favored a proposal to give 
department heads seats in Congress in order to rein in the executive 
branch.650 And in 1869, when Grant pushed a bill that would have 
repealed the Tenure of Office Act through the House of 
Representatives, Garfield opposed it, saying “never by my vote shall 
Congress give up the constitutional principle and allow to any one 
man, be he an angel from Heaven, the absolute and sole control of 
appointments to and removals from office in this country.”651 
At the start of the Hayes administration, the ever-fickle Garfield 
changed his mind about the Tenure of Office Act, which he had 
favored in 1869. Writing in 1877, Garfield said:  
During the last twenty-five years, it has been understood, by the 
Congress and the people, that offices are to be obtained by the aid 
of senators and representatives, who thus become the dispensers, 
sometimes the brokers of patronage. . . . [The Tenure of Office 
Act] has virtually resulted in the usurpation, by the senate, of a 
large share of the appointing power . . . has resulted in seriously 
crippling the just powers of the executive, and has placed in the 
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hands of senators and representatives a power most corrupt and 
dangerous.’652  
Thus by 1877, Garfield was publicly on record as opposing the 
Tenure of Office Act. 
Garfield emerged as a dark horse choice for the 1880 Republican 
nomination after front-running candidates John Sherman, Ulysses S. 
Grant, and James G. Blaine faded. Garfield’s win was attributable to 
the votes of followers of Sherman and Half-Breed Blaine, and 
consequently, the Stalwarts, led by Senator Roscoe Conkling and 
supporters of Grant, needed to be propitiated. Garfield accomplished 
this by picking Conkling’s protégé, Chester A. Arthur, the corrupt 
former Collector of the Port of New York, to be the vice presidential 
candidate.653 With Garfield and Arthur on a joint ticket, both the pro-
reform and anti-reform wings of the Republican Party were 
represented. This joint representation was made necessary by the 
stormy battles of the Hayes presidency, which had split the 
Republican Party into two wings. 
President-elect Garfield decided to make Blaine his Secretary of 
State, to Conkling’s irritation, but overall he picked a cabinet that 
“was remarkably balanced,” representing many “disparate wings of 
the party.”654 Unlike Hayes, Garfield was quite “willing to sacrifice 
some executive independence in cabinet making in order to secure 
good relations with Congress.”655 
As president, the ever-malleable Garfield was besieged by office 
seekers.656 He wrote in his journal: “My day is frittered away by the 
personal seeking of people, when it ought to be given to the great 
problems which concern the whole country. Four years of this kind of 
intellectual dissipation may cripple me for the remainder of my 
life.”657 On June 6, 1881, Garfield wrote in his diary that after an 
absence of three days, “[t]he stream of callers which was damned up 
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by my absence became a torrent and swept away my day.”658 Two 
days later he noted, “My day in the office was very like its 
predecessors. Once or twice I felt like crying out in the agony of my 
soul against the greed for office and its consumption of my time.”659 
While in office, Garfield sent somewhat conflicting signals about 
the president’s power to control the executive branch. As noted 
earlier, Garfield had condemned the Tenure of Office Act during 
Hayes’s battle with the Senate in 1877.660 In his inaugural address, 
however, the ever-changing Garfield announced his intention to ask 
Congress to place substantive limits on the removal power by 
“prescrib[ing] the grounds upon which removals shall be made” in 
order to “protect[] . . . incumbents against intrigue and wrong.”661 The 
import of this proposal was mitigated by the fact that Garfield 
specifically limited his proposed civil service tenure to “minor offices 
of the Executive Departments.” The fact that policy-making offices 
were not covered by Garfield’s proposal makes it consistent with the 
theory of the unitary executive, which calls only for unlimited 
presidential removal power over policy-making officials. It also 
renders Garfield’s inaugural address consistent with his 1877 
criticisms of the Tenure of Office Act. Because Garfield’s 
administration was tragically cut short when he was assassinated by a 
frustrated office seeker, Garfield never had the chance to expound 
further on his views of the president’s power to control the executive 
branch. 
Garfield was a weak president, as was his successor Chester A. 
Arthur. It is no accident that it was during Garfield’s and Arthur’s 
tenure in office that a young Woodrow Wilson was to claim that the 
legislative branch “has virtually taken into its hands all the substantial 
powers of government.”662 Wilson further declared that “the President 
is no greater than his prerogative of veto makes him.”663 
The major issue Garfield faced during his brief six months in office 
was civil service reform, the desire for which had been growing 
throughout the 1870s. By the time of his inaugural address, Garfield 
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had irritated reformers by proposing much less change than had 
outgoing President Hayes. Garfield proposed tenure for minor 
officeholders, as noted above, while Hayes came out for “uniform 
methods of appointment, the competitive system, the revival of the 
Civil Service Commission, and an end to congressional interference 
with executive officeholders.”664 When the Star Route Affair, a 
scandal involving contracts to deliver the U.S. mail, broke two 
months into his administration and it became clear that major 
Republican figures were involved, to his credit Garfield told 
investigators, “Go ahead regardless of where and whom you hit.”665 
This was, however, a minor contribution in light of the overall debate 
about civil service reform. 
The one major contribution of the all too brief Garfield 
administration suggests that he would have ardently defended the 
president’s authority over the executive branch. After Garfield was 
inaugurated, the Stalwart faction, led by the ubiquitous Senator 
Conkling, attempted to dictate Garfield’s nominations to many minor 
but important executive branch offices.666 Garfield refused and openly 
defied the Stalwarts by nominating William H. Robertson, a not-so-
able ally of Conkling’s chief rival as collector of the port of New 
York.667 To Garfield, the issue was simple: “Shall the principal port of 
entry in which more than ninety percent of all our customs duties are 
collected be under the control of administration or under the local 
control of a factional senator?”668 Garfield wrote that the Robertson 
nomination “brings on the contest at once and will settle the question 
whether the President is the registering clerk of the Senate or the 
Executive of the Nation. It is probable that the contest will be sharp 
and bitter but I prefer to have the fight ended now.”669 
Conkling threw the entire weight of his political machine against 
Garfield, but the public sided with Garfield. On May 5, Garfield 
strengthened his hand by withdrawing all nominations but 
Robertson’s, indicating that he “considered the power and prestige of 
the presidency to be at stake.”670 Thus compromised, Conkling and 
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fellow New York Senator Thomas C. Platt resigned their seats in the 
U.S. Senate in the hopes that the New York legislature would restore 
their reputations by re-electing them. Conkling’s gambit backfired 
when the legislature declined to re-elect either of them.671 Garfield’s 
actions were hailed as a milestone in the revival of the power and 
prestige of the presidency, and Conkling never held public office 
again.672 
Garfield’s assassination on July 2, 1881, turned the feckless 
politician into a martyr for the cause of civil service reform, a cause 
he had supported tepidly at best while still alive. Henry Adams called 
the reaction of civil service reformers to Garfield’s death “cynical 
impudence” for this reason.673 Garfield’s assassin Charles Guiteau, a 
deranged and disappointed office seeker, called out after he shot 
Garfield that he was a Stalwart and that now Arthur would be 
president.674 The general reaction of the public was universal 
indignation over the spoils system. As Senator Henry L. Dawes was 
quoted as rightly saying: 
“ . . . the method of appointment to office in this country has got to 
be changed. It can be administered but little longer in the methods 
of the past. It has outgrown those methods adapted for an old 
system of things never sufficient for them; but it was never dreamt 
by those who created it that it would be applied to the condition of 
things now existing in this country. It can no longer be that 
200,000 office-holders can be appointed in the methods that were 
fit and proper for the appointment of 1,000. Two hundred thousand 
in the very near future are to be appointed . . . .” And again, “ . . . 
were it not for the debauchery of this service itself the necessity of 
a safe administration would be so apparent that the thoughtful and 
earnest statesman of whatever party . . . would see that this must be 
changed somehow.”675 
Civil service reform, so long stalled, would be enacted in 1883 under 
the administration of Garfield’s successor.676 
Garfield’s presidency of six months was too brief to permit many 
conclusions to be drawn about it, but it is noteworthy that Garfield 
arrived in office as a stated opponent of the Tenure of Office Act. The 
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one great struggle of his six months in office was with Roscoe 
Conkling, and it showed that Garfield was determined to wrest back 
presidential control over the appointment power from the barons of 
the Senate. Garfield, like Hayes, Grant, and Johnson before him, is 
thus justifiably regarded as a defender of the unitary executive. There 
was no acquiescence during Garfield’s tenure in any diminution of the 
rightful powers of the presidency. 
D. Chester A. Arthur 
Vice President Chester A. Arthur had been placed on the 
Republican ticket to create sectional and ideological balance in 1880. 
A committed Stalwart, Arthur was to balance the more moderate 
Garfield, who had gained the support of Blaine’s Half-Breeds. 
Reformer Edward L. Godkin aptly described Arthur’s past 
associations as “a mess of filth,” but he optimistically said “there is 
no place in which [Arthur’s] powers of mischief will be as small as in 
the Vice Presidency.”677 When Arthur became president because of an 
assassin’s bullet, reformers were terrified at the thought of Conkling 
being “the power behind the throne.”678 
Moreover, there was little in Arthur’s “background to prepare him 
for executive leadership.”679 From 1871 until his dismissal in 1878, 
Arthur had been the spoilsman collector of the port of New York, a 
post in which he had been found by the Jay Commission to be 
notoriously corrupt.680 Worst of all, Arthur’s administration was 
hamstrung by the fact that he assumed the presidency without having 
been elected to it. At least two of the three previous vice presidents to 
succeed to the presidency, John Tyler and Andrew Johnson, endured 
rocky tenures in no small part because they repudiated the policies of 
the man whose death brought them to the White House. This was an 
inherent hazard in the system of picking vice presidential candidates 
to balance a party ticket. Arthur, to his credit, broke this pattern and 
behaved more like Millard Fillmore, an accidental president who 
continued the policies of his deceased predecessor. Stalwarts did not 
take over the government under Arthur. On the contrary, civil service 
reform passed and the President signed it into law. 
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The beginning of Arthur’s administration showed great promise. 
Arthur at first appeared to be a good administrator, and “his conduct 
during the assassination crisis . . . won him public sympathy.”681 He 
began by keeping Garfield’s cabinet and as he gradually replaced its 
members, he “did so responsibly, almost as if to prove that the 
Stalwarts were not bereft of talent.”682 The new Secretary of State was 
former New Jersey Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, an improvement 
over Blaine; the new Secretary of the Treasury was Charles Folger, 
Chief Justice of the New York State Supreme Court; and the new 
Attorney General was Benjamin Brewster, the former state attorney 
general for Pennsylvania.683 While Stalwart cronies were welcome at 
“sumptuous feasts,” Arthur so frustrated their desires for patronage 
that Conkling was moved to complain that the Hayes administration 
was “‘respectable, if not heroic’ in comparison.”684 Although 
thousands of patronage jobs were available in the Treasury 
Department alone, “by the summer of 1882, only sixteen removals 
had been made.”685 Most dramatically, Arthur resisted appeals to fire 
Robertson from his post as collector of the port of New York.686 
Reacting swiftly to the Star Route scandal, Arthur ordered a series of 
removals growing out of the affair, and in his first annual message, he 
pledged to prosecute offenders “with the utmost vigor of the law.”687 
Doenecke notes, “As a man Arthur may have been saddened to see 
his cronies indicted, but as president he wholeheartedly supported the 
prosecuting attorneys.”688 
In this same message, Arthur also endorsed civil service reforms 
that would include “ascertained fitness” for positions, stable tenure of 
office, and prompt investigation of abuses.689 He pledged to support 
any civil service reform bill that Congress might pass, and asked for 
an appropriation of $25,000 to reactivate President Grant’s Civil 
Service Commission.690 Ohio Democrat George Hunt Pendleton had a 
civil service reform bill pending, but Congress was initially quite 
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opposed to such reform and appropriated only $15,000 for the revival 
of the Civil Service Commission. Harvard president Charles W. Eliot, 
poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, psychologist William James, and 
author Brooks Adams signed petitions supporting the proposal, but at 
first, nothing happened.691 
Over time, however, Arthur began to show his true colors. He was 
essentially a lazy man whose “apathy toward administrative tasks was 
in almost inverse ratio to his love of high living. As a White House 
clerk later commented, ‘President Arthur never did today what could 
be put off until tomorrow.’”692 He worked six hours a day, from ten in 
the morning until four in the afternoon, “after which he pursued the 
life of a bon vivant.”693 “Twice a week, at noon, he met with his 
cabinet.”694 Arthur’s bad relations with the press were exacerbated by 
the scathing coverage given to a speech at Delmonico’s Restaurant, 
where he drunkenly confessed to knowledge of vote purchasing in 
Indiana.695 To top all of this off, Arthur suffered from very poor 
health and was essentially dying during his tenure as president. He 
suffered from Bright’s disease, a fatal kidney disorder that “leads to 
spasmodic nausea, mental depression, and inertness.”696 Arthur 
learned of his illness in 1882, and he kept it secret from the public. It 
undoubtedly contributed to his lethargy as president. He eventually 
succumbed to the disease in 1886, shortly after leaving the White 
House. 
Then, in the 1882 mid-term elections, the Republicans suffered a 
huge defeat, losing control of the House of Representatives and 
suffering a greatly reduced margin in the Senate. Newspapers referred 
to the election as a “Democratic Cyclone.”697 In the words of Mrs. 
Henry Adams, Congress may have been behaving like “a pack of 
whipped boys,” but it was this electoral convulsion, more than 
anything else, that moved Congress to enact civil service reform.698 In 
his second annual message, Arthur explicitly endorsed the Pendleton 
bill, for the first time endorsing competitive examinations and a ban 
 
691. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 98. 
692. Id. at 79 (quoting THOMAS C. REAVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS: THE LIFE OF 
CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 273 (1975)). 
693. Weisberger, supra note 677, at 79. 
694. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 79. 
695. Id. at 33, 80. 
696. Id. at 80. 
697. Id. at 99. 
698. Id. at 100 (quoting ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS SYSTEM: A 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883, at 236 (1961)). 
  
788 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
on political assessments.699 Arthur subsequently signed the measure 
into law, even though he had only supported the measure “most 
reluctantly.”700 
The Pendleton Act, as finally adopted, established a bipartisan 
Civil Service Commission of three members appointed by the 
president with senatorial consent but subject to removal by the 
president.701 It required that open, competitive examinations be held, 
with appointments going to those who earned the highest grades.702 It 
apportioned the civil service among the states equitably.703 It also 
provided for protection of the so-called “classified service” (i.e., 
positions covered by civil service protections) against political 
assessments by explicitly providing that public servant could not be 
forced to contribute to political funds or be removed for failure to 
contribute to do so.704 The Act also prohibited federal officials from 
soliciting political contributions from employees705 and barred anyone 
from soliciting or receiving such contributions in any public 
building.706 The president was given the power to extend the 
classified service to more employees by executive order,707 a power 
used to great effect by President Grover Cleveland.708 The end 
product was a model law that ended the spoils system and 
revolutionized the American civil service. Soon after its enactment, 
commentators noted a great reduction in the level of incompetence in 
the civil service, and the proceeds from assessments dropped by as 
much as half.709 
During the debates on civil service reform, Arthur never clearly 
stated his position on the removal power. It is important to note, 
however, that a close reading of Arthur’s comments regarding an 
early version of the Pendleton Act suggests that Arthur would have 
opposed any congressionally imposed limits on the removal power. 
The bill, as reported by the Senate, was modeled on the British civil 
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service system, providing for competitive examinations for entrance 
into the public service, security of tenure of most civil officers, and 
the political neutrality of the civil service.710 Arthur supported the bill 
in principle, but complained that “there are certain features of the 
English system which have not generally been received with favor in 
this country,” which included limiting entry into the civil service to 
people who are no older than twenty-five and granting federal 
employees “[a] tenure of office which is substantially a life tenure.”711 
The final version of the Act incorporated several key changes to the 
initial legislation to address some of these concerns, making the 
examinations more practical in character and deleting the provision 
permitting entrance into the civil service only at the lowest grade. In 
addition, the bill left to the president the determination of which, if 
any, officers would be covered by the Act. The result, Arthur noted, is 
to limit the scope of the bill to “subordinates whose duties are purely 
administrative and have no legitimate connection with the any 
political principles.”712 And most importantly for the purposes of this 
article, the revised act deleted all restrictions on the president’s power 
to remove,713 thus preserving, as Arthur noted, a power essential for 
ensuring presidential control of all officials in policymaking and 
political positions.714 The bill thus cured, Arthur signed it without 
reservation, although he would subsequently file a limited objection 
to its appointment provisions.715 His subsequent approval of the 
legislation is thus fully consistent with the view that Arthur did not 
acquiesce in any congressionally imposed limitations on the 
president’s power to control the executive branch. 
Arthur never specifically commented on the Tenure of Office Act 
during his presidency, but he preserved presidential removal power 
through the civil service reform battles of the early 1880s. This was 
no mean feat. It was not until the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 that 
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removal “was required to be made only to promote the efficiency of 
the [civil] service.”716 Once appointments had to be awarded to the 
winner of competitive exams, there was no incentive to make partisan 
removals anymore. Removals thus decreased substantially of their 
own accord in the classified civil service.717 The unitary executive 
was thus alive and well when Jacksonian Democrat Grover Cleveland 
became the first Democrat to be elected president since James 
Buchanan in 1856. 
E. Grover Cleveland 
As President, Grover Cleveland was a significant improvement 
over Arthur. He was “a doughty warrior of undeviating courage”718 
with an admirable commitment to civil service reform. His 1884 
presidential campaign is famous for its dirtiness, with the 
Republicans, led by Blaine, under attack for corruption, and with 
Cleveland under attack for allegedly having a child out of wedlock.719 
Cleveland called for the president to serve only a single term, a 
reform intended to eliminate presidential temptations to despoil the 
civil service.720 
Cleveland pledged “public allegiance to a Whiggish version of the 
presidency—the chief executive restricted to administrative duties 
and abjuring a role in the legislative process”721—but in his heart he 
was “[n]ostalgic for the Jacksonian past.”722 Cleveland’s “political 
heroes” were Jefferson and Jackson,723 and like Jackson, he believed 
the president, with his unique national constituency, was “the 
people’s tribune.”724 He particularly admired Jackson’s “presidential 
independence and the authority of the righteous executive in contest 
with mischievous senators.”725 Cleveland’s Jacksonian pedigree 
suggests his belief in the untrammeled importance of the presidential 
removal power. His “aggressive insistence on presidential 
independence led him to exercise increasing control of the executive 
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branch and then to seek influence over Congress and national 
legislation.”726 In the end, Cleveland was to live up to his idol in 
protecting the presidential removal power from attempted 
congressional incursions. Cleveland was able to declare at the end of 
his first year in office that his most important contribution to the 
presidency would be to insist upon the independence of the executive 
and legislative branches.727 He was accused by his critics of 
“monarchical arrogance,”728 a charge often leveled at strong and 
effective presidents. 
Cleveland was sworn in on March 4, 1885, and he delivered his 
inaugural address “from memory,” the only time this has ever 
happened in American history.729 Cleveland was “fascinated by 
detail,” and he rapidly buried himself in his work putting in long days 
punctuated by only four to five hours of sleep a night. He generally 
had cabinet meetings twice a week, and he exhibited “a measure of 
administrative talent” with his cabinet.730 He made it “understood that 
[his cabinet members] were his loyal lieutenants and were to avoid 
intramural quarrels or dissent. Cabinet officers were expected to 
observe the policies established by Cleveland for each executive 
department.”731 Importantly, “in cabinet meetings everyone was 
encouraged to speak, but no votes were taken. Cleveland would listen 
carefully to the opinion of each cabinet officer in turn, but he alone 
would make the final decision on administration policy.”732 Another 
noted historian asserts that in Cleveland’s cabinet meetings, “there 
were no set speeches, and no votes were taken, the President’s theory 
being that in a cabinet there are many voices, but one vote. Each 
member was free to express his views; but when the illumination of 
frank comment and informal discussion was over, it was the president 
who must make the decision.”733 
The conflict between the President and Congress over control of 
the executive branch and the Tenure of Office Act had been brewing 
since the Grant administration, and it reached its climax during 
 
726. Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 522, at 25. 
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731. Id. at 50. 
732. Id. (emphasis added). 
733. WHITE, supra note 522, at 100 (quoting 1 ROBERT MCELROY, GROVER 
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Cleveland’s first term.734 In his first annual message, Cleveland laid 
out a formalist vision of the separation of powers: 
Contemplation of the grave and responsible functions assigned to 
the respective branches of the Government under the Constitution 
will disclose the partitions of power between our respective 
departments and their necessary independence, and also the need 
for the exercise of all the power intrusted [sic] to each in that spirit 
of comity and cooperation which is essential to the proper 
fulfillment of the patriotic obligations which rest upon us as 
faithful servants of the people.735 
Consistent with this vision, Cleveland quickly asserted the 
authority to direct all executive officials, in one instance overruling a 
decision of the Secretary of the Interior.736 The first Democrat elected 
to the White House in a quarter-century, Cleveland also suspended 
643 officials during his first ten months in office. The Republican-
controlled Senate attempted to force the new administration into 
admitting that it made these removals for partisan purposes by 
refusing to confirm the new appointees until Cleveland had informed 
it of the reasons for the removals. After three months, only 15 of the 
643 nominations had been approved.737 As Cleveland’s biographer, 
Richard Welch, notes, “Senate Republicans were in a contentious 
mood and were determined to demonstrate the hypocrisy of 
Cleveland’s stance as a civil service reformer. They would force him 
to admit that partisan animus alone dictated his appointments policy, 
and in the revised Tenure of Office Act they believed they had the 
necessary tool.”738 
Under the Tenure of Office Act as revised in 1869, “[n]o longer did 
a president have to charge officeholders with criminal misconduct 
before he could suspend them, and no longer would a president have 
to provide the Senate with ‘the evidence and reasons’ for his 
action.”739 The president could suspend officeholders and appoint 
 
734. The Duskin controversy described below is recounted in Louis Fisher, Grover 
Cleveland Against the Senate, 7 CONG. STUD. 11 (1979); see also BINKLEY, supra note 
70, at 198-99; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1113-14; HARRIS, supra note 368, at 88; 
VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 120-21; WHITE, supra note 522, at 30-31. 
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temporary replacements, but he would have to submit “the names of 
all replacements within thirty days after the Senate had 
reconvened.”740 The revised Act lessened the obstructionist authority 
of the Senate, “but presidential control over the dismissal of civil 
officers in the executive branch was still restricted. It was the 
intention of the Republican senators to expand that restriction.”741 
Senate Republicans “caucused and decided to refuse to confirm 
Cleveland’s appointments unless he produced all documents bearing 
on the suspension of the former officeholder, as well as the 
nomination of his successor.”742 Cleveland saw this as an invasion of 
presidential prerogatives and he instructed his subordinates “not to 
submit any papers concerning suspensions but to continue to provide 
‘official papers’ in support of nominations submitted for senatorial 
confirmation.”743 Cleveland was determined to prevent the Senate 
from engaging in a fishing expedition “to publicize confidential or 
irrelevant communications.”744 
The dispute between Cleveland and the Republican-controlled 
Senate came to a head over the case of Republican George M. 
Duskin, whom Cleveland had suspended as U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of Alabama. Cleveland nominated Democrat John 
D. Burnett to replace Duskin. George F. Edmunds, the crusty 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, believed Duskin’s 
suspension was the ideal test case.745 On January 25, 1886, the Senate 
passed a resolution directing the attorney general to submit all 
documents relating to this suspension. 
The battle was joined, and it was understood by both sides that it 
was a battle over more than the installation of Duskin’s successor. 
At stake was the President’s ability to assure the cooperation of 
officials who would have responsibility for executing 
administration policy, the proper breadth of the investigatory 
powers of the Senate, and the issue of presidential control over 
papers deposited in executive departments.746 
The attorney general refused the Senate’s demand for all 
documents relating to the Duskin suspension, stating that the 
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President had directed him not to comply with the resolution. When 
the Senate persisted with its call for the information, Cleveland 
responded on March 1, 1886, with a scathing message challenging the 
constitutionality of both the original and the revised versions of the 
Tenure of Office Act and denying the Senate’s right to request such 
information. This message was targeted to the American public as 
well as the Republican Senate and placed its primary reliance on the 
text of the Constitution, declaring that “the power to remove or 
suspend such officials is vested in the president alone by the 
Constitution, which in express terms provides that ‘the executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,’ 
and that ‘he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”747 
The Senate, in contrast, “belongs to the legislative branch of the 
Government.” Although Cleveland conceded, “the Constitution by 
express provision [had] superadded to its legislative duties the right to 
advise and consent to appointments to office and to sit as a court of 
impeachment,” these provisions represented an “express and special 
grant of such extraordinary powers” which were “a departure from the 
general plan of our Government, [and thus] should be held, under a 
familiar maxim of construction, to exclude every other right of 
interference with Executive functions.” Any doubts as to the propriety 
of this view, Cleveland submitted, had been resolved by “the first 
Congress which assembled after the adoption of the Constitution,” 
 
747. Grover Cleveland, Message to the Senate (Mar. 1, 1886), in 6 MESSAGES & 
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    . . .  
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which had similarly sustained “the independence of the Executive in 
the matter of removals from office.”748 
The Senate retaliated by considering a series of four resolutions 
condemning the actions of the attorney general and declaring the 
Senate’s refusal to act on any of Cleveland’s nominations until the 
requested information was provided. After a prolonged debate, the 
Senate proceeded to pass all four of the resolutions, although the key 
resolution refusing to consider any further nominations until the 
requested information was provided passed by only a single vote.749 
However, after this vote was taken, it was discovered that the entire 
debate concerning Duskin’s suspension was for naught, as his 
appointment had already expired according to its own terms. 
Cleveland’s message of March 1 had “inspired considerable support 
from the public and the press”750 even though a few Mugwumps like 
Carl Schurz sided with the Republican Senate.751 Having exhausted 
their political resources and facing a wave of adverse public opinion, 
Senate Republicans finally conceded defeat and promptly confirmed 
Cleveland’s nominee to succeed Duskin. Shortly thereafter, an 
exhausted Congress finally repealed the Tenure of Office Act in its 
entirety,752 after Senator George Frisbie Hoar, “a devout Republican 
whose allegiance to the Constitution exceeded his love for the Grand 
Old Party, proposed repeal. Cleveland had the pleasure of signing the 
repeal bill on March 3, 1887. With its passage, Congress formally 
abrogated its claim ‘to control presidential discretion in suspending or 
removing officials in the executive branch.’”753 
Years later, Cleveland wrote, “thus was an unpleasant controversy 
happily followed by an expurgation of the last pretense of statutory 
sanction to an encroachment upon constitutional Executive 
prerogatives, and thus was a time-honored interpretation of the 
Constitution restored to us.”754 Cleveland eventually settled into a 
general policy of immediately replacing “corrupt and inefficient 
spoilsmen,” but to allow current Republican officeholders “who had 
not made themselves obnoxious” to finish their four year terms.755 
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“The implication was clear that ‘offensive partisans’ would be 
removed before their four years were up and that other Republicans, 
upon the conclusion of their term of office, most likely would be 
replaced by meritorious members of the Democratic party.”756 
Cleveland wanted to improve the efficiency of the civil service and 
right the partisan imbalance in the service after twenty-four years of 
unbroken Republican rule. To Cleveland’s irritation, the Mugwumps 
criticized him for being too partisan in his personnel policies. By the 
spring of 1886, Cleveland became worried about Democratic 
criticism, and he accelerated the removal of Republicans.757 By the 
end of Cleveland’s first term in March 1889, “some 75 percent of the 
one hundred thousand nonclassified workers had been replaced, with 
fourth-class postmasters furnishing a large share of the total.”758 
Although Cleveland was not afraid to clean house with respect to 
partisan jobs through vigorous exercise of his removal power, he did 
make major efforts to extend the merit system of classified appointees 
created by the Pendleton Act. When it was enacted under President 
Arthur, the Act initially protected eleven percent of the government’s 
131,000 employees,759 but the Act allowed the president to extend the 
merit system to additional employees by adding them to the classified 
civil service. After Cleveland was defeated for re-election in 1888, he 
extended the merit system significantly in order to limit the patronage 
authority of his Republican successor and to protect Democratic 
officeholders. “When Cleveland left the White House in March 1889, 
the classified list had expanded from sixteen thousand to twenty-
seven thousand officeholders.”760 “The extension of the merit system 
had a slow but incremental effect in making the federal civil service 
less political and more professional.”761 
It would be a mistake to conclude that in supporting the expansion 
of civil service protections, Cleveland sanctioned any interference 
with the president’s power to execute the law. As president, 
Cleveland opposed the creation of a Civil Service Commission rule 
that required “a statement of cause of removal to be filed,” and he 
never supported a requirement that removals of classified officials be 
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made only with just cause.762 Such a requirement would not appear 
until the McKinley administration added such a rule in 1897 and the 
Lloyd-La Follette Act wrote these and other requirements into the 
federal statute books in 1912.763 
Cleveland also vigorously exercised the presidential veto power, 
sending 304 veto messages to Congress in his first term—more than 
all his predecessors combined.764 Many of these vetoed bills were 
minor private pension bills that, after painstakingly reviewing each of 
them, Cleveland found lacking in merit. There was certainly no 
hesitation about vetoing bills for policy reasons in the Cleveland 
administration. The manner in which he wielded the veto put him at 
odds with one powerful interest group, the veteran members of the 
Grand Army of the Republic. 
The Cleveland administration also bore witness without comment 
to a development often mistakenly regarded as establishing 
presidential acquiescence to a non-unitary executive: the birth of the 
independent regulatory commissions. It is indisputable that under the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, members of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) were removable by the president for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. However, a close 
historical analysis indicates that Congress did not intend this clause to 
represent a departure from the unitariness of the executive branch. It 
is far from clear that these removal provisions in any way precluded 
the president from removing a member of the ICC simply for 
disagreements over policy.765 In fact, independence from the president 
was never discussed during the debates leading up to the enactment, 
and the discussions that did take place suggest that Congress was 
primarily concerned with bipartisanship, not independence from 
executive control.766 As an early scholar of independent regulatory 
commissions has noted, Congress viewed the removal provisions 
“more as a protection to the public by providing a way to get rid of 
objectionable commissioners than as a limitation on Presidential 
authority.”767 
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Other portions of the legislative history support the same 
conclusion. Throughout the decade-long debate leading up to the 
Interstate Commerce Act’s passage, members of Congress 
consistently referred to the ICC as part of the executive branch.768 
Consistent with this view, the ICC was initially placed within the 
Department of Interior and thus was not independent at all.769 It was 
not until 1889 that the ICC was removed from the Department of the 
Interior,770 and even that shift was made for purely practical 
reasons.771 When one fully appreciates that Congress never indicated 
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an intent for the ICC to be a structural innovation to limit presidential 
control over the execution of the laws,772 it becomes less surprising 
that its creation failed to evoke a presidential response. 
While Cleveland did sign the Interstate Commerce Act into law, it 
did not have Cleveland’s unmixed blessing; Cleveland “had doubts 
about the constitutional soundness of ‘government by 
commission.’”773 He “did not publicize those doubts, however, and 
appointed to the new Interstate Commerce Commission respected 
individuals such as Thomas M. Cooley, former dean of the University 
of Michigan Law School, [who were] untainted by ties to the 
management and financing of the nation’s railroads.”774 
The doubts about whether the Act placed any limits on the 
president’s power to remove and the strength of Cleveland’s other 
actions and pronouncements regarding the unitary executive, such as 
advocating the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, counsel against 
reading too much into Cleveland’s failure to object to the removal 
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Properly understood, it 
does not constitute so substantial and sustained a deviation from the 
position adopted by his predecessors as to constitute executive 
acquiescence, and the positions adopted by Cleveland fit comfortably 
into the pattern of presidential insistence on the unitariness of the 
executive established since the ratification of the Constitution. 
One final development of note occurred during the Cleveland 
years: the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Perkins.775 Perkins was a case involving a naval cadet engineer who 
had been discharged from his position by the Secretary of the Navy 
even though he appeared to be entitled by statute to the job. The issue 
was whether when Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior 
officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the 
power of removal of those heads of departments as it deems best for 
the public interest. It is of critical importance that in Perkins it was 
the Secretary of the Navy and not the President who was trying to 
exercise the removal power. After noting that the case did not involve 
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a presidential removal of a Senate confirmed principal officer, the 
Court said “We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the 
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may 
limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public 
interest.”776 
This conclusion makes eminent good sense as applied to the 
removal power of heads of departments. Since the Secretary of the 
Navy is a creature of statute to begin with, and since he gets his 
authority to appoint inferior officers from Congress, it makes sense 
that Congress could restrict the Secretary of the Navy’s statutory 
removal power. Importantly, the Perkins case did not involve an 
effort by the President to remove such an inferior officer or to 
delegate his executive power of removal to the Secretary of the Navy. 
The Perkins Court thus elided over that far more interesting and 
provocative question in a cursory three-page opinion that was largely 
devoid of analysis. Moreover, even if Perkins were read to limit the 
President’s power to remove at will inferior officers appointed by 
Heads of Departments, nothing in Perkins precludes principal officers 
from supervising and directing all exercises of executive power by 
inferior officers. Failure to follow such supervision or direction 
would, in our judgment, constitute “just cause” grounds for removal. 
From the perspective of the unitary executive, Cleveland’s record is 
unequivocal. His first term in office was nothing less than a great 
triumph. Cleveland’s biographer Richard Welch sums up his 
achievements as follows: 
[T]he presidency was reestablished as a branch of the government 
coordinate in authority with the Congress, and this was in large 
part attributable to the labors and personality of Grover Cleveland. 
The administrative reforms that he encouraged in the various 
departments, his extensive use of the veto power, his fight for 
executive independence during his battle with the Senate over the 
Tenure of Office Act, and his leadership efforts in such areas as 
Indian policy, western land policy, and tariff reform gave the 
executive branch a vigor and a morale that it had not known for 
twenty years.777 
All of this was in part due to his “naturally assertive disposition” 
and in part due to his desire to improve “the level of integrity in 
American politics.”778 The end of the first Cleveland administration 
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thus marked the close of a century of presidential administration in 
which the president remained firmly in control of the executive 
branch of the government. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Presidents throughout the period from 1837 to 1889 persisted in 
opposing almost all congressional attempts to infringe upon their sole 
power to execute the laws. With the exception of one loose statement 
by John Tyler that was never acted upon and a few wartime laws 
limiting the removal power that President Lincoln did not have the 
energy to block, every president during this fifty-two-year period 
vigorously defended the unitary executive. Admittedly, Presidents 
Grant and Cleveland failed to enter their objections when Congress 
enacted statutes purporting to limit the president’s power of removal. 
In Grant’s case, a statute passed limiting his ability to remove minor 
postal officials, and, in Cleveland’s case, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was created. However, in light of Grant’s vigorous 
opposition to the Tenure of Office Act and Cleveland’s resolute 
defense of his removal of U.S. Attorney Duskin, it is difficult to 
construe these limited departures from the presidents’ uniform 
espousal of the unitariness of the executive branch as sufficient to 
constitute acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate construction. 
On the contrary, by the end of the century, the presidency had 
managed to reclaim most of the prestige and authority lost during 
Andrew Johnson’s administration. 
Throughout this period, presidential opposition to invasions of the 
unitariness of the executive branch was so consistent and sustained 
that one of the harshest critics of the unitary executive was forced to 
admit that “[b]y the combined action of the three branches of 
government the principle of superior control became firmly rooted in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.”779 As Leonard White notes, 
“the executive power was the constitutional possession of the 
President, and it carried with it the practical authority to see that the 
laws were enforced. The President, in short, was the constitutional 
head of the administrative system.”780 
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